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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the transposition of the European Community legislation in 
Poland prior to accession. The principal research question is: What were the factors 
that facilitated and inhibited transposition over time? The key argument is that the 
Polish government’s transposition record was decisively influenced by the 
configuration of rules that the domestic core executive could use to extend selective 
incentives and monitoring to ministers and ministerial departments. The thesis starts 
by showing that the adoption of transposing legislation during pre-accession was 
likely to have been complicated by significant collective action problems that 
discouraged ministers and their staff from contributing to the transposition record. It 
develops an explanatory hypothesis that focuses on selective incentives and 
monitoring extended by the core executive vis-a-vis line ministries. The central part 
of the thesis presents original empirical data on cross-temporal changes in both core 
executive rules and the transposition record. In two concluding chapters the thesis 
brings together the data on core executive institutions and transposition to show that 
the institutionalization of stricter core executive constraints vis-a-vis line ministries 
led to a marked improvement of Poland’s transposition record. It further finds that 
the effect of the core executive variable was influenced by EU incentives and party 
political constellations. These findings hold interesting implications for the study of 
Europeanization of public policy in the new and old EU member states and, more 
broadly, for further research on national executives and transposition.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
I. Research Question
There is a fast-growing literature that seeks to explain varying patterns of 
transposition and implementation of the European Community legislation at the 
national level (for recent overviews see Caporaso, Cowles et al. 2001; Borzel, 
Hofmann et al. 2004; Falkner, Hartlapp et al. 2004; Sverdrup 2004; Falkner, Treib et 
al. 2005 forthcoming). Above all, that literature is concerned with an empirical 
puzzle -  evidence of major variation in transposition and implementation records 
across countries, policies and time within the European Union and beyond. For 
instance, according to the European Commission’s Internal Market Scoreboard, in 
May 2004 the founding members of the European Union and Greece had the worst 
transposition record, while the Nordic states and the United Kingdom were the best 
in meeting implementation targets (European Commission 2004a). Similar variations 
are found in transposition records over time. For example, between 2001 and 2004, 
the United Kingdom and Ireland transformed from laggards to leaders, while the 
record of Italy and the Netherlands deteriorated significantly (European Commission 
2001; European Commission 2004a). The member states also exhibit cross-sectoral 
differences in the extent to which they comply with the Community law (see Borzel, 
Hofmann et al. 2004; Falkner, Treib et al. 2005 forthcoming).
The EU compliance puzzle has recently become applicable to the new member states 
in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) who joined the Union in May 2004 (Nicolaides 
1999; Jacobsen 2001; Nicolaides 2002). Even a cursory look at the European 
Commission’s reports that mapped the progress of legal alignment in the accession 
states between 1998 and 2003 proves that the CEE countries also showed significant 
variation in their transposition and implementation records. A similar picture 
emerges from the July 2004 Internal Market Scoreboard. Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic were found to be the worst transposition laggards, while Hungary and 
Lithuania came top of the league (European Commission 2004a).
The empirical puzzle raises interesting theoretical questions about what facilitates 
and impedes transposition and implementation of the Community legislation at the 
national level. In its theoretical outlook, the research on EU compliance is located at 
the crossroads of international relations (IR) and comparative politics (CP) theories,
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and its discourse inevitably oscillates between agency and structure as explanations. 
The IR-inspired approaches seek to link implementation records to agency factors 
such as state choice, elite preferences and public opinion (Mbaye 2001; Borzel, 
Hofmann et al. 2004). More structure-based models underscore the monitoring 
function of the European Court of Justice and the European Commission (Snyder 
1993; Mendrinou 1996; Tallberg 2003). In relation to the CEE states, similar 
arguments are advanced with reference to conditionalities imposed by the European 
Union (Grabbe 2002; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004).
Approaches rooted in the CP theory note that the extent of EU compliance depends 
on whether the Community legislation runs with or against the preferences of key 
social, economic and political actors at the national level (see Borzel 2000; Treib 
2003). Most CP-based models, however, accord primary explanatory power to 
domestic structural variables. A policy legacy approach argues that compliance is 
contingent on the degree of fit or congruence between EU policy and national 
arrangements (Knill 1998b; Caporaso, Cowles et al. 2001). Other schemas link 
variation in compliance records to the characteristics of the institutional setting 
within which the Community legislation is transposed -  the existence of multiple 
veto points (Haverland 2000; Giuliani 2003), the availability of institutional 
resources (Siedentopf and Ziller 1988; Ibanez 1999; Nicolaides 2002; Borzel, 
Hofmann et al. 2004) or 'reform capacity' of political institutions (Heritier and Knill 
2001; Knill 2001; Bursens 2002). Finally, attempts have been made to develop multi- 
causal models that systematically account for the effect of many external and 
domestic variables (see Falkner, Treib et al. 2005 forthcoming).
Besides empirical puzzlement and theoretical ambitions, varying patterns of national 
compliance with the Community law raise more practical, normative considerations. 
For one thing, the proper operation of the single market depends crucially on correct 
and timely implementation of the Community legislation. Implementation gaps 
deprive individuals and businesses of their rights and disrupt the free movement of 
goods and services within the Union (European Commission 2004b). Moreover, the 
EU’s external competitiveness is contingent on consistent application of its rules 
across all member states since enhanced competition determines the European 
economy’s ability to generate growth and innovation. Finally, the implementation of
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the EU rules determines the legitimacy of the European Union as a governance 
system.
The normative significance of implementation have led the EU institutions to place 
rule compliance at the top of their agenda. This was evident during the Eastern 
enlargement when the EU made full transposition and application of the Community 
legislation a sine qua non condition of accession (see Mayhew 2000). The 
determination to tackle implementation deficits is also apparent in the actions of the 
European Commission which opens an ever increasing number of infringement 
proceedings (Borzel, Hofmann et al. 2004; Sverdrup 2004) and disseminates 
transposition best practices among member state governments (cf. European 
Commission 2004b). In a similar vein, the European Parliament has repeatedly urged 
national governments to improve their implementation records (European Parliament 
2003; European Parliament 2004).
Against the background of such empirical, theoretical and normative concerns, this 
thesis studies the transposition of the European Community legislation in Poland 
before accession. The principal research question is: what are the factors that 
facilitated and inhibited transposition over timel The thesis has two ambitions. First, 
it seeks to explain cross-temporal changes in Poland’s transposition record during 
three consecutive governments under the premiership of Jerzy Buzek and Leszek 
Miller. The period under investigation (October 1997-December 2002) covers the 
terms of the 3rd parliament and the first 15 months of the 4th parliament. Second, and 
more importantly, the thesis generalizes these historical experiences to contribute to 
theory building within Europeanization research and seeks to construct a model of 
EU compliance applicable to both new and old member states.
This introductory chapter first presents the conditionality theory that has dominated 
existing research on domestic adaptation in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and 
identifies its problems and shortcomings. Second, it proposes an approach in which 
the importance of domestic executive configurations is explicitly modelled. Third, it 
discusses the research design and methods of data collection adopted in the present 
study. Fourth, the chapter demonstrates how this research contributes to the wider 
debates on Europeanization and core executives. Fifth, it concludes by previewing 
the forthcoming chapters.
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II. The External Incentives Model and its Critique
In its theoretical outlook, research on the transposition and implementation of the 
Community legislation in the CEE states has so far been dominated by the external 
incentives model (Grabbe 2002; Schimmelfennig, Engert et al. 2003; Hughes, Sasse 
et al. 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005 forthcoming). Inspired by IR 
theory, this approach identifies conditionality as the key mechanism that shaped 
adaptation of domestic legislation in CEE prior to enlargement. The conditionality 
involved the offering of material and non-material rewards and sanctions in return 
for achieving regulatory alignment. The material rewards included aid and technical 
assistance, while non-material ones took the form of EU membership, access to 
negotiations, and other mechanisms affecting the international and domestic image of 
the national governments (Grabbe 2002; Schimmelfennig, Engert et al. 2003).
The theoretical case for the impact of EU conditionality is built on two principal 
assumptions. The first assumption is that legal adaptation during pre-accession was a 
bargaining game in which the European Union enjoyed a supreme advantage over 
the CEE states. The EU’s high bargaining power stemmed from asymmetries in the 
distribution of information and benefits, and was further reinforced by institutional 
levers such as monitoring reports and country streaming that the Union acquired 
during the negotiation process. Thanks to its powerful position, the EU was able to 
manipulate the outcome of domestic legal alignment according to its preferences (cf. 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005 forthcoming). The other assumption is that the 
weak institutionalization of the policy environment in CEE enhanced the 
effectiveness of conditionality by making domestic accommodation relatively less 
complicated than in the highly institutionalized systems of the old EU member states. 
Moreover, the exigencies of modernization and democratization that ran in parallel to 
Europeanization are claimed to have made the post-communist elites highly 
receptive to EU policy templates. Hence, EU conditionality is expected to have fallen 
on favourable ground as national legislators looked to the Community law for 
regulatory inspiration (cf. Grabbe 2003; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005 
forthcoming).
Although commonly applied to explain rule adoption in CEE, the external incentives 
model suffers from two important problems. The first problem is related to the 
choice of intervening variables. The model tends to contextualize the impact of
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conditionality mainly with reference to the bargaining power assumption. The EU’s 
power is thus taken to vary with the precision and formality of the rules that a 
candidate state must adopt. Adaptation is also expected to be the more likely, the 
higher the net benefits and the shorter the time distance between adaptation and 
reward (Grabbe 2002, p. 263; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005 forthcoming). 
Other variables considered include the EU’s ability to monitor compliance, the 
political salience of adaptation and the availability of exit options (cf. 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005 forthcoming). But relatively limited attention 
is paid to contextualizing the domestic receptivity assumption. In most applications 
of the external incentives model, there is a tendency to assume away the importance 
of domestic actor constellations or institutional veto points for explaining the patterns 
of legal compliance in CEE. If relevant control hypotheses are introduced, this is 
rarely done with systematic reference to insights from comparative politics theory. 
Neither is the external incentives model informed by a systematic understanding of 
the process of rule adoption at the national level. In defining its dependent variable, it 
pays limited attention to factors such as legislative technique employed in EU rule 
adoption, the need for interministerial coordination or implementation across levels 
of government. Yet, as the available data demonstrates, both old and new EU 
member states clearly differ in the way in which they organize the process of rule 
adoption internally, not least because of disparate legal systems and administrative 
traditions (Page 1998; Heinrich 1999; Bovens and Yesilkagit 2004). This relative 
neglect of domestic variables stands in stark contrast to findings from research on 
rule compliance in the old EU member states. By failing to control for such 
hypotheses, the external incentives model runs the risk of overestimating the impact 
of EU conditionalities on rule adoption in CEE. In doing so, it may also overlook 
crucial domestic developments that will provide the foundations for domestic 
patterns of EU compliance after accession.
The second problem with the external incentives model is that by concentrating on 
the top-down hierarchical mechanism of Europeanization in CEE, it prejudges the 
importance of EU conditionality as the primary causal variable driving policy change 
at the domestic level. It is thus biased against considering the potential impact of 
non-EU-related external and domestic variables. In particular, the model tends to 
treat legal adaptation to EU legislation prior to enlargement as a process that is
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largely separate from the modernization and democratization of the CEE states (but 
see Mattli and Plumper 2004 for a recent attempt to close this gap). Further, it 
neglects the empirical evidence of extensive socio-economic entanglements within 
which domestic legislators operate in Central and Eastern Europe (Gomiak and 
Jerschina 1995; Stark and Bruszt 1998; Staniszkis 1999). Finally, the model does not 
allow for a strategic use of EU constraints by domestic legislators, and the impact of 
such actions on the patterns of legal change. The reluctance to test the causal impact 
of EU constraints against rival domestic explanations sets the external incentives 
model apart from research on rule compliance in the old member states which 
devotes increasing attention to ‘inside-out’ or ‘bottom-up’ perspectives on 
Europeanization (see for example Hix and Goetz 2000; Borzel 2001; Goetz 2003; 
Radaelli 2003). By failing to integrate such hypotheses in a rigorous manner, the 
external incentives model runs the risk of oversimplifying the modalities of domestic 
change and, thus, may fail to capture the actual dynamics of Europeanization of 
public policy in CEE.
III. An Alternative Domestic Institutions Approach
Given the major explanatory shortcomings of the external incentives model, this 
thesis develops an alternative theoretical approach to the study of rule adoption, one 
that draws on public choice theory and accords primary explanatory power to 
domestic factors that facilitate and inhibit policy change (cf. Downs 1957; Buchanan 
and Tullock 1962; Mueller 2003). The central argument is that where a policy reform 
brings benefits that are non-exclusive and diffuse over many electoral constituencies 
and where the reform requires many departments to be involved, ministers and their 
staff will have limited incentives to contribute to policy change (cf. Olson 1965; 
Frohlich, Oppenheimer et al. 1971; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Doring 1995; Doring 
and Hallerberg 2004). This is because, if it is impossible, or at least difficult, for 
ministers to take individual credit for providing benefits vis-a-vis their departments 
and stakeholders, ministers may have limited incentives to implement collective 
commitments because contributions to such projects carry a high opportunity cost. 
The other problem is related to coordination costs and arises when a collective policy 
covers a horizontal issue which requires joint action by several ministers. In such 
cases, ministerial incentives to be responsive are dampened by the need to incur
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additional costs of coordinating positions, resolving disputes and monitoring 
agreements.
This theoretical insight is applied here to the study of transposition in Poland. It is 
argued that the adoption of transposing measures under pre-accession was likely to 
be perceived as a reform project that brought long-term diffuse benefits and that 
entailed high coordination costs. Accordingly, it may be expected that Polish 
ministers and departments would have limited incentives to implement transposition 
commitments. This assertion is based on three observations. First, the adoption of 
transposing measures was regarded as offering mostly diffuse benefits because, 
lacking the experience of policy formulation, ministers and their staff were uncertain 
about the precise consequences of transposition and, hence, perceived it mainly 
through the lens of modernization and EU accession. Second, even when they were 
able to identify concentrated individual benefits, they expected such benefits to 
materialize only after enlargement. This was because the largest financial and 
political benefits were to become visible after accession, while most adaptation costs 
had to be incurred before Poland joined the EU. Third, the implementation of 
transposition commitments required joint legislative action from most, if not all, 
Polish ministries. Many of the Community measures dealt with horizontal, cross­
cutting policy problems which required the collaboration of many different agencies 
for full transposition.
In developing its hypotheses, the thesis focuses on the role of the domestic core 
executive (see Dunleavy and Rhodes 1990; Rhodes and Dunleavy 1995). The central 
argument is that the core executive represents a unique institutional response to 
collective dilemmas in the production of the legal rules that bring diffuse benefits to 
many voters and require interministerial cooperation. Hence, in the present context, 
the probability that ministers and departments improve the government’s 
transposition record is hypothesized to be positively related to the institutionalization 
of selective incentives and monitoring that are extended to line ministers by the 
domestic core executive. More specifically, that probability is highest in two 
situations. First, this is the case where the prime minister or some other non-sectoral 
minister acts as a central authority in the area of EU rule adoption within the 
executive. Under this hierarchical solution, the prime minister or a non-sectoral 
minister has -  by virtue of his institutional position -  personal incentives to sanction
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and/or reward ministers, act as a competitive agenda-setter and monitor individual 
actions. Second, the probability of EU rule adoption within the executive is highest 
where institutional rules exist that require ministers to manage the transposition 
record as a group. Under this collectivity-based arrangement collective action 
problems are solved by core executive institutions that mobilize ministers to 
constrain each other’s agenda-setting powers and to monitor compliance with 
collective decisions.
Although the primary focus is on the role of domestic executive institutions in 
shaping national transposition records, the impact of institutional rules originating 
outside the executive must not be overlooked. Three contextualizing variables are 
employed: (i) institutional opportunities generated by the European Union, (ii) 
institutional rules within party organizations and governing coalitions, and (iii) 
institutional incentives provided by domestic non-executive actors. All the three 
types of rules may be employed -  in the language of the collective action theory -  to 
extend selective incentives and monitoring to Polish ministers and departments. As 
such, they can directly contribute to solving the collective action problems that 
impinge on EU transposition. The European Commission may act as the central 
authority inducing and monitoring domestic ministers and departments. EU-induced 
selective incentives and monitoring may also originate within the collectivity-based 
arrangements such as the association council/committee, expert meetings or 
negotiation sessions. Polish ministers and departments may also be subject to party- 
based incentives that originate within their own party or the governing coalition. The 
incentives may also be extended by parliament or within the context of linkage 
institutions that channel social and business interests.
IV. Research Design
This thesis follows a longitudinal research design for testing its hypotheses against 
empirical evidence. It thus seeks to establish whether a dynamic causal relationship 
exists between the independent variable (core executive institutions) and the 
dependent variable (transposition record). In its methodological approach, the study 
combines the congruence method with process-tracing (George and Bennett 2004). It 
first employs a deductive theory to predict the value of the dependent variable for a 
given value of the independent variable. These theoretical expectations are then 
checked against empirical data on transposition paths. In a second step, if the data
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confirms the prediction, the study will employ process tracing to identify causal 
mechanisms (or causal chains) that link the independent variable with the observed 
effect. The causal relationship between core executive institutions and transposition 
outcomes will be subject to three further types of contextualization. First, the depth 
of that relationship will be examined by identifying the influence of institutional 
rules originating outside the executive. Second, the thesis will address the question of 
whether the core executive institutions are a necessary condition for changes to occur 
in transposition record.
The dependent variable is Poland’s transposition record. The transposition record is 
defined as the extent to which the Polish executive adopted national transposing 
legislation correctly and timely. It is operationalized using quantitative indicators of 
domestic legislative activity. The indicators capture policy change in two 
dimensions. The first dimension is the level of substantive adaptation, i.e. the extent 
to which Poland adopted the required transposing legislation. The other dimension is 
the timeliness of transposition, i.e. the extent to which the Polish government passed 
transposing legislation according to a pre-agreed schedule.
Two further remarks are in order regarding the measurement of the transposition 
record. First, the data covers only transposition through parliamentary legislation. 
Transposition in Poland had to start with parliamentary legislation as no secondary 
law could be adopted without express and specific delegation of implementing 
powers in a act of parliament. In effect, transposition through secondary legislation 
occurred only towards the end of the period under examination. The study thus 
covers a sample of around 30 percent of the domestic legislative activity related to 
EU transposition (EuroPap 2001). The other remark is that the transposition record is 
measured only with reference to the actions of the executive, while the legislative 
process in parliament falls beyond the scope of the research. The decision to focus 
exclusively on intra-executive stage of transposition follows from the theoretical 
framework and the choice of the explanatory variable.
The data on legislative activity comes from four principal sources. First, the author 
analyzed draft parliamentary laws adopted by the cabinet in 1997-2002 to select EU- 
related transposing legislation. This was done based on the electronic texts of the 
explanatory notes attached to draft legislation available at the lower chamber’s 
internet website. The review was necessary because, during the period at issue, the
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Polish government did not have a reliable flagging system with regard to EU 
transposition. The second source is the TAIEX Progress database developed and 
maintained by the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Office (TAIEX) 
in Brussels. Thanks to permission from the Office of the Committee for European 
Integration (UKIE) in Warsaw, the author gained access to print-outs from the 
database that listed all Polish legislation within substantive areas covered by the 
Community law and assessed the EU compatibility of each of the domestic measures. 
The information has been obtained from nine different updates of the database.
Third, the data on EU-related legislative activity is derived from National 
Programmes for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) and the NPAA implementation 
reports. These annual programmes contain information about domestic legislation 
that had to be adopted before accession and the expected timing of transposition. 
Besides the yearly NPAAs, the thesis also uses the data from short-range 
transposition plans adopted by the cabinet and the Committee for European 
Integration (KIE). The access to these latter documents was granted with permission 
from the UKIE. The fourth and final source of information is the written records 
maintained by the Cabinet Agenda Department at the Prime Minister’s Chancellery 
(KPRM). Thanks the KPRM’s permission, the author gained access to information 
about all draft legislation submitted to the cabinet, their submission and adoption 
dates, sponsoring ministry, evidence of comments and remarks by ministries, and 
brief progress updates. The data obtained from these four sources has been used to 
compile datasets which are presented in Annexes 1 and 2.
The independent variable is the core executive. More specifically, the focus is on 
institutional rules that the core executive used to extend selective incentives and 
monitoring to line ministers and their staff. In searching for changes in institutional 
configurations, the thesis adopts a regulative definition of institutions which are 
taken to denote the formal and informal rules of the game that shape human 
behaviour (North 1990; Scott 2001). Two methods of data collection have been 
employed to map cross-temporal patterns of institutional change. First, the author 
resorted to documentary analysis which covered both primary and secondary sources. 
As for the former the author was granted permission to search and photocopy internal 
documents and correspondence maintained in the public archives of the Prime 
Minister’s Office and the Office of the Committee for European Integration. The
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research was based on a final selection of 82 internal UKDE and PMO documents and 
195 pieces of official correspondence (internal memos, letters, faxes). As for 
secondary sources, the author reviewed the academic literature on the subject 
available both in English and Polish, documents stored in the PMO and UKIE’s 
library and internet websites, as well as press articles published in 1997-2002 in two 
Polish dailies (Gazeta Wyborcza, Rzeczpospolita), a weekly magazine
(Unia&Polska) and the EuroPap news service (euro.pap.com.pt).
The second method of data collection was semi-structured interviews. Between June 
2001 and March 2004 the author undertook five trips to Warsaw and one visit to 
Brussels during which 60 personal interviews were made with 55 interviewees. The 
interviews were taped and transcripted, unless the interviewee did not agree to 
having the conversation recorded. In that latter case, detailed notes were taken during 
the interview. The interviewees included directors and deputy directors (44 %), 
ministers (26 %), middle-ranking officials (22 %) and advisors (9 %). Most 
interviewees were affiliated with the UKIE Office (47 %) and the Prime Minister’s 
Chancellery (KPRM) (25 %), others came from line ministries (11 %), European 
Commission (7 %), parliament (5 %), and the foreign ministry (4 %) (see Annex 3). 
The interviews were conducted on a rion-attributable basis and the author was asked 
to keep the names of the interviewees confidential. The interviews followed a similar 
structured pattern. After a brief introduction of the research project the interviewees 
were prompted to respond to a pre-planned list of open questions. The questions 
recurred from interview to interview, though new questions were added over time 
and subject to context. The interviews lasted from one to one and a half hours each.
V. Wider Theoretical Significance
This research contributes to a wider theoretical debate on Europeanization (see for 
example Featherstone and Kazamias 2000; Goetz and Hix 2000; Heritier, Kerwer et 
al. 2001; Knill 2001; Caporaso, Cowles et al. 2001; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; 
Laffan 2003; Bulmer and Lequesne 2005; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005 
forthcoming; Laffan 2005 forthcoming). Its contribution is twofold. It represents one 
of the first attempts to undertake a systematic investigation into how institutional 
configurations inside the national executive affect the extent to which a country 
complies with the Community law. EU transposition -  both in pre-accession states 
and member states -  has generally been considered to be driven mainly by the
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executive branch of government (see Page 1998; Lippert, Umbach et al. 2001;, 
Fabbrini and Dona 2002). It thus seems natural to expect that the internal life of the 
executive will have a significant impact on legislative outcomes. Yet, the EU 
compliance literature has so far paid limited attention to institutional configurations 
at the centre of government. This neglect stands in stark contrast to a sustained 
interest in the way central governments have adapted to European Union 
membership that informs parallel streams of Europeanization research both in its 
Western and Eastern variants (see Laffan 1981; Guyomarch 1993; Metcalfe 1994; 
Wright 1996; Kassim, Peters et al. 2000; Bulmer and Burch 2001; Lippert, Umbach 
et al. 2001; Laffan 2003; Nowak-Far 2004). Although implicitly assuming an 
important role of the ‘European’ core executives, this literature has stopped short of 
examining causal linkages between institutional configurations and policy outcomes. 
The thesis connects that latter research with the study of EU compliance.
This study’s other contribution is to a wider understanding of the causal mechanisms 
by which European integration impacts on executive government. Underlying much 
of that research is a search for the ‘European effect’ inside executive organizations 
combined with an empirical ambition to ascertain whether EU membership leads to 
convergence or divergence of institutional configurations (Meny, Muller et al. 1996; 
Wessels and Rometsch 1996; Hanf and Soetendorp 1998; Rupp 1999; Kassim, Peters 
et al. 2000; Wessels, Maurer et al. 2003). More recently, attention has moved to 
identifying internal and external factors that mediate executive adaptation at the 
national level (Laffan 2003; Dimitrov, Goetz et al. 2005 forthcoming). This research 
contributes to that latter literature by examining variables that conditioned the 
development of the ‘European’ core in Poland. In particular, it examines how 
international and domestic opportunity structures have influenced the cost-benefit 
calculations of national actors in the process of institution-building. The study thus 
contributes to an emerging ‘bottom-up’ approach to Europeanization which focuses 
on the way in which domestic actors use European demands strategically to pursue 
their own individual interests (Goetz 2003; Radaelli 2003).
The thesis further contributes to research on national core executives in Eastern and 
Western Europe (see for example Rhodes and Dunleavy 1995; Weller, Bakvis et al. 
1997; Peters, Rhodes et al. 2000; Rhodes 2000; Goetz and Wollmann 2001; Hayward 
and Wright 2002; Dimitrov, Goetz et al. 2005 forthcoming). This literature is based
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on a realization that growing sectoralization, budgetary pressures and cross-cutting 
nature of the policy agenda have over the last decade underscored the importance of 
strong and effective centres of government. Responding to Rhodes and Dunleavy’s 
appeal for more theory-guided research on core executives (Rhodes 1995, p. 27), this 
study develops a conceptual approach based on collective action theory. In doing so, 
it argues that the core executive represents a unique institutional response to 
collective dilemmas that impinge on the production of legal rules (or policies more 
broadly) that bring diffuse benefits to many voter constituencies and that entail high 
coordination costs. This conceptualization links up with those functional definitions 
of central agencies that emphasize their role in ensuring democratic control and 
accountability within government (see for example Daintith and Page 1998).
Research on core executives has so far employed institutional configurations at the 
centre of government as a dependent variable. More recently, attempts have also 
been made to explore the effect of core executive configurations on policy volatility 
(Manning, Barma et al. 1999; Evans and Manning 2000; Blondel and Manning 2002) 
and fiscal discipline (Brusis and Dimitrov 2001; Von Hagen 2003; Hallerberg 2004b; 
Dimitrov, Goetz et al. 2005 forthcoming). This thesis contributes to that new stream 
of core executive studies by focusing on how intra-executive relations between the 
centre and ministerial departments may affect the government’s capacity to 
implement policy decisions that are integrative and welfare-maximizing. In doing so, 
it informs a broader debate about institutions and institutional effects within the 
rational choice institutionalism (North 1990; Scharpf 1997; Weingast 1998). 
Defining institutions as constraints on opportunistic behaviour, this tradition has 
spawned a rich literature exploring the role of political institutions in leading 
individual actors to optimal political, economic and social outcomes (see for example 
Shepsle and Weingast 1994; Doring 1995; Lane and Ersson 2000; Scarpetta and 
Tressel 2002; Pluemper and Martin 2003; Doring and Hallerberg 2004).
VI. Chapter Preview
The thesis comprises six chapters including this Introduction. Chapter 2 presents the 
theoretical framework for analyzing the transposition of the Community legislation 
in Poland. It demonstrates that the adoption of transposing legislation was likely to 
have been complicated by significant collective action problems which discouraged 
ministers and their staff from contributing to the transposition record. The chapter
19
then develops an explanatory hypothesis which focuses on the existence of selective 
incentives and monitoring extended by the core executive vis-a-vis line ministries. 
Chapter 3 maps cross-temporal variation in institutional rules that the Polish core 
executive had at its disposal to provide selective incentives and monitoring to cabinet 
ministers and their departments in the adoption of transposing legislation. It 
demonstrates that between 1997 and 2002 six broad configurations of such rules 
were present. Chapter 4 measures the Polish government’s transposing record over 
time using quantitative indicators of legislative activity. It concludes by identifying 
four consecutive stages each characterized by a distinct pattern of the transposition 
record. Chapter 5 brings together the data on core executive institutions and the 
transposition record checking for consistency with the predictions formulated in 
Chapter 2. It looks for process-tracing evidence of causal mechanisms that linked the 
two variables and considers the strength of that relationship by analyzing the impact 
of contextualizing variables. Chapter 6 contains the conclusion. It assesses the 
research results in the context of their contribution to the wider theoretical debates in 
the literature on EU compliance, core executive and political institutions.
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Chapter 2: A Domestic Institutions Approach to Studying EU 
Transposition
I. The Problem
The approach adopted in this thesis relies on theoretical insights from public choice 
theory of policy change (cf. Downs 1957; Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Mueller 
2003). As such, it is based on three private interest assumptions. First, ministers use 
policies to maximize electoral support for their personal re-election. The most natural 
source of such support is the socio-economic clientele within their own policy 
jurisdiction. This is because the public tends to judge a minister’s success in office 
according to how effectively he or she advances the interests of such private 
stakeholders. The party leadership may further bind ministers to cater for selected 
electoral constituency. Second, ministers use public policy to further the position and 
interests of their own department. In doing so, they wish to secure the loyalty of 
ministerial bureaucrats who are generally assumed to adopt bureau-shaping and 
budget-maximizing attitudes (Dunleavy 1991). The co-operation of civil servants is 
important because it determines a minister’s ability to achieve goals as the head of 
department. Third, both ministers and their staff are rational utility-irtaximizers who 
seek to derive the highest possible benefits from public policy at the lowest costs. As 
government resources such as legislative time, finance and personnel are limited, 
opportunity costs must always be taken into account.
Given these interest assumptions, it may be predicted that, absent any constraints, a 
policy reform should be more likely if the benefits it brings to ministers and their 
staff are exclusive and concentrated and if the policy production involves a small 
number of ministerial departments (cf. Von Hagen and Harden 1994; Hallerberg 
2004b). This is because political and civil service careers depend on catering for 
departmental interests. The utility-maximizing attitude further predisposes ministers 
and their staff to minimize co-operation with other departments because the more 
departments become involved, the higher the costs of co-ordination and the higher 
the uncertainty as to the final outcome of policy change. Arguing a contrario, one 
can predict that, where a policy reform brings benefits that are non-exclusive and 
diffuse over many electoral constituencies and where the reform requires many 
departments to be involved, ministers and their staff will have limited incentives to
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contribute to policy change (cf. Olson 1965; Frohlich, Oppenheimer et al. 1971; Cox 
and McCubbins 1993; Doring 1995; Doring and Hallerberg 2004).
Three collective action problems impinge on policy development in such cases. The 
first problem is a public goods dilemma that stems from the non-exclusive nature of 
the regulatory benefits. If benefits from legislation accrue to many socio-economic 
groups regardless of whether they support a given minister, its production is liable to 
the free-rider problem. In effect, individual ministers may have strong incentives to 
maximize net individual benefits by not contributing to the production of such 
legislation. This theoretical insight is at the heart of the public goods theory (cf. 
Olson 1965; Hardin 1982). Second, the public goods problem is further reinforced by 
the collective nature of regulatory benefits. If it is impossible, or at least difficult, for 
individual ministers to take personal credit for providing benefits vis-a-vis their own 
departments and policy stakeholders, ministers will have limited incentives to 
produce such legislation. The contribution to a collective benefit legislation is thus 
likely to carry a high opportunity cost. If resources are limited (as they usually are) 
and ministers have opportunities to commit them to policies that yield a more 
favourable cost-benefit ratio, then a strategy of not contributing may be expected to 
dominate.
Besides the public goods dilemma, the joint production of legislation is subject to 
high co-ordination costs. This is particularly the case where a single legal measure 
covers a horizontal, cross-cutting policy problem which requires joint legislative 
action by several ministers or agencies. Ministers’ incentives to contribute to such 
legislation may be dampened by the need to incur additional costs of co-ordinating 
positions, resolving disputes and monitoring agreements. Such co-ordination costs 
may be expected to be the higher, the more cross-cutting the policy problem is and 
the more departments are needed to provide legislative inputs. In effect, individual 
ministers may follow dominating strategies of defecting from joint action as 
contributions to joint legislation prove too costly.
The above theoretical insight is applied here to the study of transposition of the 
Community legislation in Poland. It is argued that the improvement of the 
transposition record was perceived by domestic legislators as a reform project that 
brought diffuse and non-exclusive benefits and that entailed high co-ordination costs. 
This assertion is based on two observations. First, with regard to the distribution of
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benefits, Polish ministers and their staff were likely to expect transposing legislation 
to bring diffuse benefits because the largest gain from improving the transposition 
record -  moving closer to EU membership -  accrued to the cabinet as a whole 
regardless of whether a given minister contributed or not. Perhaps more importantly, 
lacking the experience of policy formulation, Polish ministers and their staff were 
uncertain about the precise benefit distribution from transposition. In effect, they 
were likely to perceive it mainly through the lens of policy modernization and EU 
accession. Even when they were able to identify concentrated private benefits from 
transposition (as was probably the case after the screening process was completed), 
they expected such benefits to materialize only after enlargement. This was because 
the dynamic of the integration process was such that, while most adaptation costs had 
to be incurred before accession, the largest financial and political benefits were to 
become visible only after Poland joined the EU (see Rada Ministrow 2000; UKIE 
2003). Although the discount rates applied to such private benefits are certain to have 
fallen the closer the country moved to membership, it is important to note that the 
date of accession had not been pre-agreed and depended on progress in transposition. 
Therefore, until membership was secured, transposition costs were offset only by die 
diffuse benefits related to modernization and Europeanization.
The other observation, relating to mode of law production, is that EU transposition 
required joint legislative action from most, if not all, Polish ministries and central 
agencies. Like in most cabinet systems Polish ministers enjoy a monopoly of intra­
executive legislative initiative within their policy remits, and rule adoption could not 
start without their proposal. At a most general level, the collective production of 
legal alignment was necessary because the Community’s acquis contained several 
thousand legal measures that spanned almost the entire policy spectrum. The Polish 
ministries had to transpose more than 2,000 directives covering various policy fields. 
Besides the directives, there were also selected regulations and decisions that had to 
be rendered into domestic legislation to prepare domestic institutions for direct 
applicability of such EU laws after accession. For example, the European 
Commission’s 1997 Single Market White Paper identified 666 priority EU measures 
which required action by 19 ministries and central agencies. See Table 2.1. More 
importantly, at a level of individual laws, many of the Community measures dealt 
with horizontal, cross-cutting policy problems which required the collaboration of
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many different ministries for full transposition. The misfit between the scope of EU 
measures and national portfolios is common in the old EU member states (Page 
1998; Bovens and Yesilkagit 2004) and was also pronounced in a pre-accession 
country. For example, more than 60 percent of the White Paper’s priority measures 
required legislative inputs from two or more agencies for full transposition (cf. UKIE 
1997).
Table 2.1. Distribution of the Community Measures by Competent Ministry
Competent Ministry Community Measures in 
Ministerial Competence
Measures for which 
Competence Is Shared
Agriculture 219 104
Transport 128 87
Health 82 63
Economics 57 57
Finance 29 10
Customs 27 27
Communications 19 5
Environment 17 16
Labour 16 6
Justice 12 7
Nuclear Agency 11 11
Public Procurement 11 o
Competitions Office 9 •5
Securities Commission 7 7
Polish Central Bank 6 6
Internal Affairs 5 5
Patents 5 3
Culture 4 2
Tourism & Sports Office 1 1
Radio & Television Commission 1 1
Total 666 423
Source: own compilation based on the 1997 White Paper Action Plan (UKIE 1997)
If transposition was expected to bring diffuse non-exclusive benefits and to entail 
high co-ordination costs, its production was liable to collective action problems. This 
means that, absent any constraints, Polish ministers and their staff would have 
limited incentives to improve the country’s transposition record. This is because the 
public goods dilemma would create strong incentives for ministers to free-ride on the 
transposition efforts of their cabinet colleagues. The high opportunity costs of
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transposition would encourage ministers and departments to commit resources to 
other, most likely domestic, legislative uses that could bring more favourable cost- 
benefit ratios. The extensive need for co-ordination was likely to provide a further 
bias against transposition work as ministers and their staff would prefer to focus on 
legislation that may be adopted through individual decision. In practice, collective 
dilemmas would result in the Polish executive finding it difficult to initiate and adopt 
transposing legislation and to comply with internal and external transpositipn 
commitments.
II. The Explanatory Hypotheses
Generic Solutions
The literature on collective action provides four broad types of explanations on what 
facilitates or impedes the resolution of collective action problems. These are: (i) 
change in the nature of the policy programme to be adopted, (ii) change in actor 
preferences (iii) change in action resources appurtenant to actors, and (iv) change in 
institutional incentives and opportunity structures. Naturally, these explanations are 
not mutually exclusive. Indeed, attempts have been made to incorporate all four into 
a single analytical framework (see Ostrom 1990, p. 182-216). The first approach 
focuses on the extent to which a policy programme offers actors the opportunity to 
obtain exclusive individual benefits in addition to the collective benefit. If such 
private incentives exist, the rational self-interest may lead individuals to contribute to 
the collective action. In the present context, if a minister and his staff could use 
transposition to produce some exclusive private benefits for their own clients, 
stakeholders and departments, then the probability of improving the collective 
transposition record would be increased.
Although this approach is certain to provide interesting insights, its usefulness for the 
study of a pre-accession state is reduced because Polish ministers and their staff will 
have operated under incomplete information. As argued above, Polish ministers and 
their staff were likely to be uncertain about the precise consequences of transposition 
for their electoral constituencies besides the collective benefit of an improved 
transposition record. Insufficient knowledge of the acquis communautaire may have 
also prevented ministries from using transposition strategically to produce individual 
benefits. There was also a general perception among political decision-makers that
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the largest financial and political benefits from transposition would become visible 
only after Poland joined the EU. An official government report published in 2000 
concluded that, ‘although [the accession to the EU] is certain to have a positive long­
term impact, it will bring short-term and medium-term adaptation costs for the Polish 
producers, administration and consumers’ (Rada Ministrow 2000, p. 43).
The second approach links the likelihood of co-operation to actor preferences. It is 
often pointed out that actors may not always be guided by rational self-interest whose 
maximization is responsible for producing collective action problems. Specific 
extrarational motivations such as morality, the desire for self-development through 
participation, ignorance and misunderstanding may have an important impact on 
individual incentives and help resolve collective action problems (cf. Hardin 1982, 
pp. 101-124; Ostrom 1998). In the present context, this would mean that some 
ministers may be more inclined to contribute to the collective transposition record 
than others because, for example, they may have a personal desire to be seen as 
strong champions of European integration or if transposition was perceived as a 
patriotic duty. Without rejecting such arguments, it must be noted, however, that 
Polish ministers and their departmental staff had limited time and opportunities to 
develop strong internal motivations that could lead them to favour the collective EU 
transposition record more than individual interest benefits.
A third argument holds that a change in resource endowment may help actors resolve 
collective action dilemmas by changing their benefit-cost calculations. In the present 
context, this would imply that different level of resources such as personnel, finance 
or time may influence the preference that ministers and their staff may have for 
contributing to the production of transposing legislation. The logic would further 
imply that larger amounts of action resources would increase the likelihood that 
actors contribute to the collective action. This said, this argument is not without its 
problems. For one thing, although more action resources may indeed increase a pool 
of resources that any individual sets aside for group donations, this effect is likely to 
be small since actors will have strong incentives to use the additional resources to 
further their individual rather than group interests.
The fourth approach -  pursued in this thesis -  centres on changes in institutional 
incentives and opportunity structures (Olson 1965; Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1970; 
Frohlich, Oppenheimer et al. 1971; Ostrom 1990). The theory holds that collective
26
action problems are most acute where institutional rules exist that encourage actors 
to ‘go it alone’ or pursue their narrow self-interest. Conversely, the probability that 
actors resolve collective action problems is highest where there are rules that 
mobilize them to adopt co-ordinated strategies. Such latter conditions are posited to 
obtain in two institutional contexts. First, the likelihood of co-operation is positively 
related to the existence of rules that provide actors with selective (private) 
inducements to contribute to the collective good. Such incentives may take various 
forms such as rewards, sanctions, exclusion, facilitation, or other similar constraints 
on agenda-setting powers. Their principal function is to transform dominating 
defection strategies into contingent strategies of co-operation.
Second, the selective incentives must be accompanied by institutional rules that 
make information available about the behaviour of individual actors. These rules 
may take the form of, among others, oversight procedures, reporting requirements or 
disclosure mandates. Their task is to ensure the credibility of selective incentives by 
eliminating opportunities for shirking. Perhaps more importantly, information serves 
to reduce the level of uncertainty associated with any group action. This is crucial 
because members of a group are likely to behave strategically and to make their 
contribution to the collective good contingent on the actual choices of others in a 
group (cf. Frohlich, Oppenheimer et al. 1971; Runge 1984; Ostrom 2003). The key 
task of information-enhancing rules is thus to transform such contingent behaviour 
into dominant strategies of co-operation.
The selective incentives and monitoring may be sustained within two organizational 
configurations: (i) hierarchy and (ii) collectivity (cf. Frohlich, Oppenheimer et al. 
1971; Fiorina and Shepsle 1989; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Andeweg 2000). The 
hierarchical relationship posits the existence of a central authority. This role has 
three institutional features: (i) the central authority has at its disposal selective 
incentives with which to reward or sanction members of the group, (ii) it incurs the 
cost of monitoring the behaviour of individual members, and (iii) it is rewarded for 
its role in solving the collective problems through a compensation mechanism which 
links its personal interests with the extent of the collective behaviour (Cox and 
McCubbins 1993, pp. 90-94). The central authority’s role is essentially that of an 
enforcer and monitor. It provides selective incentives to change the pay-off structure 
in a way that makes co-ordinated behaviour desirable and supplies information to
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dispel uncertainty about strategy choices. The authority may contribute to the 
resolution of collective dilemmas by fulfilling two other functions. It may act as an 
arbiter of conflicts that arise between members of a group and thus lower the costs of 
achieving collective interests (Cox and McCubbins 1993, pp. 94). It may also 
function as a competitive agenda-setter (Fiorina and Shepsle 1989). In this latter role 
the central authority mobilizes other members of a group towards the achievement of 
collective interests by constraining their agenda-setting powers.
Under the collectivity relationship, there is no central authority and the group is self- 
governing (cf. Ostrom 1990, p. 15-18). Institutional rules exist that (i) enable all 
individuals in a group to extend to each other selective incentives such as sanctions, 
rewards or exclusion, (ii) make it possible for individual members to share the costs 
of monitoring, (iii) establish an allocation mechanism through which the personal 
interests of the group members are linked to the extent of co-operation. Most 
commonly, such institutional rules provide for a committee-type mechanism or 
similar collective constraints on the individual autonomy of sequence, contingency 
and frequency of action. It is interesting to note that collectivity-administered 
selective incentives and monitoring are frequently untenable without some recourse 
to hierarchy. For example, absent an external monitor or enforcer, large groups may 
suffer from inherent problems of unobservability, while small groups will find it 
difficult to ‘group punish’ non-compliant members in such a way as to allow for 
further co-operation. Thus, it is a frequent practice for self-governing groups to hire 
an external agent to help them with internal policing (cf. Ostrom 1990, p. 15-18).
In analyzing the impact of such institutional rules on the resolution of collective 
action problems, this thesis adopts a regulative definition of institution (Scott 2001, 
pp. 71-89). Institutions are thus taken to denote rules of the game that shape human 
behaviour (cf. North 1990). Such rules may be less or more formal depending on the 
carrier or repository in which they are embedded. The formal rules will include laws, 
protocols, routines or standard operating procedures that have been formalized in 
legal texts. Informal rules will include such behavioural characteristics of a group as 
norms, conventions and social capital (cf. Blondel and Manning 2002). For present 
purposes, three categories of rules are of special importance (Hood 1983; Scharpf 
2000; Ostrom 2003):
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■ position rules -  create institutional positions that may be occupied by individual or 
multiple actors; in the present context, these rules mandate the existence of 
hierarchical or collective institutional configurations.
■ authority rules -  identify actions that actors in a particular position may or must 
take in specific situations; in the present context, these rules specify the powers to 
reward, sanction, exclude, facilitate or otherwise affect the behaviour of individuals 
in a group.
■ information rules -  mandate information flows among actors; in the present 
context, these rules specify how the actions of actors are planned and monitored.
While focusing primarily on the role of institutions in the resolution of collective 
dilemmas, this study recognizes that there are limits to what can be explained 
through an institutionalist lens. The operation of institutional rules is influenced by 
other variables, notably those mentioned at the start of this section. Thus, accepting 
the significance of such other factors, the present study qualifies its institutionalist 
account with references to their effect, particularly when institutions alone are not 
sufficient to tell the full story. Consequently, the impact that changes in policy type, 
actor preferences and action resources may have had on transposition outcomes is 
discussed in chapter 4.
Institutional Rules within the National Executive
What explanatory hypotheses may be generated from the above discussion for the 
study of the collective action problems that Polish ministers were likely to encounter 
during transposition? This thesis uses the above theoretical insights of the collective 
action theory to hypothesize that the probability that Polish ministers contribute to 
the transposition record is highest in two situations: (i) where the prime minister or 
some other non-sectoral minister acts as a central authority in the area of EU 
transposition and/or (ii) where institutional rules exist that require ministers to 
manage the transposition record as a group. These solutions point to hierarchy and 
collectivity as two strategies for delivering selective incentives and monitoring 
within the executive (cf. Andeweg 2000; Hallerberg 2000; Hallerberg 2004b).
Under the hierarchical solution the prime minister or a non-sectoral minister has -  by 
virtue of his institutional position -  personal incentives to act as monitor, arbiter and 
competitive agenda-setter with a view to ensuring that other ministers adopt co­
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operative strategies. His or her ability to mobilize individual ministers toward a 
collective interest crucially depends on the configuration of three types of 
institutional rules: (i) position rules that link the personal interests of the prime 
minister or non-sectoral minister to the achievement of collective interests, (ii) 
authority rules that specify his or her powers to sanction and reward ministers, and to 
act as agenda-setter and/or arbiter, and (iii) information rules that determine his or 
her position within an information network. More specifically it is hypothesized that 
the ability of the prime minister or non-sectoral minister to resolve collective action 
problems in the improvement of the collective transposition record depends on the 
existence of the following rules (cf. Weller 1985; Weller 1991; Muller, Philipp et al. 
1993; Aucoin 1994):
Table 2.2. Rules Facilitating the Resolution of Collective Action Problems Through Hierarchy
Position Rules Authority Rules Information Rules
■ There is a minister ■PM may appoint/dismiss ■PM/MfT may impose
responsible for or otherwise transposition agenda &
transposition (MfT) reward/sanction ministers timetable
■MfT reports to prime ■MfT may alert.the PM if ■Ministers are required to
minister (PM) ministers do not contribute report to PM/MfT about
to transposition legislative actions in
■PM/MfT may require transposition
amendment to draft ■ PM/MfT may require
legislation and may information on
arbitrate conflicts transposition
■PM may reject/accept bids ■PM/MfT has information
for resources such as on transposition and non-:
finance and legislative transposition demands on
time resources
■PM may decide which ■PM/MfT has information
priorities are allocated on the availability of
resources resources
P M -prim e minister, MfT-minister for transposition
To use such powers effectively in furthering the collective interests of the 
government, the prime minister or minister for transposition needs to possess 
appropriate resources such as organization, personnel and finance. These resources 
are typically concentrated in central agencies such as the prime minister’s office and 
other specialized secretariats at the centre of government (see for example Weller 
1991; Muller-Rommel 1993; Peters, Rhodes et al. 2000). These agencies are 
responsible chiefly for analyzing information from sectoral ministries, generating 
specialized advice and providing secretarial and administrative support. The resource
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capacity of such units will determine the prime minister’s and the minister for 
transposition’s ability to act as a central authority.
Under the collectivity-based arrangement collective action problems are solved 
through the introduction of institutional rules that require ministers to make 
transposition decisions as a group (cf. Andeweg 2000). Such rules will facilitate the 
improvements of the collective transposition record by, inter alia, encouraging 
ministers to act as monitors or competitive agenda-setters for one another and to 
consider the full effect of individual legislative actions for their collective interest. 
The efficacy of this solution depends on the configuration of three types of rules: (i) 
position rules providing for the requirement to manage the transposition record as a 
group, (ii) authority rules that specify the powers of individual ministers to intervene 
in other ministers’ legislative actions, and that determine what action should be taken 
if non-compliance is detected, (iii) information rules that specify how ministers learn 
about each other’s actions. More specifically the possibility that collectivity will 
solve the collective action problems in the improvement of the collective 
transposition record depends on the existence of the following rules (cf. Aucoin 
1986; Baylis 1989; Thiebault 1993; Andeweg 1997).
Table 2 3 . Rules Facilitating the Resolution of Collective Action Problems Through Collectivity
Position Rules Authority Rules Information Rules
■The full cabinet is 
involved in managing the 
transposition record
■There exists a permanent 
cabinet committee for 
transposition (CfT)
■The CfT consists of 
cabinet or junior ministers
■The Cabinet/CfT works on 
transposition legislation 
and has selective 
incentives for rewarding 
& sanctioning
■Conflicts are resolved in 
cabinet/CfT
■The Cabinet/CfT requests 
amendments to draft 
legislation
■The Cabinet/CfT 
rejects/accepts bids for 
resources
■The Cabinet/CfT decides 
which priorities are 
allocated resources
■The Cabinet/CfT 
determines transposition 
agenda & timetable
■Ministers are required to 
report in cabinet/CfT 
about legislative actions in 
transposition
■The Cabinet/CfT reviews 
progress in improving 
transposition record on a 
regular basis
■ The individual record of 
ministers is clearly visible 
to all Cabinet/CfT 
members
PM -prim e minister, MfT -  minister for transposition, CfT -  committee for transposition
For such institutional rules to bring ministers round to more co-operative strategies,
they must be backed by organizational resources available to ministers as a group.
Such resources are typically housed in the Cabinet Office or other committee 
secretariats (see Campbell 1988; Barker and Peters 1993; Peters and Barker 1993; 
Bakvis 1997; Savoie 1999). These units produce assessments of legislative proposals 
that are independent from departmental views and are informed by the collective 
interest of the government. They also ensure that legislative drafts are routed 
according to pre-agreed operational rules and that all the cabinet or cabinet 
committees have enough information to monitor the behaviour of individual 
ministers and enforce mutual commitments.
Hierarchy and collectivity as organizational vehicles of selective incentives and 
monitoring are not mutually exclusive. In practice, the choice between hierarchy and 
collectivity is at best a question of degrees (cf. Rhodes 1995; Andeweg 1997; Elgie
1997). Hierarchy and collectivity entail similar effects for intra-executive power 
relations. Both postulate the strengthening of all those individual and collective 
actors, organizations and procedures that are located at the heart of the executive and 
that have come to be defined as ‘core executive’ (see Dunleavy and Rhodes 1990; 
Rhodes and Dunleavy 1995). The core executive is typically taken to comprise the 
prime minister, finance minister and non-sectoral ministers as well as ‘the complex 
web of institutions, network and practices surrounding the prime minister, cabinet, 
cabinet committees, and their official counterparts, less formalised ministerial ‘clubs’ 
or meetings, bilateral negotiations and interdepartmental committees’ (Rhodes 1995,
p. 12).
That stronger core executives may be positively related to policy change is often 
observed in the mainstream literature on national executives (see for example Boston 
1992; Weller, Bakvis et al. 1997; Peters, Rhodes et al. 2000; Wright and Hayward 
2000). A more contextualized proposition holds that strong core executives tend to 
facilitate radical policy change, whereas weaker centres entail a more incremental 
pattern of change (Stark and Bruszt 1998; Lindquist 1999). Following (Hallerberg 
and Von Hagen 1997; Hallerberg 2004b; Dimitrov, Goetz et al. 2005 forthcoming) 
this dissertation develops a theoretical framework in which such empirical 
observations are tested and explained.
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The Emergence o f Selective Incentives and Monitoring
Although this study is chiefly interested in exploring the effect that intra-executive 
rules have on the resolution of collective action problems, its cross-temporal design 
makes it necessary to develop some theoretical insight into how such rules emerge 
over time. The first thing to note here is that the supply of institutional rules to solve 
collective dilemmas is itself a second-order collective action problem (Ostrom 1990). 
As it is difficult to exclude others from benefiting from such rules once they are 
supplied, individual actors will prefer to free-ride on the efforts of others. A similar 
dominating strategy of non-co-operation may also derive from high opportunity and 
co-ordination costs. Hence, to a large extent, the preconditions for institutional 
change within the executive mirror those for the resolution of the first-order problem 
in the improvement of the transposition record.
Two principal approaches may thus be discerned with regard to the mechanics of 
institutional change. First, institutional innovations may originate as a result of a 
collective commitment by all actors to provide for new rules that would govern their 
mutual interactions (Ostrom 1990, pp. 15-18). In the present context, the 
transformation of core executive institutions would thus be possible if the cabinet or 
a cabinet committee adopted new rules that enhance the hierarchy or collectivity of 
decision-making in the area of transposition. Second, institutional rules may be 
supplied by entrepreneurs who find it personally profitable to organize a group for 
the provision of a collective good. Such individuals will find this role attractive only 
when the total benefits they receive exceed their total costs (Frohlich, Oppenheimer 
et al. 1971, pp. 6-7). In the present context, the reinforcement of the core executive 
would be possible if some central actor, most likely the prime minister, senior 
cabinet member or party leader, acted as an entrepreneur for the transposition record 
and incurred the cost of organizing the cabinet for that purpose. It must be noted that 
an entrepreneur-inspired institutional change need not lead to a hierarchical 
configuration of selective incentives and monitoring. The prime minister or other 
actor may just as well provide for collectivity-enhancing rules.
The likelihood that institutional change occurs is related to three institutional factors 
that affect the support that a leader or group members may have for change to the 
status quo rules. First, there are international opportunity structures imposed by 
external regimes. Such institutional incentives create opportunities for profits to be
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earned through group organization. In the present context, it is possible that the 
European Union may encourage the prime minister or the cabinet to supply 
institutional rules that address the collective action problem in the improvement of 
the transposition record. Second, similar incentives may be provided by domestic 
extra-executive institutions. For present purposes, it is important to note the 
opportunity structures extended by the electoral system, socio-economic interests and 
non-executive state actors such as parliament or courts. Third, the support for change 
to the status quo rules -  and hence to solve or preserve a collective action problem -  
is expected to be shaped by the characteristics of the party composition of the cabinet 
(cf. Hallerberg 2004a; Hallerberg 2004b; Dimitrov, Goetz et al. 2005 forthcoming). 
The likelihood of institutional change is thus related to factors such as the internal 
cohesiveness of coalition parties, the ideological distance between them, and the 
expectation of whether they will run together or against each other in the next 
elections. More robust core executives are thus likely to emerge in single-party 
governments or coalition governments in which parties are internally cohesive, close 
in ideological terms, and expect to run together in the next elections.
Lastly, one needs to consider the dynamic of institutional change. At a most general 
level, change at each decision point in time may be expected to be relatively minor if 
ministers and departments are able to adapt incrementally the status quo rules. In 
such situations change will proceed in multiple steps as the prime minister or 
ministers test different institutional solutions in response to the collective action 
problem (see for example Argyris and Schon 1996). The assumption here is that 
actors will be able to respond flexibly to changes in external opportunity structures 
and the results of their own experiential learning. If, however, for systemic, 
informational or other reasons, such incremental adaptation is not possible, one may 
expect internal and external pressures to accumulate over time and, at some point, 
create a ‘critical juncture’ or a ‘window of opportunity’ at which radical institutional 
change may occur. This latter case would be associated with the emergence of a 
crisis situation involving the perceived failure of the existing rules.
Contextualizing Variables
Although the primary focus of the study is on core executive and its contribution to 
the solution of collective problems in the production of transposing legislation, the 
impact that institutional rules embodied in non-executive organizational carriers may
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have on individual behaviour must also be taken into consideration. Three types of 
such institutional rules will be analyzed in the present context: (i) institutional 
opportunities generated by the European Union, and (ii) institutional incentives 
provided by political parties and governing coalitions, and (iii) institutional 
incentives extended by domestic non-executive organizations. In the language of the 
collective action theory all these rules may be used to extend selective incentives and 
monitoring to Polish ministers and departments. As such, they may directly 
contribute to solving the collective action problems that impinge on EU 
transposition.
The European Commission may act as the central authority inducing and monitoring 
domestic ministers and departments. The tools it may use are positive and negative 
inducements otherwise known as ‘conditionalities’ Such conditionalities involve the 
offering of material and non-material rewards in return for supplying improvements 
to the transposition record. Material rewards may include financial assistance. The 
Commission may for instance make the disbursement of the Phare and other pre­
accession funds conditional on the transposition of specific EU measures. Non­
material rewards and sanctions would take the form of various mechanisms that 
shape the international and domestic image of the government (cf. Schimmelfennig, 
Engert et al. 2003). The chief objective of conditionality is to increase the individual 
cost of non-transposition (or the individual benefit of transposition) for Polish 
ministers. Besides conditionality, the Commission may also act as monitor. In doing 
so, it may impose comprehensive informational requirements on national 
administrations and feed the information back to the domestic arena through public 
or non-public channels. EU-induced selective incentives and monitoring may also 
originate within collectivity-based arrangements such as the association 
council/committee, expert meetings or negotiation sessions. The collective pressure 
may also originate from rules that increase natural competition among accession 
states in improving their individual transposition records.
Political parties contribute to the resolution of collective action problems because 
their organizations provide party leaders with institutional levers for mobilizing their 
members towards collective goals and for monitoring their behaviour. Selective 
incentives that party leaders may offer to their members include career advancement 
within the party hierarchy, membership of prestigious parliamentary committees or
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senior government positions. In the present context, such incentives may be used by 
party leaders to mobilize ministers to contribute to transposition. The significance of 
political parties as a solution to collective dilemmas is most evident in two-party 
systems, in which parties appeal to the broad electorate and tend to form single-party 
governments. The situation is more complex in multi-party systems in which parties 
represent narrower socio-economic interests and are likely to form coalition 
governments. Yet, even in that latter case, collective dilemmas may be solved 
through party-based mechanisms if coalition parties co-operate and develop 
institutions that enable them to implement joint policies (see Blondel and Cotta 1996; 
Blondel and Cotta 2000; Muller and Strom 2000; Thies 2001). These party-based 
institutions may take the form of coalition summits, overlapping jurisdictions 
between ministries or the shadowing role of junior ministers. These institutional 
levers could be used by coalition leaders to ensure that ministers contribute to the 
collective goal of improving the transposition record.
Finally, Polish ministers and their staff may be subject to incentives and monitoring 
extended by non-executive domestic organizations. Two sources of such non­
executive incentives are crucial here. First and foremost, ministers and high-ranking 
government officials are exposed to close scrutiny from the parliament. Their 
preferences in this regard may be shaped in bilateral contacts with parliamentary 
leaders or within collective frameworks of parliamentary committees. Second, the 
incentives and information may be supplied within the context of linkage institutions 
that channel social and business interests. These may include in particular bilateral 
contacts with lobby groups or collective mechanisms such as tripartite commissions 
or similar round tables.
III. Research Methods
In testing the hypotheses outlined above this study combines the congruence method 
with process-tracing. The congruence method is normally employed as an alternative 
to controlled comparison in situations where the research objective is to analyze a 
single case or a few cases that are insufficiently comparable to achieve a satisfactory 
level of control (George and Bennett 2004). The method thus seems to be well-suited 
for a single-country examination of factors that facilitated and inhibited transposition 
of the EU legislation over time. Although in principle the longitudinal design 
adopted here makes it possible to split the empirical material into a number of
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observations, such cases would not qualify for a controlled comparison. This is 
because one may easily expect that, besides changes in procedural rules within the 
core executive, the period under examination (1997-2002) was characterized by 
significant cross-time modifications to internal and external political conditions in 
Poland, not least due to government turnover and accession negotiations. In that case, 
the analysis would flout the key principle of the controlled comparative design which 
requires that cases should resemble one another in every respect but one (King, 
Keohane et al. 1994).
The congruence method consists in employing theory to predict the value of the 
dependent variable for a given value of the independent variable and in verifying 
such expectations against empirical material (see George and Bennett 2004). If the 
actual outcome of the dependent variable is congruent with the prediction generated 
by the theory, then there is a possibility of a causal relationship between the two 
variables. In the case at hand, the key theoretical expectation is that individual 
ministers should overcome collective dilemmas in the production of transposing 
legislation when the prime minister or some other non-sectoral minister has 
procedural powers to mobilize them towards the collective goals of the cabinet 
and/or if collectivity-enhancing institutions exist that allow ministers to manage 
transposition as a group. This theoretical expectation will be checked against the data 
on transposition paths in Poland. If the empirical material confirms the prediction, 
such consistency will provide some support for the theory outlined in the preceding 
section. The result will however be still open to challenge. The evidence of mere 
consistency is not a strong proof of a causal relationship and must be subject to 
further investigation (George and Bennett 2004). This is to safeguard against a 
possibility that there is a hidden variable that is responsible for the observed effect 
and/or to ensure that the value of the dependent variable continues to be congruent 
with the theory even if the impact of such other variable is taken into consideration. 
To this end, the present study will employ the process-tracing method which consists 
in identifying causal mechanisms (or causal chains) that link the independent 
variable with the observed effect. In the present context, the existence or absence of 
causal mechanisms will be determined based on the detailed analysis of the sequence 
of events linking the operation of core executive institutions and transposition
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outcomes as well as on qualitative evidence derived from semi-structured interviews 
with key political and administrative actors.
The causal relationship between core executive institutions and transposition 
outcomes, if any, will be subject to two further types of contextualization. First, the 
depth of that relationship will be analyzed by examining the influence of changes in 
institutional rules sustained by the party organization, EU institutions and domestic 
extra-executive organizations. The predictions about the influence of these variables 
are derived from the collective action theory. Their impact will be checked using that 
same combination of the congruence method and process-tracing technique that is 
employed to test the core executive hypothesis. If any of the three variables will be 
found to have mattered, the strength of the causal relationship between core 
executive institutions and transposition would need to be qualified accordingly (cf. 
George and Bennett 2004). Second, the concluding chapter will address the question 
of whether changes in core executive institutions are a necessary condition for the 
changes of the transposition record. This will be done by moving beyond the 
congruence and process-tracing methods and comparing the Polish case with 
evidence from other Central European countries that acceded to the EU in May 2004 
and the existing member states.
IV. Summary
This chapter has developed a theoretical framework for examining the variation in 
the transposition record in Poland under pre-accession. See Figure 2.1. In doing so, it 
has generated the following principal causal hypothesis: the probability that 
ministers and departments make improvements to the collective transposition record 
is over time positively related to the domestic core executive acquiring institutional 
levers to extend selective incentives and monitoring to line ministers and 
departments (1). Provided that that causal relationship is confirmed by the empirical 
data, the study will pursue its enquiry by assessing the depth and causal priority of 
that relationship. It is hypothesized that the depth of the relationship will be 
determined by the impact that three other institutional variables may have on the 
resolution of collective action dilemmas in the production of transposition: EU 
constraints and accession dynamic (2A); party controls and inter-party co-operation 
(3A); domestic extra-executive constraints (4A). The causal priority of the 
relationship between core executive institutions and transposition is hypothesized to
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depend on the extent to which its existence is dependent on the prior presence of any 
of the three variables: EU constraints and accession dynamic (2B); party controls and 
inter-party co-operation (3B); domestic extra-executive constraints (4B).
Figure 2.1. Causal Chains Linking Institutional Variables Hypothesized to Influence 
Transposition Outcomes
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Chapter 3: The Emergence of Domestic ‘European’ Core Executive
This chapter maps cross-temporal variation in institutional rules that the Polish core 
executive employed in order to extend selective incentives and monitoring to cabinet 
ministers and their departments in the adoption of transposing legislation between 
1997 and 2002.
I. The New Core Emerges
Internal and External Pressures for Institutional Change
In the mid 1990s the Polish ‘European* core executive came under increasing 
adaptation pressures. The need for institutional change was, first and foremost, due to 
a new integration dynamic that emerged after the European Union reformulated its 
policy vis-a-vis the CEE states. Having agreed to work towards enlargement at the 
1993 Copenhagen summit, the EU became more actively involved in guiding 
adaptation processes in Poland, putting pressure on domestic actors to respond to the 
new integration challenges. In the area of legal alignment the European Commission 
published a single market white Paper which identified the core of the acquis 
communautaire to be adopted during the first stage of the pre-accession.
At the same time, the Polish government became increasingly aware that the existing 
domestic institutions did not guarantee effective response to the new challenges (cf. 
NIK 1996). Since 1991, EU affairs had been coordinated inside the executive by a 
cabinet plenipotentiary, who had a non-cabinet rank of undersecretary of state and 
was located within the Office of the Council of Ministers (URM). The chief problem 
was that the plenipotentiary had too low a rank to redirect ministerial attention to EU 
adaptation (interview 13, p. 3; (URM 1995, p. 33). He was not a member of the 
cabinet and his interlocutors in line ministries typically had the rank of director or 
undersecretary of state, which limited his coordination role to administrative level.
The plenipotentiary’s predicament was thus summarized by the parliamentary 
Europe Agreement Committee writing in 1994 to prime minister Pawlak,
‘The present organizational structure does not ensure sufficient degree of 
adaptation, in particular due to lacuna in inter-ministerial coordination; the 
plenipotentiary for European integration and foreign assistance does not hold 
[sufficient] powers to perform [his] functions (...) which means that he is not 
able to secure and control the implementation of adjustment processes by 
appropriate ministries’. (Komisja ds Ukladu Europejskiego 1994)
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Unsurprisingly, when the Oleksy government resolved in November 1995 to prepare 
a comprehensive programme for the transposition of the white Paper directives into 
the Polish legal system, the plenipotentiary met with serious problems in 
coordinating this process. Most significantly, he found it difficult to arbitrate 
competence conflicts where EU legislation cut through a number of ministerial 
portfolios. A close observer noted,
‘The plenipotentiary did not have any powers (...) he ran into serious 
problems because he could not arbitrate conflicts (...). It was simply not 
possible to solve a majority of conflicts without the involvement of the 
political level in the decision-making process. This is why a change was 
necessary’, (interview 15, p. 4)
These internal and external pressures found their window of opportunity when the 
Oleksy government launched a comprehensive centre of government (COG) reform 
in 1995. Plans for a systematic overhaul of the core executive had been developed 
already in early 1990s, following the break-down of a change-team model of 
government characteristic for the Balcerowicz reforms (Zubek 2005 forthcoming). In 
1995, the SLD-PSL cabinet returned to the reform idea, after the coalition had met 
with acute problems when implementing its ‘Strategy for Poland’ (URM 1995; 
Rydlewski 2002, p. 87-88). Accompanied by a rhetoric of anticipatory adaptation to 
the European Union, the COG reform aimed to improve central coordination of 
government policies by reinforcing the powers of the prime minister, establishing 
new central agencies and reorganizing line ministries (cf. Zubek 2001; Rydlewski 
2002). The domestic management of EU-related affairs constituted a key focus of the 
COG reform. The convergence of Europeanization pressures with a broader internal 
thrust for more effective governance thus paved the way to institutional change 
within the core executive.
New Position Rules: A Mixture o f Hierarchy and Collectivity
In October 1996, the central agencies responsible for EU coordination went through
a major reconfiguration. At political level, a Committee for European Integration
(KIE) was established as a collective supreme organ of state administration with a
♦status corresponding to that of an individual minister . It comprised eight cabinet
* In Poland cabinet ministers function formally as supreme bodies of state administration within their 
policy jurisdictions. The constitutional practice also allows the creation of collective committee-type 
supreme bodies of state administration whose formal status is analogous to that of a cabinet minister.
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ministers and had competence to coordinate Polish EU policy. The government 
intended the KIE to operate as an inner cabinet that would be much more powerful 
than traditional cabinet committees. Speaking in parliament the COG reform minister 
said,
‘The institution we are talking about here resembles, in some sense, a small 
cabinet for European integration (...). Within (...) [its] competence and if no 
objection has been raised, its decision has binding force for (...) [its] 
members and the government administration. Let me emphasize that this 
institution has the power to make decisions’. (Pol 1996a; Pol 1996b)
The government maintained that, if an advisory committee were to be established, 
‘all its decisions of strategic nature would need to be submitted to the full cabinet. 
This would lengthen the decision-making process, whereas adaptation to the EU 
must proceed smoothly’ (Pol 1996c). This position was in line with a more general 
tendency within the COG reform to reinforce central coordinating units. The 
government may also have been influenced by the experience of intense inter­
coalition conflicts that often blocked the SLD-PSL cabinets (cf. Rydlewski 2000). It 
thus wanted to create a small forum in which the prime minister and the KIE 
secretary would be able to push through decisions without the involvement of the full 
cabinet. By arguing for a committee with wide decision-making powers, the 
government was also guided by more immediate political calculations. It planned to 
constrain the competences of the foreign minister in EU affairs, not least because 
under the 1992 Small Constitution the latter was one of three presidential ministers 
over whom the cabinet and the prime minister had hitherto limited influence 
(interview 20, p. 4; (Nowina-Konopka 1996b). The KIE’s organizational format was 
modelled on domestic administrative blueprints, including the Committee for 
Scientific Research (KBN) and other similar committee-type supreme organs (Pol 
1996a). It also had some functional resemblance to the Presidium of the Council of 
Ministers, an inner cabinet which was abolished in the early 1990s.
The 1996 decision to establish the KIE committee and its permanent secretariat 
(UKIE) institutionalized new position rules providing an organizational vehicle for 
administering selective incentives and monitoring in the area of EU transposition, 
The rules mandated the emergence of both collective and hierarchical relationships.
Such collective administrative bodies are then represented on the cabinet by their chairs who have the 
rank of constitutional cabinet ministers.
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The collective relationship arose through binding selected cabinet ministers to make 
decisions on EU matters as a group. The KIE committee thus emerged as a primary 
collectivity-enhancing mechanism. The hierarchical relationship was introduced 
through the creation of the KIE chair and the KIE secretary. The KIE chair had a 
formal mandate to manage the internal and external business of the committee. The 
KIE secretary -  a position activated whenever the prime minister chaired the KIE 
committee -  may be viewed as an agent retained by the KIE committee to assist the 
KIE chair with day-to-day management of the committee. Another hierarchical 
relationship existed between the committee and the non-KIE members of the cabinet. 
The KIE enjoyed the status of an inner cabinet with powers to make binding 
decisions in lieu of the full council of ministers in matters related to EU integration. 
This arrangement was predicated on the prime ministerial chairmanship of the KIE.
The Limited Development o f Authority and Information Rules
Despite its broad coordination mandate, the KIE had rather weakly institutionalized 
powers in EU transposition (interview 13, p. 3; interview 14, p. 3). As an UKIE 
official said, ‘the parliamentary act establishing the KIE (...) provides for 
compatibility screening and refers generally to coordination and monitoring [but] this 
is a very soft mandate’ (interview 26, p. 4). The vagueness of the KIE’s brief was, in 
large part, a result of deliberate design. In its desire to pool ministerial competences 
in a committee with decision-making powers, the government was constrained by the 
constitutional principle of ministerial autonomy. If it had specified the KIE’s powers 
and those of its chairman in too much detail, the entire construct would have been 
liable to strong opposition from cabinet ministers and, possibly, a legal challenge 
before the constitutional court. Hence, the KTE’s position was reinforced through a 
supreme organ status, but the government stopped short of furnishing it with specific 
coordination and control powers.
In 1996-1997 the indeterminacy of the KIE’s formal mandate did not become 
evident, not least because the principal responsibility for facilitating, monitoring and 
enforcing collective commitments made by Polish ministers within the KIE rested 
with prime minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, who became the first chair of the 
KIE. He had both formal and informal authority to direct the work of the KIE 
committee and to represent it in relations with other ministers. The KIE chairman 
received operational support from the KIE secretary, Danuta Hubner, who headed the
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Office of the KIE (UKIE). The prime minister could rely on his strong political and 
institutional position to provide the necessary leadership for the KIE. Thanks to his 
involvement, the KIE was able to review transposing legislation, adopt an adaptation 
programme and attempt to resolve conflicts among ministers (cf. Internal Memo KIE 
26/03/1997 1997; KIE Protocol 4/1997 1997; KIE Protocol 5/1997 1997; Official 
Communication SekrMinDH/533/97/DK-jp 1997).
Yet, given the approaching parliamentary elections, the KIE secretary and her 
secretariat had little time to institutionalize their powers vis-a-vis other ministers. In 
effect, when Hiibner was leaving in October 1997, no regular monitoring was in 
place to control transposition work at ministry level. Ministers were required to 
report progress in the implementation of the new transposition programme only 
every six months (cf. KIE Protocol 3/1997 1997). The first such reporting exercise 
was scheduled for December 1997. Neither did the KIE secretary provide routine 
transposition guidance. The only instrument in this regard was provided by a largely 
reactive EU compatibility assessment carried out for all government-initiated 
legislative drafts. However, a proposal to redesign the compatibility screening 
procedure in such a way as to authorize the KIE secretary and the UKIE to issue 
legislative guidelines was not implemented (Official Communication 
SEkrMinDH/174/97/DHP 1997; UKIE Internal Document March 1997 1997); 
interview 13, p. 3-4; interview 21, p. 6-7]. Finally, the KIE secretary developed 
limited enforcement powers independent of the prime minister and frequently had to 
rely on the latter’s personal intervention in case of ministerial non-compliance 
(interview 14, p. 3-4; interview 15, p. 3).
To summarize, between autumn 1996 and autumn 1997, the position rules creating 
the KIE committee and the KIE chair/secretary operated with limited related 
authority and information rules. The latter had to be developed through separate 
institution-building processes which would require time and resources. Hence, in the 
meantime, selective incentives and monitoring were extended primarily by invoking 
the established authority and information rules attached to the position of the prime 
minister who acted as the KIE chair. The prospect of sanctions or rewards from the 
prime minister provided a central incentive for ministers and departments to make 
contributions to the transposition record. Of course, given the overloaded schedule of 
any prime minister, such mobilizations were likely to be erratic and limited to
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specific issues. In any case, given the availability of alternative rules and the prospect 
of the on-coming parliamentary elections, only a few authority and information rules 
emerged in the period that were directly attached to the position of the KIE 
committee and the KIE chair/KE secretary. Three such rules stand out. First, 
ministers agreed to implement a joint transposition programme and to review 
progress twice-yearly within the KIE, while the KIE secretary was asked to act as the 
monitor. Second, the KIE committee also started to acquire competence to consider 
transposing legislation, though mainly in emergency situations. Third, the KIE 
secretary retained the power to screen legislation for EU compatibility but attempts 
to widen the scope of that competence were unsuccessful.
II. The Core Declines
In October 1997, at the start of the Jerzy Buzek government, the extent to which line 
ministries were mobilized in EU transposition by the core executive declined. The 
key contributing factor was the internal incohesiveness of the AWS-UW governing 
coalition which pushed the Buzek cabinet towards ministerial-type government. Not 
without significance was also a relative lack of domestic and external incentives for 
the strengthening of the existing core executive institutions. Under such conditions, 
party political configurations led to a general downgrading of central coordination 
and control, and largely prevented ministers from responding promptly to revealed 
organizational deficiencies.
The Impact o f Party Configurations
The Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) and the Freedom Union (UW) -  two parties 
that formed the coalition supporting the Buzek government -  were in many ways 
strange political bedfellows. The UW was a strongly liberal party headed by Leszek 
Balcerowicz, former finance minister in the first non-communist government of 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki. The AWS was a diverse mixture of trade unionists, Christian 
democrats and conservative nationalists, headed by the head of the Solidarity Trade 
Union, Marian Krzaklewski. Despite such fundamental differences, the two parties 
came together, mainly based on historical post-dissident lineage. The programmatic 
incohesiveness of the AWS-UW coalition was also marked in the area of EU-related 
domestic alignment. Although both the AWS and the UW were committed to 
European integration in principle, major differences persisted at the level of practical
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policy choices. The AWS opted for a gradual alignment sensitive to the interests of 
large state enterprises and lent a sympathetic ear to reports from socio-economic 
interests about difficulties in complying with EU requirements. The UW was much 
more euro-enthusiastic, advocating a much quicker adaptation that would benefit the 
emerging small and medium-sized private sector.
It must also be noted that, at the start of the Buzek government, ministers did not 
consider EU accession a top priority for the cabinet. The negotiations had not started 
until spring 1998, and the European Union institutions had not yet exerted strong 
pressures on the Polish government. The cabinet’s and prime minister’s interest was 
firmly with national politics and the four ambitious reforms launched in local 
government, health care, education and social insurance (interview 14, p. 6-7; 
interview 15, p. 5). These issues received most attention in parliament, the media and 
within linkage institutions with socio-economic interests, while EU accession was 
only beginning to stir some political interest. It must also be noted that euro-sceptic 
factions inside the AWS further pushed the cabinet’s policy on Europe towards the 
lowest common denominator (interview 15, p. 5).
The combination of party configurations and weak internal and external incentives 
led to a decline in the position of the European core executive. The position of the 
KIE chairman deteriorated after Buzek had conceded to his party’s pressure to 
appoint Ryszard Czamecki to the post. Although a full cabinet member, Czamecki 
commanded little authority among his ministerial colleagues, mainly on account of 
his young age, relative political inexperience and limited expertise in European 
affairs. An UKIE official said,
Minister Czamecki (...) found it extremely difficult to mobilize other 
ministers. (...) He was just one of cabinet ministers and, although he was 
responsible for EU affairs, he had no expertise in this area. A situation in 
which minister Czamecki would arbitrate a conflict between, say, 
Balcerowicz [finance minister and deputy prime minister] and Tomaszewski 
[home minister and deputy prime minister] was simply unthinkable’, 
(interview 27, p. 5)
Further, despite inheriting a weakly institutionalized position in EU transposition, 
Czamecki had limited personal incentives to push for more powers in this area. As a 
leader of the euro-sceptic National Christian faction, Czamecki wished to improve 
the UKTE’s legitimacy within government by, inter alia, making it known that he
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considered transposition commitments undertaken by the previous government as too 
ambitious (interview 20, p. 5). ^
Czamecki’s position as the KIE chair was checked by Bronislaw Geremek, foreign 
minister and senior member of the Freedom Union, who frequently contested the 
former’s policies (interview 20, p. 4; interview 27, p. 5; interview 38, p. 1). Their 
conflicts were, of course, as much political as structural. The KIE removed one of the 
most prestigious policy areas from the foreign ministry’s remit and turf wars between 
the KIE chairman and the foreign minister were to some extent inevitable (interview 
27, p. 5). Inside his own secretariat, Czamecki was also kept in check by Piotr 
Nowina-Konopka, a Freedom Union-nominated deputy minister. A public conflict 
with Nowina-Konopka was later a major contributing factor in Czamecki’s dismissal 
in the mid 1998 (Subotic 1998).
More significantly, unlike Hiibner, Czamecki could not rely on the prime minister’s 
support. EU integration was not a major priority for Jerzy Buzek, not least because 
he had little personal experience in foreign affairs (interview 20, p. 1-2; interview 36, 
p. 2). Buzek himself was also sceptical about the relative benefits of the integration 
process and, early in his term, considered renegotiation of the Europe Agreement 
(interview 15, p. 5). Perhaps more importantly, prime minister Buzek suffered from a 
weak political stature. His leadership was undermined, first and foremost, by the 
incohesiveness of his own party, the Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS). Marked 
programmatic differences and on-going internal disputes within the AWS pushed 
Buzek into a constant balancing act between different factions of his own party. His 
role as prime minister was further weakened by the presence of the AWS leader, 
Marian Krzaklewski, outside the government. Buzek’s authority in cabinet was often 
challenged by Leszek Balcerowicz, deputy prime minister, finance minister and 
leader of the AWS’s coalition partner, the Freedom Union. Having no independent 
power base, the prime minister was frequently held hostage by deals struck between 
Krzaklewski and Balcerowicz (Zubek 2001; Zubek 2005 forthcoming).
Organizational Fragmentation o f the European Core
Rather than strengthening the role of the European core, the AWS and the UW were 
thus more interested to shackle the KIE chair and to downgrade the competencies of 
the UKIE and the KIE committee. This was most evident in the organizational
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fragmentation of the core when, after protracted political bargaining between the two 
coalition parties, the chief negotiator and his accession coordination machinery were 
located outside the KIE and the UKIE. Buzek and Czamecki were opposed to 
placing the chief negotiator within the Freedom Union-dominated foreign office but 
the attachment within the UKIE was contested by the UW leaders (interview 34, 
p.2). The main candidate for the job, Jan Kulakowski, former ambassador to the EU 
also rejected the latter option (interview 49, p.T). A high-level UKIE official said, 
‘Kulakowski himself did not agree [to the UKIE attachment], since he believed the 
problems that the negotiations entailed would be of the kind that he could be 
effective only if he were deputy foreign minister or was located close to the prime 
minister’ (interview 34, p. 7).
In the end, a compromise solution was chosen, and Jan Kulakowski was appointed 
cabinet plenipotentiary at secretary of state level within the Prime Minister’s 
Chancellery (KPRM). The chief negotiator stood at the head of a negotiation team 
that comprised undersecretaries of state nominated by line ministries, though 
appointed in a personal capacity by the prime minister. Kulakowski had two deputies 
at secretary of state level, one from the foreign ministry and the other from the 
UKIE. The team’s permanent secretary was an undersecretary of state from the 
UKIE. The negotiation team was assisted by an interministerial committee for the 
accession negotiations which had operated at undersecretary level since the mid 1997 
to screen domestic legislation for negotiations problems. The committee was led by 
the KIE chairman, and Kulakowski became its deputy chair. See Figure 3.2.
The separation of the UKIE from the Chief Negotiator led to intense inter- 
organizational rivalries. Having lost his bid to have the chief negotiator as his deputy, 
Czamecki had an ambition to control his staff at operational level (interview 34, p. 6; 
interview 30, p. 3). An KPRM official said, ‘[The relations] were terrible. The 
Christian Democrats’ appointees [at the UKIE] wanted to have the widest possible 
control over us but had no professional justification, for these people had limited 
expertise in EU affairs. They took every chance to incapacitate us. It was a fierce 
fight’ (interview 30, p. 3). The rivalry was also evident in Czamecki’s refusal to 
second some of the UKIE personnel to Kulakowski. Since mid 1997, the UKIE had 
had a Department for Accession Negotiations (DNA) providing administrative 
support to the interministerial committee for accession negotiations. As Kulakowski
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was not able to retain a large staff at the KPRM for budgetary reasons, he asked for 
the DNA personnel to be placed under his control (interview 30, p. 5). It was only 
after Buzek’s intervention that Czamecki reluctantly agreed to delegate one section 
o f the DNA to work directly for the chief negotiator, though it remained 
organizationally part of the UKIE (cf. Official Communication SJK/7-37/98 1998).
Figure 3.2. Individual and Collective Actors in EU Affairs within the Core Executive in 1998
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The hybrid organizational arrangement fuelled further rivalries between the UKIE
and the KPRM. The seconded section, called the Centre Supporting the Accession 
Negotiations (CONA), though formally part of the DNA department, became 
increasingly alienated from the rest of the UKIE, working more and more closely 
with Kulakowski’s small team in the KPRM (cf. Internal Memo DNA/1632/98
1998). It quickly marginalized the remaining part o f the DNA -  in November 1998 it 
already employed 14 staff, while the rest of the DNA had a personnel of four 
including the director. An UKIE minister said,
‘This [institutional arrangement] posed many problem. In formal terms the 
[CONA] answered to the UKIE management, but at an operational level it 
was accountable to minister Kulakowski. But any attempt to exercise the 
formal lines of accountability was considered an attack on the chief 
negotiator, and the CONA management or Kulakowski complained that we 
put pressure on them (...) later (...) Kulakowski was aware that the CONA
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worked without any supervision and had become alienated in the sense that it 
only did what it wanted’, (interview 15, p. 11)
The complex organizational matrix inhibited information flows between the CONA 
and the rest of the UKIE (interview 13, p. 12). A DPI official said, ‘[The 
cooperation] was not too good. The [CONA] had an odd status: we were all on the 
same budget but they answered to the chief negotiator who was in the KPRM. Even 
our minister sometimes did not have any influence over what they did. This gives 
you some idea how hard it was for someone like a department director to be able to 
affect their work’ (interview 8, p. 7).
The inter-party competition and a general malaise in EU affairs further prevented 
ministers from addressing organizational problems that were revealed in the process 
of transposition. The KIE chairman was, for example, hampered in his role as 
facilitator of EU transposition by weak institutional linkages between his secretariat 
and other central agencies within the core executive. This was particularly apparent 
in the UKIE’s relationship with the Prime Minister’s Chancellery. During the semi­
annual planning cycle the Chancellery’s Cabinet Agenda Department did not verify 
whether line ministries included transposition commitments in their inputs into the 
cabinet legislative plan (interview 7, p. 13; interview 2, p. 5). A Chancellery official 
said, ‘cooperation with them [UKIE] is limited. There is also limited information 
with regard to the decisions made in the KIE committee (...). Our role has been 
limited to routing of documentation from the UKIE to the cabinet’ (interview 4, p. 
ii).
There was also limited communication with the finance ministry led by Leszek 
Balcerowicz. The transposition planning process was weakly coordinated with the 
budgetary cycle. An UKIE minister said, ‘the translation [of transposition 
commitments] into the budget was delayed in time (...) unfortunately the two 
processes were not correlated. The work on the national programme for the adoption 
of the acquis was finalized in mid-year, at a time when the discussions on the next 
budget only started’ (interview 16, p. 1). Furthermore, since 1994 the finance 
ministry had blocked proposals to introduce EU-related expenditure into the formal 
budgetary classification, concerned that this might legitimize ministerial bids for 
more budgetary resources (Komisja ds Ukladu Europejskiego 1994; Komisja ds 
Ukladu Europejskiego 1996). In effect, line ministries had subsumed EU-related
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expenditure under existing budget heads which made it difficult for the centre to 
control what resources were in fact allocated to transposition (cf. Official 
Communication SekrMinPS/1296/99 1999).
Finally, besides problems resulting from the UKTE-KPRM divide, there were also 
organizational tensions within the UKIE itself. See Figure 3.3. The key issue was 
limited cooperation between the two main departments involved in legal adaptation. 
The Department of Integration Policy, employing 19 staff mostly with an economics 
background, was the lead department for supporting interministerial coordination. Its 
brief covered, in particular, the planning and monitoring of adaptation action at 
ministry level. The other department was the Department of Legal Harmonization 
(DHPiST), staffed with 24 lawyers, which had a more analytical profile and 
concentrated mainly on checking all government initiated drafts for compliance with 
the EU law. To a large extent these two departments worked independently. An 
UKIE official said, ‘There were no stable, binding procedures requiring the two 
departments to work together closely. And, if there are no such procedures or similar 
frameworks, then bureaucratic units have a tendency to work and function 
autonomously’ (interview 26, p. 9-10).
The weak cooperation was most evident during interministerial consultations. Acting 
on behalf of the KIE chairman, the DHPiST prepared a legal compatibility 
assessment, while the DPI provided more general comments on the compliance with 
national transposition commitments. Despite a complementary character of these 
tasks, the two departments had developed no standard operating procedure for 
communication at an operational level (interview 25, p. 5-7; interview 8, p. 10-11). 
In effect, the two opinions frequently provided competing assessments (cf. Internal 
Memo DHPiST/173/98 1998). The relationship between the DHPiST and the DPI 
was hindered, in large part, by different professional profiles of their staff and 
personal ambitions of their directors (interview 26, p. 10). The sympathies of the 
UKIE leadership also mattered. Under Czamecki the rivalry between the DHPiST 
and the DPI was further fuelled by the KIE chairman’s close collaboration with the 
DHPiST and his relative mistrust for the undersecretary of state supervising the DPI 
(interview 25, p. 5-7; interview 40, p. 1).
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Figure 3.3. UKIE’s Organigram in December 1998 (staff level in brackets)
UNDER­
SECRETARY OF 
STATE
UNDER­
SECRETARY OF 
STATE
Department for 
European Education 
(20)
HR and Training 
Office
Director General's 
Office 
(13)
DIRECTOR
GENERAL
Political Cabinet of 
the KIE Chairman
Administration and 
Payments Office 
(45)
UKIE
Secretariat
(44)
Legal Harmonization 
Department 
(DHPiST)
(24)
Integration 
Policy Department 
(DPI)
(19)
Department for 
Information and 
Communication 
(27)
European
Documentation
Department
(20)
International
Relations
Department
(22)
Accession 
Negotiations 
Department (DNA) 
(27)
KIE SECRETARY
Department of 
Foreign Assistance, 
and Community 
Programmes and 
Funds 
(28)
Source: own compilation based on Executive Regulation No 6 of the KIE Chair of 3 June 1998 
and Executive Regulation no 1 of the KIE secretary of 30 September 1998, staff figures were 
supplied to the author by the UKIE secretariat
The Impact on Authority and Information Rules
Problematic political leadership combined to dampen the central control over the 
process of EU transposition. In late 1997 and early 1998, this was clearly evident 
when the Buzek government set out to prepare a national programme for the 
adoption of the acquis (NPAA). In response to the EU-formulated accession 
partnership, Polish ministries for the first time had to plan transposition of the entire 
Community legislation. In December 1997 the KIE committee approved a list of 
adaptation priorities to be addressed and a general template that ministries had to 
follow in the preparation of the programme (cf. UKIE Internal Document 10/12/1997
1997). But the KIE chairman and the UKIE left ministries far-reaching freedom in 
the practical ‘who, when and what’ of transposition (interview 8, p. 5; interview 46, 
p. 5). Responsibility for identifying EU measures and domestic legislative actions
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was firmly with line ministers. The UKIE only collated and checked their inputs for 
compliance with the pre-agreed format. An UKIE official said,
The first NPAA (...) contained information that a particular ministry wanted 
it to contain. Ministries were not required to identify all EU legal measures 
for each priority they addressed [and] (...) identified only those EU measures 
that they thought they would be able to transpose, given the cabinet 
legislative plan and the like. So [commitments] were a bit accidental. For 
instance, if  a ministry was working on a new energy law, it would decide to 
implement this and that [directive] on the margins of that new law’, 
(interview 21, p. 3)
The ministries alone were responsible for making provisions within their budgets to 
implement the NPAA. The same decentralized rule applied to the NPAA’s 
integration with the cabinet’s semi-annual legislative planning cycle (cf. Official 
Communication SekrMinRCZ/2047/w/98/DPI-TBG 1998).
Most importantly, the Czamecki-led KIE departed from a practice that slowly had 
evolved under Cimoszewicz that the committee had competence to process EU- 
related legislation. Draft transposing measures were prepared by line ministries and 
then routed through the standard interministerial procedures and cabinet committees 
together with non-transposing legislation. This change was part of a more general 
downgrading of the KIE’s status. The committee’s predicament was revealed in the 
low frequency of its meetings, the secondary rank of its participants and the general 
nature of its agenda. Between October 1997 and June 1998, the KIE met on a 
monthly basis and held only eight sessions. Each meeting lasted approx. 2.5 hours on 
average. Its agenda was dominated by formal presentations of reports and documents 
rather than real decision-making. To salvage the KIE’s authority, the prime minister 
attended and chaired the committee meetings, despite Czamecki being formally in 
the chair (interview 20, p. 3). Even so, the KIE evolved towards a monthly debating 
forum, attended mainly by junior ministers, civil servants and numerous guests 
including academics and parliamentarians (interview 14, p. 4; interview 15, p. 4-5). 
A close observer said,
‘The KIE did not have any legislative initiative. All in-coming draft laws 
were only screened [for EU compatibility] by the UKIE and the Foreign 
Office. The KIE’s role was a mere formality. (...) The KIE heard reports.
(...) It had no control powers or powers to take initiatives’, (interview 36, p.
4)
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Denied the opportunity to set the legislative agenda within the KIE committee, the 
KIE chairman and the UKIE confined their role to reactive comments on draft 
legislation within interministerial consultations. Like all other ministries, it received 
draft legislation for comments and could review its compliance with transposition 
commitments (interview 8, p. 11; interview 46, p. 7). But the UKIE’s position in the 
process was on a par with other ministries and its opinion had the status of one 
ministry’s comment on another’s draft.
A slightly more authoritative instrument was provided by the EU compatibility 
assessment, a procedure under which the KIE chairman screened all legislation for 
compliance with the Community law. Based on the authority of the cabinet bye-laws, 
such assessments had to be attached to all cabinet submissions. However, their 
effectiveness as a transposition guidance was limited, since they focused on legal 
conformity per se rather than on implementation of transposition commitments 
(interview 45, p. 8). An UKIE lawyer thus summarized the approach adopted in the 
compatibility assessment,
‘We [the DHPiST] concentrated more on legal implementation rather than on 
planning legal adaptation. (...) in all honesty, we did not care when, in what 
sequence and by whom such adaptation will be carried out. For us, it was the 
result that mattered. We made sure that changes that must be made were 
made in compatibility with the EU directives. The deadlines and timing were 
of secondary importance to us’, (interview 13, p. 2)
The UKIE staff were rarely involved in the law-making process at operational level. 
Only sporadically did they participate in interministerial conciliation committees (cf. 
Internal Memo DPI 12/10/1999 1999), while legislation-focused task forces 
involving the UKIE staff were the exception rather than the rule (interview 52, p. 7- 
8). A high-level UKIE lawyer admitted that the DHPiST had interacted with line 
ministries only when the latter had disagreed with their compatibility assessment 
(interview 25, p. 10). This passive role of the UKIE’s legal services was confirmed 
by an agriculture ministry official who said, ‘they [UKIE lawyers] maintained -  
which was probably true -  that they had too much work to be able to help us or 
offered to help us at such future times that we were able to solve the problems 
ourselves by then’ (interview 42, p. 4).
Transposition work at line ministry level was not subject to weekly or monthly 
monitoring procedures that could mobilize ministerial officials on a regular basis.
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When adopting the NPAA in May 1998, the KIE committee asked its chairman to , 
report on progress only once a year. Part of the problem was that the transposition 
commitments contained in the NPAA provided too general an indication of the 
transposition tasks and the timetable for their implementation. A minister said, ‘the 
national programme [NPAA] was not liable to week-to-week or month-to-month 
monitoring given that transposition deadlines were identified with yearly precision’ 
(interview 15, p. 7).
Admittedly, the UKIE secretariat did track legislative changes on the margins of 
parallel processes (interview 15, p. 6-7; interview 27, p. 1; interview 46, p. 5). This 
was chiefly done during the preparation of the Polish input into the Commission’s 
regular progress report (interview 8, p.l). The first such report was to be published in 
autumn 1998 and, already in mid-year, line ministries were asked by the UKIE to 
prepare the necessary information (cf. Official Communication 
SekrMinJP/355/w/98/DPI-ES 1998). Another opportunity, although perhaps less 
effective, was provided by the meetings of the Europe Agreement institutions, at 
which Polish ministries presented the Commission with an update on transposition 
(interview 46, p. 1). The final monitoring channel was a bimonthly updating by line 
ministries of the Harmonogram Database, which since early 1996 had been 
maintained by the Taiex office in Brussels (interview 21, p. 6). Besides such 
institutionalized processes, the UKIE secretariat also undertook ad hoc interventions 
in crisis situations (interview 46, p. 5). While taken together these information 
channels ensured that the UKIE had a fairly good idea about the progress of 
transposition, they had the effect of mobilizing ministerial officials in irregular -  at 
best six-monthly -  intervals.
The KIE chairman and the UKIE had also limited institutional levers to sanction non- 
compliance if transposition delays were detected. Neither the KIE committee nor the 
cabinet considered transposition progress on a regular basis which made it difficult 
for the KIE chairman or the prime minister to provide positive or negative incentives 
to non-compliant ministers. Enforcement was thus undertaken only in crisis 
situations through the KIE chairman’s ad hoc interventions with the prime minister. 
An UKIE official said,
‘If one of our experts at the department saw there was a problem, for
example, a particular draft law was scheduled for the end of May, and came
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April no work was under way, he or she would alert his boss and the 
department director who would, in turn, check what the status was, and if 
that did not help, we would take the matter up [to the minister]’, (interview 
4 6 , p. 5)
The effectiveness of such interventions was, however, adversely affected by the KIE 
chairman’s weak political position and his gradually deteriorating relationship with 
the prime minister (interview 20, p. 3). This lack of enforcement from the centre was 
recalled by a economics ministry official who said, ‘I remember my surprise when a 
large number of tasks that had had to be undertaken in a given year or within some 
time brackets were subsequently deferred to a new deadline, [and this was done] 
completely without any consequences’ (interview 19, p. 7-8).
Finally, after the accession negotiations were launched in March 1998, the core did 
not mobilize line ministers and their departments to translate the screening lists and 
negotiation positions into specific legislative blueprints. In large part, this lack of 
control seems to have stemmed from the confidential nature of negotiation 
documents. An UKIE official said, ‘In the beginning we adopted very restrictive 
rules as to the accessibility of negotiation-related documentation. Most of it was 
confidential and so it did not reach ordinary staff. And certainly this was a mistake. 
(...) [The documents] were only distributed to the members of the negotiation team 
at junior minister level’ (interview 30, p. 6). In effect, by retaining the monopoly of 
negotiation-related information, the core made it difficult for ministerial staff to 
integrate negotiation commitments into their day-to-day work. An internal document 
thus summarized the situation, ‘The draft negotiation positions are prepared and 
analyzed by a small group of people and so the exact nature of negotiation 
commitments is not generally known to ministerial staff. As a result, when preparing 
programmes and draft laws central government staff do not take account of 
negotiation commitments’ (UKIE Internal Document 12/07/1999 1999),
It is also important to note that transposition commitments fell between two stools 
within the core executive. Kulakowski’s negotiation team focused initially on 
technical administrative support to line ministries during the screening process. An 
official at the Department for Accession Negotiations said,
‘Our role was that of pure organizational support. We focused on mundane 
but necessary things such as arranging travel, routing and consulting 
documents. And this is where our job ended. (...) At the start of the 
negotiations we were involved in the technical support of interministerial
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consultation meetings where screening lists A and B were discussed. (...)
We were responsible for the flow of the entire [screening] documentation, 
i.e. sending lists to ministries, electronic communication, collating 
documents, attending the interministerial meetings. (...) We also kept all 
records’, (interview 32, p. 1)
When the negotiations were extended to cover the most sensitive issues, 
Kulakowski’s focus shifted to the identification of the key negotiation problems 
(UKIE Internal Document 1998b). His team became more actively involved ip 
shaping the nature of Polish negotiation commitments, in particular by developing 
arguments to substantiate ministerial requests for transitional periods (interview 30, 
p. 6). It also tackled regulatory and budgetary impact assessment (interview 10, p. I; 
interview 58). But it had limited interest to assess legislative consequences of the 
negotiations. Some analytical work in this area was conducted in the DNA but their 
reports were rarely practical enough and were not used as transposition guidance for 
ministries (interview 11, p. 2). In effect, the chief negotiator’s team did not maintain 
regular monitoring or enforcement of the transposition commitments made during 
the negotiations. An UKIE official said,
‘In my assessment the DNA had an important role to play when it came to 
the preparation of negotiations sessions, instructions, explanatory notes, etc.
But they completely lost interest the moment a session was closed. They did 
not mind what happened afterwards. Of course there were certain crucial 
issues that captured their interest but these were [selected] issues that made it 
to the headlines’, (interview 46, p. 6)
Neither did the UKIE become involved in mobilizing ministries to make good on 
their screening and negotiation commitments. For one thing, they too had problems 
with accessing confidential negotiation documents. In September 1998, an UKIE 
junior minister wrote to the chief negotiator indicating that negotiation documents 
were not passed over the UKIE, which made it difficult to monitor the 
implementation of adaptation commitments (Official Communication 
SekrMinMKF/644/98/os 1998). The communication problems persisted and were 
again signalled by the UKIE the following year (cf. Internal Memo DHPiST/141/99
1999). Also, one needs to note that the UKIE did not play a prominent role in the 
formulation of the negotiation positions which, counter to the formal procedure 
established in July 1998, were first approved by Kulakowski’s Negotiation Team 
and, only then, passed on to other ministries, including the UKIE, for interministerial 
consultations. In effect, the interministerial committee for the preparation of the
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accession negotiations, formally chaired by the UKIE head, was by-passed (Internal 
Memo DNA/355/99 1999).
Most significantly, the UKIE did not develop any regular procedure for integrating 
the screening and negotiation commitments into the NPAA. A DPI official said,
‘We relied on institutional memory of our staff. Someone who had attended 
a negotiation session looked into his or her notes and suggested that the 
NPAA should be supplemented with this or that task. (...) We [also] 
received all formal protocols and instructions. There were also many 
personal contacts. (...) So it was informal cooperation, informal exchange of 
information’, (interview 46, p. 6)
The situation was not much improved by an arrangement that each negotiation 
chapter had a central note-taker who attended all screening and negotiation sessions. 
These staff were recruited from three different central agencies -  the UKIE, KPRM 
and the Foreign Office -  and hence provided little added-value for coordination 
within the core executive. The KIE committee discussed transposition mainly in the 
context of the NPAA (cf. UKIE Internal Document 1998c). Similarly, the 
Department of Integration Policy (DPI) continued to focus predominately on the 
NPAA programme as the bearing mark for EU transposition. The NPAA was thus 
quickly losing relevance as the key guidance instrument in EU transposition. The 
same was true of the transposition annex to the NPAA, which the UKIE’s legal 
department, DHPiST, prepared in the second half of 1998. The DHPiST did not 
incorporate the specific issues disclosed during the screening sessions, but based it 
on much less precise original formulations made in early 1998. Unsurprisingly, the 
annex was quickly discarded as adding little value (interview 15, p. 15).
To summarize, between September 1997 and July 1998 (when Czamecki resigned), 
the position rules relating to the KIE committee and the KIE chair remained 
unchanged. What changed, however, was the opportunity which existed under the 
Cimoszewicz government to invoke the formal and informal authority and 
information rules attached to the position of the prime minister. As demonstrated 
above, that possibility disappeared for two reasons. First, the Buzek government 
departed from the practice of prime ministerial chairmanship of the KIE committee 
and appointed a cabinet minister to the KIE chair. Second, and perhaps more 
importantly, the prime minister’s weak political standing frequently prevented him
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from invoking his formal prerogatives, even tljpugh, in practice, he often presided 
over the KIE meetings.
Under these circumstances, ministers and departments faced only the limited 
authority and information rules attached directly to the position of the KIE chair and 
the KIE committee. These, however, had not been well institutionalized, as shown at 
the start of this chapter. Worse, the external and domestic incentives as well as the 
institutional setting did not facilitate the development of such rules. For one thing, 
neither Czamecki nor Buzek had strong personal incentives to act as a political 
entrepreneur for such new rules. In any case, both had too weak a standing to make 
such an attempt likely to succeed. Moreover, the intra-coalition conflicts prevented 
ministers from entering into collective commitments to new rules within the KIE. In 
fact, the KIE committee became less and less operational as the frequency of the 
meetings dropped, the agenda grew ceremonial and ministers began to send junior 
deputies. Also, the ability of the KIE chair and the KIE committee to extend selective 
incentives and monitoring was undermined by a competition with the chief 
negotiator and the negotiations teams, fragmentation of resources such as personnel 
and finance, and organizational conflicts at departmental level within the UKIE. 
Finally, the accession negotiations only just started and there was no pressure from 
the EU that would provide ministers incentives to develop new rules.
As a result, the authority and information rules attached to the position of the KIE 
chair/secretary and the KIE committee remained limited, both in number and scope, 
throughout the period. The dearth of institutional incentives was most evident with 
regard to authority rules. In a departure from the practice developing under the 
Cimoszewicz chairmanship, the KIE committee did not work on transposing 
legislation. Its involvement in the legislative process was limited to passive screening 
for EU compatibility performed by the KIE chair. Neither the KIE committee nor its 
chair had any authority to encourage ministers and departments to actively contribute 
to the transposition record. Also, the rivalry between the UKIE and the chief 
negotiator’s team prevented the development of authority rules that would encourage 
the translation of screening tables into legislative commitments.
The situation looked slightly better when it came to information rules. But, although 
the KIE committee and the KIE chair were involved in planning and monitoring 
transposition, the applicable rules provided rather lightweight constraints on
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ministers and departments. In planning, only general templates were provided to 
ministries and programmes were collated from ministerial inputs without much 
substantive involvement by the KIE chair or the KIE committee. In monitoring, 
progress was comprehensively assessed by the KIE committee only once a year, with 
no week-to-week or month-to-month checks at operational level.
III. The Neglected Core Persists
Between July 1998 and December 1998 a significant, albeit unsuccessful, attempt 
was undertaken to provide for new authority and information rules that would 
enhance intra-executive incentives that ministers and departments faced in EU 
transposition. The opportunity for institutional change within the core executive 
arose when prime minister Buzek assumed the KIE chairmanship, following the 
departure of minister Czamecki in July 1998. Czamecki’s position in cabinet had 
been on the decline since early 1998, not least because the smaller coalition party, 
the Freedom Union (UW), lobbied for the prime minister to chair the KIE, an 
arrangement that would allow more manoeuvring space to the UW-nominated 
foreign minister (interview 20, p. 2-3; (Rzeczpospolita 1998). But Czamecki was 
more generally perceived as a weak Europe minister, and he was dismissed after 
Poland had lost a significant share of the Phare resources (Groblewski 1998; Subotic
1998). Standing at the KIE’s helm, the prime minister appointed a new 
undersecretary of state within the UKIE, Maria Karasinska-Fendler, who became a 
provisional KIE secretary.
Having carried out a stock-taking exercise, Karasinska-Fendler alerted Buzek in 
September 1998 to serious transposition delays that had accumulated under 
Czamecki. An UKIE minister said,
‘Based bn ministerial reports [Karasinska-Fendler] had the implementation 
of the NPAA measured in a single table with pluses and minuses where a 
law had been adopted or not adopted. The tabfl generated a major turmoil in 
cabinet because it turned out that ministers undertook commitments but were 
not able to deliver’, (interview 36, p. 5)
The new KIE secretary proposed to Buzek that the negotiation team should be 
replaced with a smaller committee of state undersecretaries from the UKIE, Foreign 
Office and the Economics Ministry (interview 36, p. 11). The KIE secretary further 
recommended that junior line ministers should be required to produce -  after each 
screening session -  a detailed list of legislative initiatives that had to be undertaken
60
to transpose relevant EU measures. The UKIE would then integrate the list with the 
NPAA on a regular basis (Bielecki 1998). In addition, Karasinska-Fendler wanted to 
establish a ‘rolling’ catalogue of outstanding legislative drafts (KIE Protocol 8/1998 
1998; UKIE Internal Document SS/2/1/009 1998). Finally, she proposed to 
reorganize the UKIE by dismissing around 150 people (interview 36, 11). 
Karasinska-Fendler’s proposals were largely in line with similar suggestions made at 
the time by chief negotiator Kulakowski and other members of the Negotiation Team 
(cf. KPRM Internal Document 17/12/1998 1998; KPRM Internal Document 
SS/2/1/034 1998).
These proposals, however, remained largely unimplemented culminating in 
Karasinska-Fendler’s resignation in December 1998. There seem to have been two 
principal factors that contributed to the collapse of her reform plan. The first factor 
was Karasinska-Fendler’s lack of wider political legitimacy within the government. 
Due to an internal coalition deadlock, she was appointed only a provisional KIE 
secretary at undersecretary of state level. After prime minister Buzek had assumed 
the KIE chairmanship, the Freedom Union (UW) evoked an unwritten rule that 
guaranteed that if the minister came from one party, his first deputy had to be 
nominated by the other coalition party (interview 16, p. 7). Buzek being a member of 
the AWS, the UW wanted to nominate his deputy, the KIE secretary (Saijusz-Wolski 
1999; Wielowieyska 1999; Subotic 1999b). The AWS failed to honour this 
arrangement and the UW blocked a permanent appointment to the post. Karasinska- 
Fendler’s provisional status and a relatively low rank within the administration 
proved a major handicap. An UKIE minister thus summarized Karasinska-Fendler’s 
predicament, ‘[she] had no political power base and nobody supported her, neither 
the SLD, nor the Solidarity’ (interview 36, p. 3). A high-level UKIE official 
confirmed,
‘There is a natural restraint when someone who is a provisional appointee 
contacts a full minister (...) also for a person who holds a position equivalent 
to an undersecretary of state it is more difficult to negotiate with a cabinet 
minister. (...) I think this is one of the reasons why the secretariat [the 
UKIE] was not able to achieve what it planned to do (...) our authority to 
convince others or to impose what we had planned was inadequate’, 
(interview 16, p. 8)
The second, and perhaps more important, factor was Karasinska-Fendler’s inability 
to rely on the full support of the prime minister (interview 36, p. 7). Buzek, who
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despite becoming the KIE chair continued to have a weak political position within 
his cabinet and party, had neither personal motivation nor sufficient authority to back 
Karasinska-Fendler’s proposals. Also, at the end of 1998 his government was 
finalizing work on the legislation introducing the social and economic reforms that 
were to be launched from January 1999. Buzek’s attention was thus firmly on 
domestic politics (interview 36, p. 2). A minister said, ‘the most serious problem then 
was that [Karasinska-Fendler] could not convince the prime minister that, while he 
would not win elections on European integration alone, he would be certain to lose 
them [if his government failed on that issue]. But because this was not a political 
priority, [Karasinska-Fendler] was a redundant minister’ (interview 36, p. 7).
This episode demonstrates that, between June and December 1998, the position, 
authority and information rules that the core executive had at its disposal to induce 
ministers and departments to contribute to EU transposition remained unchanged in 
their scope and substance. This was despite Karasinska-Fendler’s entrepreneurship 
undertaken in the face of mounting evidence of transposition delays. Karasinska- 
Fendler’s failure to trigger institutional change raises two important points. First, it 
shows that the outcome of entrepreneurship in institution-building was heavily 
dependent on the prime minister’s support, the preferences of the main coalition 
parties and Karasinska-Fendler’s own political and institutional standing. In a 
situation where such conditions were not favourable, the KIE secretary’s mission 
could hardly succeed. Second, it is interesting to note that, although Buzek assumed 
the KIE chairmanship, his weak political standing largely prevented him from 
exercising the formal and informal prerogatives attached to the prime ministerial 
position. This was in stark contrast to prime minister Cimoszewicz in the years 1996- 
1997. Hence, the weak institutionalization of the rules attached to the position of the 
KIE committee and the KIE chair could not be compensated by strong incentives 
extended by prime minister Buzek. In any case, due to an overloaded schedule of any 
premier, his interventions could only be ad hoc and limited to specific issues.
IV. External and Domestic Conditions Change
The conditions that had until then prevented the reinforcement of the authority and 
information rules began to change from early 1999. As a result, both prime minister 
Buzek and chief negotiator Kulakowski emerged as key entrepreneurs seeking to
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develop institutional levers with which to mobilize ministers to adopt transposing 
legislation.
The Prime Minister as Rule Entrepreneur
In spring 1999, EU transposition attracted the close attention of prime minister 
Buzek. There were a number of reasons for the prime minister’s new interest, most 
notably (i) a gradual evolution of his personal stance on EU affairs, (ii) the prospect 
of an impending crisis in accession negotiations and (iii) domestic political 
calculations within the AWS-UW cabinet. The first point to note is that Buzek’s 
personal preferences as prime minister evolved from relative indifference to 
increasing engagement in EU affairs. An UKIE minister said, 4since he took the 
office, the prime minister had undergone a major personal transformation, that is, he 
changed from a largely unknown politician with a rather simplistic worldview to a 
politician who appreciated Poland’s position in the external world’ (interview 15, p. 
13). In this, Buzek was aided by his advisors. A senior advisor recollected,
‘Arkuszewski [the chef de cabinet] managed to organize a really exceptional 
exercise - a personal workshop in European integration for the prime 
minister. We took him away for one whole day. (...) And three people 
lectured the prime minister on what the European Union was. (...) We 
covered it all, from the Treaty of Paris to the present day, going through all 
the EU policies one by one.’ (interview 35, p. 2)
In large part, the prime minister’s new interest in EU-related affairs was also a 
function of the negotiation dynamic which in early 1999 had reached an advanced 
stage. Increasingly drawn into the accession process, Buzek soon realized that the 
slow pace of domestic adaptation was becoming Poland’s chief liability and, if 
unaddressed, it might seriously undermine the country’s bid for membership 
(interview 29, p. 13; interview 15, p. 5; interview 16, p. 4). Most significantly, his 
attention was caught by alarming signals from the European Union (interview 49, p. 
4). An UKIE official said,
‘There were official visits by European Commissioners who directly said 
what they thought about the situation (...) There was an exchange of letters, 
perhaps not yet at political level but no longer at official level, for example, 
communications from Poland Director at DG Enlargement to the KIE 
secretary or minister Pietras, the secretary of the negotiation team. All these 
contributed [to increased awareness of the prime minister]’, (interview 46, p.
2)
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The decisive moment came at the end of April 1999 when a negative assessment was 
repeated by the European Commission during the 7 meeting of the Association 
Committee. The Commission clearly stated that, unless Poland improved its 
adaptation record, it would not be admitted in the first round of enlargement and 
would lose a substantial share of the financial assistance (UKIE Internal Document 
June 1999 1999, p. 2). An UKIE minister said,
‘In April 1999 we had a meeting of the association committee where the 
Commission indicated that it would take an extremely critical position [in the 
forthcoming progress report on Poland]. And that information reached the 
prime minister -  it managed to get through all the organizational shields that 
usually surround the prime minister and reached him. And the prime minister 
decided to take this up’, (interview 15, p. 13)
But equally important were domestic signals indicating that EU transposition lagged 
behind. Most significantly, the revision of the NPAA programme in March 1999 
revealed serious hold-ups in the transposition process (interview 16, p. 4) 
(Apanowicz 1999). As a follow-up, the UKIE provided a detailed report to the prime 
minister and identified a list of priority areas where immediate action had to be taken 
(cf. KIE Protocol 03/1999 1999).
The prime minister’s final conversion to EU transposition came when he saw the 
opportunity for using integration with Europe as a way of injecting new impetus into 
his government. By mid 1999, the socio-economic reforms that formed the core of 
the AWS-UW coalition had been well-advanced, and the Buzek government looked 
for new challenges (cf. Paradowska 1999a). The introduction of fresh policy issues 
was also hoped to prop up the waning popularity of the government. Although the 
coalition parties were split on what the government should concentrate on, both the 
AWS and the UW agreed that EU integration had to be addressed (cf. Paradowska 
1999b). An UKIE minister said, ‘Looking for [new] objectives for his cabinet 
[Buzek] identified European integration as an objective that he was able to realize, 
and one that would both let him avoid a crisis and achieve something’ (interview 15, 
p. 13). Accordingly, in September 1999 the prime minister identified EU-related 
legal adaptation as one of five major priorities for the last two years of his cabinet’s 
term (Gazeta Wyborcza 1999; Official Communication SekrMinPS/1768/99/DPI-mk
1999).
64
Additional Rule Entrepreneurship by the Chief Negotiator
Buzek’s interest in transposition was matched by an increasing attention that the 
chief negotiator and his staff paid to the process of internal adaptation. Around the 
early 1999, when the negotiations started to cover the most crucial chapters of the 
acquis communautaire, Kulakowski and his team began to realize that the slow pace 
of transposition was adversely affecting their ability to achieve further progress 
(interview 27, page 2). A close observer said,
‘(...) the chief negotiator did not have any influence over the cabinet, did not 
have any lever to force full ministers to implement what the members of the 
negotiation team at a deputy minister rank declared. All were under the 
illusion that the negotiations would last long, and so they did not have to 
rush things, there being so much other more important business. And at some 
point we realized that there was a large number of things which we had 
promised to do but which were lagging behind.’ (interview 30, p.3)
Kulakowski’s new interest was also a direct result of a significant change in the 
negotiation tactics on the part of the European Union. Since the early 1999, the 
European Commission had started to place more emphasis on the pace of adaptation 
as a measure for assessing the candidate country’s progress towards accession. The 
Polish ambassador to the EU wrote, ‘The emphasis has clearly shifted from 
measuring negotiation progress by the number of closed chapters to measuring 
progress by the degree of [internal] adaptation, and the pace of accession 
negotiations is now determined by the pace of internal alignment in the candidate 
countries’ (Official Communication SJK/456-406/99 1999).
Realizing that further progress in the accession negotiations was not viable unless the 
transposition backlog was dealt with, Kulakowski’s negotiation team started looking 
internally for ways in which to influence the transposition process (interview 27, 
page 2). A member of Kulakowski’s staff thus captured this new dynamic, ‘we tried 
to save the negotiations. We understood very quickly that unless we gave them a 
major shake-up, found some way to give a jolt to the structures responsible for 
transposition, then in some areas we would have major problems. And so this was a 
very pragmatic decision’ (interview 35, page 4).
The Failure o f Existing Rules as a Window o f  Opportunity
In mid 1999 both prime minister Buzek and chief negotiator Kulakowski realized 
that, without the creation and enforcement of new authority and information rules, it
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would not be possible to extend effective selective incentives and monitoring to 
ministers and departments. This realization came as a result of two related events. 
First, in spring 1999, Buzek failed to secure a prerequisite condition for change to 
institutional rules -  the appointment of a permanent KIE secretary and the head of 
the UKIE. That post had been vacant since December 1998 and, as the KIE 
chairman, the prime minister was interested to solve the protracted impasse. In line 
with his new interest in EU transposition, Buzek made it known in March 1999 that 
he wanted Jan Kulakowski, the chief negotiator, to become the KIE secretary, thus 
merging the UKIE and the KPRM teams (cf. Kublik 1999; Subotic 1999b).
But the Freedom Union refused to accept this arrangement and put forward Jerzy 
Osiatynski, a former UW finance minister, for the KIE secretary. In return, the UW 
offered to give up the post of culture minister. The AWS initially agreed but later 
changed tack, fearing that the UW would in effect have full control over foreign 
policy (Subotic 1999a). Consequently, Buzek suggested that the UW nominate Jacek 
Saryusz-Wolski, former cabinet plenipotentiary for European integration in 1991- 
1996, but the Freedom Union leaders refused. A minister said,
‘Mr Saryusz-Wolski is not a member of the Freedom Union or a person 
recommended by our party. [If he were to be appointed as the KIE secretary] 
we would need to receive back the post of the culture minister or an 
equivalent post This would be a good solution. But the problem is that prime 
minister Buzek wants the UW to nominate Mr Saryusz-Wolski’. (Saijusz- 
Wolski 1999, p. 3)
As a result the situation within the UKIE did not improve. Buzek appointed Saryusz- 
Wolski his personal advisor at the KPRM and the deadlock continued precluding any 
further change. In the event, in April that year, Buzek appointed Pawel Samecki as 
yet another provisional KIE secretary at state undersecretary level.
The second event came when, in mid 1999, Buzek tried, and failed, to mobilize his 
ministers in the area of EU transposition through the existing institutional 
framework. Seeking to avoid an openly negative assessment in the forthcoming 
Commission’s progress report, the prime minister convened three KIE meetings 
devoted entirely to transposition in May and June (KIE Protocol 05/1999 1999; KJE 
Protocol 06/1999 1999; KIE Protocol 07/1999 1999). A list of most pressing issues 
was prepared based on assessments from the UKIE, Kulakowski and the Polish 
ambassador to the EU (UKIE Internal Document 28/06/1999 1999; UKIE Internal
Document DPI 16/06/1999 1999). At the accession conference in Brussels in June, 
the Polish foreign minister made a firm commitment to submit outstanding 
legislation to parliament by July (UKIE Internal Document 16/06/1999 1999). 
Inviting the ministers responsible for major delays to the special KIE meetings, 
Buzek asked them to present realistic action plans. The KIE imposed specific 
deadlines on ministers and asked the UKIE to monitor implementation. A few ad hoc 
meetings were convened between Buzek and individual ministers to resolve the most 
contentious issues.
But this attempt largely failed (Apanowicz and Bielecki 1999). Although some 
transposition activity was registered in June-July, it did not translate into a new 
sustainable dynamic. The prime minister did not convene a KIE meeting in June 
which were to review the implementation progress, perhaps knowing he would need 
to openly admit defeat. The failure proved to Buzek and Kulakowski that without 
new rules the process of transposition would be difficult to accelerate. This mood 
was best captured by one government minister who said, ‘Buzek was scared, he was 
really terrified by the situation and he wanted to change this. But he had too high a 
position to do it himself and he did not have the right people’ (interview 29, p. 13).
In summary, a change in external and internal opportunity structures transformed the 
preferences of the key core executive actors -  the prime minister and the chief 
negotiator -  who identified EU transposition as an area in which rapid remedial 
action was necessary. At the same time, the mid 1999 attempt to bolster the pace of 
EU transposition demonstrated that, without new institutional rules, personal 
leadership was not sufficient to produce desired outcomes. The impending 
transposition crisis also provided a new opportunity for Jerzy Buzek to use the issue 
strategically to bolster his standing within the governing coalition. As a result, in mid 
1999 Buzek and Kulakowski emerged as political entrepreneurs for the development 
of new authority and information rules. In organizing his cabinet for addressing the 
collective action problem in the improvement of the transposition record, prime 
minister Buzek knew that he could capture a leader’s profit. If successful, he would, 
first, avoid a collective bad of a major transposition debacle and, second, emerge as a 
true leader within his own party. In supporting Buzek, chief negotiator Kulakowski 
and his staff were acutely aware that any reinforcement to the existing rules would
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benefit them directly since they would be able to revitalize the accession 
negotiations.
V. The Core Reforms Hastily
Having realized that institutional levers they had at their disposal were insufficient 
for generating a new legislative dynamic, Buzek and Kulakowski started to look for 
ways in which to institutionalize a more forceful role of the centre in EU 
transposition. Since an internal coalition impasse continued to block change within 
the UKIE secretariat, it was the Prime Minister’s Chancellery (KPRM) that, in the 
following months, emerged as the dominant institutional actor in EU transposition. In 
June 1999, prime minister Buzek asked Wojciech Arkuszewski, his former chef de 
cabinet and the then secretary for parliamentary affairs at KPRM, to become 
involved more closely in the coordination of transposition legislation.
A political old hand, Arkuszewski commanded great personal authority among both 
the AWS and UW ministers and high-level civil servants (interview 35, p. 5). 
Furnished with an appropriate mandate, he could use his staff and organizational 
resources located at the KPRM’s Department of Parliamentary Affairs and 
Department of Coordination to plan and monitor transposing legislation (interview 
27, p. 2; interview 33, p. 5-6). In contrast to the UKIE secretariat, both these 
departments were closely involved in the regular legislative process within the 
executive and parliament and, hence, were able to rely on well-developed personal 
networks within the governmental administration. Last but not least, the 
organizational proximity between Arkuszewski’s and Kulakowski’s staff quickly 
locked these two teams in regular cooperation (interview 39, p. 6). A member of the 
chief negotiator’s team thus characterized Arkuszewski’s position, ‘It was a 
combination of three elements: he had personal authority, in some cases he could 
invoke the prime minister’s authority and he could invoke our [Kulakowski’s] 
authority’ (interview 35, p. 5).
Arkuszewski’s first move was to establish a detailed catalogue of all outstanding 
transposition measures, a catalogue that for the first time linked commitments made 
during accession negotiations and those undertaken in the national programme for 
the adoption of the acquis (NPAA) (Internal Memo DPI/7/12/1999 1999; Official 
Communication MJP/859/99/TN 1999; Official Communication
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SekrMinPS/1497/99/DHP/ap 1999). In planning transposition, Arkuszewski and his 
staff were assisted by two junior ministers in the UKIE and members of 
Kulakowski’s team (interview 16, page 4; interview 27, p. 1). A close observer thus 
recollected the process,
‘[Arkuszewski] asked the deputy director of the Audit Department in the 
Prime Minister’s Chancellery (...) and two secretaries to collect data. [He] 
first wrote to all deputy ministers to ask what had to be transposed and when.
And then [he] put all that information into a single database. (...) This data 
was incomplete but in a sequence of fierce arguments [he] was able to find 
out the rest. (...) The UKIE maintained their data in such a way that it had no 
practical implications (...) nobody really knew what exactly had to be done.
(...) The UKIE sent [Arkuszewski] long lists of things to do but these 
catalogues did not agree with the information [he] received from ministries.
A large part of our work was to clarify which drafts were which’, (interview 
29, p. 9-10)
By developing a detailed listing of pending transposing laws the core executive 
actors were able to gain a clear and complete picture as to what remained to be done, 
when and by whom. Arkuszewski started from short listings of most pressing issues 
(“The List of Nine”) and gradually moved to more medium-range planning 
instruments such as ‘the List of Sixty-Seven’ and the plan for the first half of 2000 
(Official Communication SWA-45-39/99 1999). Arkuszewski and his staff soon 
operationalized the listing or -  in their own words -  ‘made it fit for effective 
governing’ (interview 29, p. 10). As well as providing for precise (monthly) 
deadlines, they specified, by name and ministry, the junior ministers responsible for 
preparing individual measures and prioritized all transposing legislation using a one- 
to-five star categorization (Official Communication SWA-10-28/99 1999; Official 
Communication SWA-45-39(3)/1999 1999). In effect, each ministry’s transposition 
record became readily measurable and visible to all actors concerned.
Arkuszewski was asked by prime minister Buzek to extract from those draft laws 
whose preparation was in progress the EU-related provisions and have them 
compiled into special ‘transposition drafts’ (cf. KIE Protocol 18/1999 1999). The 
progressive operationalization of the transposition planning instrument was 
appreciated by both Kulakowski and the UKIE staff. An UKIE minister said,
‘Thanks to the newly forged partnership between the Prime Minister’s 
Chancellery and the UKIE, we were able to prepare a more advanced 
document, a plan which assigned accountability to specific people who now 
bore [personal] responsibility for both delays and successes. So I would say
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that, yes, the UKIE did have a good idea of what should be done but at the 
same time the prime minister’s chancellery played a central role by assigning 
a higher priority [to transposition] and pushing things through. By the 
authority of the prime minister’s staff the chancellery held much greater 
sway than a regular office [such as the UKIE] which, no matter how 
important, had simply none of the chancellery’s influence and powers of 
persuasion’, (interview 16, p. 4)
Detailed planning was soon matched by close monitoring and evaluation. 
Arkuszewski harnessed the KPRM’s authority and technical resources to monitor 
progress in line ministries on a week-to-week basis (interview 27, p. 2; interview 33, 
p. 5-6). The KPRM parliamentary secretary himself became involved in monitoring. 
A close observer noted, ‘[Arkuszewski] made up a list of outstanding issues and 
started ringing ministers. And so he spent six months on the phone, talking to 
ministers from morning to evening’ (interview 29, p.7). The regular monitoring from 
the KPRM shifted the attention of junior ministers in line ministries from non-EU to 
EU-related legislation. Arkuszewski’s position within the KPRM and his close 
linkage to the prime minister helped ensure more effective enforcement. If delays 
were detected, Arkuszewski was able to take the matter directly to the prime 
minister. A KPRM official said, ‘[Arkuszewski] talked individually to people 
responsible for a particular issue at a given ministry (...) [and if consensus could not 
be reached] went to the prime minister and told him [he] had a problem’ (interview 
29, p. 14). The parliamentary secretary had also sufficient authority to cut through 
long drawn-out conflicts that in many instances blocked interministerial 
consultations for long years (interview 29, p. 12).
As parliamentary secretary at KPRM, Arkuszewski was also able to alert the prime 
minister to the fact that transposition drafts had to be assigned sufficient legislative 
time. In early January 2000, he criticized the draft cabinet legislative programme as 
‘completely unrealistic’ given the number of transposition commitments to be 
fulfilled in the course of that year (interview 7, p. 8; (Wielowieyska 2000). In a ,letter 
to the head of the Prime Minister’s Chancellery, Arkuszewski contended that line 
ministers had proposed to submit over 200 draft parliamentary laws in the year 2000, 
whereas the parliament was able to adopt only approximately 100 per year (Official 
Communication SWA-20-1/2000 2000). More importantly, the draft programme 
omitted a large number of transposing drafts that had to be adopted. He 
recommended that the cabinet assign most of the legislative time remaining until the
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2001 parliamentary elections to priority EU-related legislation. In the event, 
Arkuszewski’s intervention was only partially successful, but he succeeded in 
ensuring that the proportion of time assigned to EU transposition drafts did indeed 
increase (cf. KPRM Internal Document RM-20-1-00 2000).
Arkuszewski’s institution-building actions were complemented by new initiatives 
undertaken by chief negotiator Kulakowski and his staff. Three types of new 
institutional rules must be mentioned in this context. First, at the chief negotiator’s 
request, the Negotiation Team introduced in July 1999 a new procedure for preparing 
draft negotiation positions (Official Communication SJK/456-315(l)/mcm/99 1999; 
UKIE Internal Document 12/07/1999 1999). From mid 1999 junior ministers 
responsible for negotiations in line ministries were required to provide detailed 
timetables for the transposition of the EU legislation within their remit. Analogous 
programmes had to be provided for all negotiation position that had been already 
adopted (cf. Official Communication DWZ.V.078/88/99/PKM 1999; Official 
Communication IE60/sjr/ask/725/99 1999; Official Communication
IE/WHP/1383/EP/99 1999; Official Communication MI-1/22.21/1139/KM/99 1999). 
The data from the timetables was cross-checked with Arkuszewski’s listings and 
entered the rolling catalogue of outstanding transposition commitments. Second, the 
meetings of the Negotiation Team began to monitor progress in the preparation of 
transposing legislation. A close observer said,
‘At the time the Negotiation Team played a role that was largely 
disproportionate to its original mandate. It often replaced the KIE committee, 
that is, tackled adaptation and other alignment issues (...) there were 
numerous matters that landed on the agenda of the Negotiation Team even 
though they should not have been discussed there’, (interview 39, p. 3)
Furthermore, Kulakowski’s staff at KPRM used the December 1999 Helsinki 
summit’s decision to review progress in legal adaptation to undertake an internal 
stock-taking exercise (cf. KPRM Internal Document 2000). In doing so, they had line 
ministries prepare detailed reports on how far they had progressed in EU 
transposition. These reports provided a fundamental basis for transposition 
monitoring undertaken by the chief negotiator from January 2000 (cf. UKIE Internal 
Document 1998b; Official Communication SKJ/458-11/BZ/00 2000). Kulakowski’s 
staff at the KPRM also developed more short-range monitoring tools. An official 
said, ‘we started implementing monitoring instruments which we did not have at the
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start (...) for example lists of outstanding negotiation commitments. And we tried to 
get the cabinet or the KIE committee to adopt them in some form Or the other so that 
they had some binding force [for ministries]’ (interview 30, p. 5).
Finally, the chief negotiator’s involvement helped coordinate transposition planning 
with the budgetary process, not least because the finance ministry provided a budget 
line for the implementation of the negotiation positions, while this was not the case 
for the UKIE-led NPAA programme (cf. Official Communication SJK/4561-5/99 
1999; Official Communication SJK/4561-9(l)/MDW/2000 2000). The chief 
negotiator’s increasing interest in EU transposition also meant that budgeting for 
transposition started to be discussed in the subcommittee for the budgetary 
implications of the accession negotiations, a committee that worked predominately 
for the Negotiation Team.
To summarize, between autumn 1999 and spring 2000, a major institutional change 
occurred within the core executive that resulted in the development of new position, 
authority and information rules. As regards position rules, the parliamentary 
secretary, chief negotiator and the Negotiation Team took the place of the KIE chair, 
KIE secretary and the KIE committee respectively as the key organizational vehicles 
for administering selective incentives and monitoring in EU transposition. The new 
rules mandated the emergence of both collective and hierarchical relationships. The 
meetings of the Negotiation Team provided the main collectivity-enhancing 
mechanism. The hierarchical relationship existed in two dimensions. First, it arose in 
the relationship between state secretary Arkuszewski and senior/junior ministers. 
Second, it existed between chief negotiator Kulakowski and the members of the 
Negotiation Team. The new position rules came with new authority and information 
rules. The change with regard to authority rules relied mainly on Arkuszewski’s 
strong position within the KPRM, his high standing within the AWS party, and his 
closeness to the prime minister. Arkuszewski harnessed his institutional authority tp 
sanction junior ministers who failed to contribute to the transposition record. If his 
personal intervention was not successful, ministers knew he could at any time take 
the matter directly to the prime minister. Arkuszewski also used his authority to 
facilitate interministerial consultations by seeking to resolve disputes.
The largest improvements, however, occurred with regard to information rules. A 
detailed transposition plan was prepared which made it possible to assign
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responsibility if contributions to the collective record were not made. For the first 
time, the plan prioritized drafts and imposed deadlines on ministers and departments. 
Regular week-to-week monitoring was undertaken by Arkuszewski’s team and 
progress was also double-checked within the collective framework of the negotiation 
team. The negotiation team introduced further information rules by requiring 
ministers to submit reports on transposition progress. Although the new position, 
authority and information rules brought real constraints on the behaviour of ministers 
and departments, it must be noted that most of these rules were weakly 
institutionalized. Not having been formalized in legal texts, they were underwritten 
mainly by the personalities that called them into existence. In large part, the weak 
institutionalization of the rules contributed to their rapid transformation in spring 
2000, as is demonstrated in the next section.
VI. The Core Rebounds
The Resolution o f the Coalition Deadlock
The KPRM lost its central role in EU transposition after Arkuszewski resigned in 
mid March 2000. Besides a general disillusionment with Buzek’s record in office, his 
resignation was prompted by an increasing realization that, by becoming closely 
involved in EU transposition, he was creating a structure parallel to the UKIE 
secretariat which in many respects added to, rather than alleviated, coordination 
problems within the centre. A close observer said,
‘[Arkuszewski] came to the conclusion that what he was doing was partly 
destructive since he was in essence providing an interim cover for a vacancy 
in the position of the KIE secretary (...). And it was that vacancy that was a 
major problem. (...) In [his] view a full KIE secretary had to be appointed’, 
(interview 29, p. 14)
Following Arkuszewski’s resignation, the planning and monitoring system 
reinforcing the KPRM’s role in transposition quickly unravelled, not least because it 
heavily relied on Arkuszewski’s personal commitment and authority. The new 
parliamentary affairs secretary at the KPRM simply lacked the necessary political 
clout and personal influence to underwrite it further.
Having lost Arkuszewski, who over the previous nine months had been responsible 
for accelerating EU transposition, prime minister Buzek realized that, if the slowly 
emerging new legislative dynamic were to be maintained, he quickly had to find new
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personal and institutional support. This was all the more important because he was 
already alerted to the risk of a slowdown in transposition (cf. Official 
Communication SekrMinPS/920/2000/TN 2000). Against this backdrop, the prime 
minister made yet another -  though this time successful -  attempt to unblock the 
appointment of the KIE secretary and the head of the UKIE.
There were three main factors that helped to resolve this long-standing impasse. 
First, Buzek was able to use the media and parliamentary pressures for a solution to 
the UKIE issue. Following the publication of an unfavourable Commission report in 
autumn 1999 and an intense parliamentary debate in mid February 2000, the Sejm 
passed a resolution requiring the government to ‘more clearly correlate the 
competencies and functions of the Committee for European Integration, Government 
Legislative Centre and departments responsible for transposition in individual 
ministries’ (Sejm RP 2000). In an article published in the daily press the speaker of 
the Sejm and, at the same time, a high-ranking member of the AWS called for an end 
to the deadlock over the UKIE leadership (Plazynski 2000). An UKIE official said, 
‘From July 1998 the UKIE had not had a permanent leader and so it was evident to 
anyone who wanted to know that things were not right. (...) So it was natural to 
expect that this had to be changed. (...) I think it was the protracted limbo that led to 
change -  that is the main explanation’ (interview 16, p. 7).
The second factor was that the prime minister’s support for Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, 
the main candidate for the KIE secretary since early 1999, increased significantly 
after the latter had proved his worth as prime minister’s advisor. A close observer 
said, ‘I think that over time Buzek became convinced that Saryusz-Wolski was the 
right person for the job. By spring 2000, Saryusz-Wolski had become Buzek’s right- 
hand man in EU affairs and the prime minister knew he could trust him’ (interview 
60). Finally, both the AWS and the UW began to realize that, if a major crisis were 
to be avoided, the UKIE needed a strong leadership which could be provided only by 
a person with high political and professional authority. In the event, the domestic 
pressures, Buzek’s strong support for Saryusz-Wolski and the converging 
preferences of the coalition parties made the Freedom Union drop its objections. In 
effect, in April 2000 Buzek nominated Saryusz-Wolski as the KIE secretary and the 
head of the UKIE.
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Jacek Saryusz-Wolski was highly respected both within the UKIE and among EU- 
related personnel in line ministries. For one thing he was a renowned expert in EU 
affairs and vice-rector of the College of Europe, an academic who ‘had a long-term 
vision and understood the integration processes within a broader context’ (interview 
46, p. 3). More significantly, Saryusz-Wolski was an experienced minister. Between 
1991-1996, he was government plenipotentiary for European integration with 
undersecretary of state rank within the Office of the Council of Ministers (later 
transformed into the Prime Minister’s Chancellery). This meant that most of the key 
civil servants within the UKIE had owed their jobs to Saryusz-Wolski (interview 60). 
Saryusz-Wolski also had a forthright strong-minded personality and was well-known 
for his assertive management style (interview 29, p. 14; interview 27, p. 4).
Significantly, Saryusz-Wolski’s authority hinged on staunch support from prime 
minister Buzek. Speaking of Saryusz-Wolski’s ability to rely on the prime minister’s 
support, an UKIE official said,
Saryusz-Wolski was in close contact with Buzek. (...) He held great 
influence over the prime minister and -  though he met with significant 
resistance from his colleagues in other ministries -  I think ministers were 
aware that he could easily make their life difficult by informing the prime 
minister which minister was not doing what he or she was supposed to be 
doing’, (interview 46, p. 3)
Saryusz-Wolski was skilful in reinforcing the image of his close relationship with the 
prime minister. Although nominated to the UKIE, he retained a small office close to 
Buzek’s office at the KPRM where he had the benefit of a private line to the prime 
minister (interview 52, p. 4; interview 60).
This episode demonstrates that the mounting accession crisis acted a catalyst for the 
resolution of the long-standing deadlock over the appointment of the KIE secretary 
and the position of the UKIE. Thanks to pressures arising from within the accession 
process, by early 2000, both the AWS and the UW realized that their individual costs 
of compromise would be much smaller than the collective bad of a failed EU 
accession. Not without significance for achieving this result were the incentives and 
opportunities arising inside the domestic arena. National actors both channelled and 
amplified external EU pressures, but also guided the government’s response towards 
specific changes to intra-executive institutional rules whose deficiency was widely 
perceived as the main source of the problem. The domestic pressure reverberated all
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the more strongly since, rather unexpectedly, the electoral fate of the AWS-UW 
cabinet and that of its individual parties became linked to their ability to deal with the 
accession crisis.
The Creation and Enforcement o f New Rules
Although building on some of the earlier instruments, Saryusz-Wolski and his staff 
developed a new institutional framework for planning, monitoring and enforcing EU 
transposition, one which moved the onus for coordination from the KPRM and the 
Negotiation Team to the UKIE and the KIE committee. For one thing, Saryusz- 
Wolski was quick to reorganize the UKIE, notably by creating internal structures that 
functioned largely in parallel to the existing ministerial departments and were staffed 
with people he brought into the office. An UKIE official said, ‘The UKIE was in a 
complete organizational mess. It was overstaffed and many of the personnel were ill- 
qualified political appointees from Czamecki’s Christian Democrats Party. But 
Saryusz-Wolski did not have the time and the energy to deal with all this. He simply 
by-passed it’ (interview 60). He placed loyal staff in strategic positions within the 
UKIE -  his political cabinet, the secretariat of the UKIE and the director general’s 
office. Most importantly, Saryusz-Wolski appointed a junior minister for 
transposition, Cezary Banasinski, with an explicit coordination brief. Banasinski by­
passed the UKIE’s existing lawyers and established a new Department for European 
Legislation (DLE) with twelve staff. Its management was hand-picked by Saryusz- 
Wolski and Banasinski from the Accession Negotiations Department. An UKIE 
official said, ‘(Banasinski ) created a elitist department where people worked much 
more than eight hours a day, had the highest pay in the UKIE and treated their work 
as a public mission rather than a bureaucratic job’ (interview 17, p. 2). See Figure 3.4 
for the UKIE’s internal organigram in December 2000.
In transposition planning, Saryusz-Wolski further operationalized instruments that 
had been earlier developed by Arkuszewski and Kulakowski. Several days before his 
nomination, the KIE committee had adopted a list of all outstanding transposition 
commitments to be fulfilled before the date of accession and had recommended it for 
adoption by the full cabinet (cf. KIE Protocol 07/2000 2000) (interview 15, p. 14). 
As KIE secretary, Saryusz-Wolski used that list to select measures that had to be 
adopted in 2000, if the Commission were to note progress in its forthcoming regular 
report. In May 2000, the KIE adopted a formal resolution asking line ministers to
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prepare all such parliamentary drafts by June and September 2000. The resolution 
had a binding force and was published in a reactivated Official Journal of the 
Committee for European Integration which significantly increased its standing in the 
eyes of junior ministers and civil servants (UKIE Internal Document 2000). In 
preparing the KIE resolution, the UKIE secretariat for the first time used external 
time constraints to impose formal transposition deadlines on ministries (interview 11, 
p. 8). The catalogue of outstanding transposition drafts replaced all previous lists 
created by Arkuszewski and Kulakowski. A new list for the year 2001 was adopted 
by the KIE committee in November 2000 (KIE Protocol 16/2000 2000; Official 
Communication SekrMinJSW/1797/2000 2000).
Figure 3.4. UKIE’s Organigram in December 2000 (staff levels in brackets)
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work on legislation. Every week we pushed through two to four draft laws. This 
meant that EU-related laws by-passed the regular cabinet committees and were 
debated by the KIE ( ...) ’ (interview 14, p. 8). From October 2000, the KIE 
committee started to meet weekly and the prime minister continued to chair the 
meetings. See Figure 3.5. The KIE was shadowed by meetings at lower levels. 
Saryusz-Wolski wanted to organize a regular pre-KIE meeting at undersecretary of 
state level but this was soon replaced by ad hoc conferences at director and minister 
level. An UKIE minister said,
‘At the start we tried to create a pre-KIE meeting but we quickly gave up.
(...) This forum was disregarded by ministries and was attended not by 
junior ministers but department directors. As a result, it had limited decision­
making powers so we quickly replaced it with a weekly full KEE meeting.
The technical coordination role was fulfilled by ad hoc conferences at 
director level. (...) These conferences were organized by the UKIE only with 
the ministries concerned (....). And so if something could not be resolved at 
the KIE meeting, then the committee directed that by such and such time 
tomorrow the ministries concerned would meet together with the UKIE 
representative and would prepare a solution’, (interview 14, p. 10)
The ad hoc conferences also served to control time. If a disagreement blocked 
progress on an issue, the KIE asked undersecretaries of state from the UKIE and 
line ministries to find a solution by a specific deadline lest the matter should be 
passed on to cabinet (interview 11, p. 13).
Figure 3.5. The Number of KIE Meetings between 1997 and 2002 (based on KIE protocols 
accessed by the author at the UKIE archives)
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The responsibility for transposition monitoring moved from the Negotiation Team 
and the KPRM to the KIE committee and the UKIE. FrQm July 2000 legislative 
progress started to be verified at the beginning of each KIE session. A system was 
introduced whereby once a week all line ministries were subject to close scrutiny, 
their legislative record was debated and checked draft by draft (interview 14, p. 8). 
An UKIE official said,
‘The regular KIE meetings were used to check legislative progress. So 
between 50-90 per cent of the KIE agenda was occupied by EU-related 
legislation. (...) It looked as follows. The ministry responsible introduced a 
draft and then minister Banasinski presented a preliminary EU compatibility 
assessment. If there were problems, they were dealt with at the KIE or were 
referred to separate meetings with the ministries concerned. (...) If drafts 
were delayed, ministries were questioned and then regularly monitored. 
Once in a while a list of outstanding drafts was prepared to show which 
ministries did not comply with their commitments’, (interview 12, p. 3)
The KPRM continued to offer assistance in monitoring legislative progress and, at 
some point, a list of outstanding parliamentary and secondary laws started to be 
made available at every cabinet meeting (interview 17, p. 3). The regular verification 
had a clearly mobilizing effect on line ministers and their staff. An UKIE official 
said, ‘All [ministerial staff] got used to the fact that regular requests for information 
and verification of implementation from the UKIE set the pace of the process’ 
(interview 12, p. 5).
Like Arkuszewski, Saryusz-Wolski and Banasinski combined close monitoring with 
strict enforcement. In the latter they heavily relied on the prime minister’s support. A 
close observer said, ‘The UKIE informed on ministries by writing reports for the 
prime minister that, for example, ministry X was late by six weeks. Then the prime 
minister would raise the issue with the minister during a cabinet meeting or would 
call a junior minister and ask why something had not been done and demanded 
immediate action’ (interview 16, p. 6). Another official concurred,
‘If delays were identified, letters were sent from the KIE secretary to 
ministers, and if delays persisted, meetings were organized with the prime 
minister. (...) Besides the premier, such meetings were attended by the 
minister concerned, his deputy for EU affairs, [Saryusz-Wolski] and his 
UKIE staff. (...) If there were still delays, the prime minister would send 
reprimands to his ministers which we [the UKIE] had drafted’, (interview 14,
p. 8)
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To ensure effective enforcement of transposition commitments, Saryusz-Wolski 
wanted the prime minister to chair all KIE sessions, knowing that with Buzek’s 
presence the KIE decisions and their implications were much more significant 
(interview 16, p. 6-7). Buzek also made it known in his cabinet that he considered 
transposition record as an important benchmark for assessing a minister’s 
performance in office (interview 35). This new rule allowed Saryusz-Wolski and 
Banasinski to place additional pressure on line ministers and their staff (interview 26, 
p. 14). An UKIE official said, ‘Banasinski was able to use arguments to the extent 
that any delays or errors could have negative personal consequences for the ministers 
responsible for transposition in a given area. (...) He would say to a minister, ‘if this 
issue is not dealt with, then I will need to refer it up to the cabinet, and then you 
would have to provide an explanation personally to the prime minister’ (interview 
26. p. 14).
Besides the monitoring and enforcing role, the UKIE began to operate as a facilitator 
of transposition. Banasinski’s team moved beyond passive compatibility checks in 
their legal work. An UKIE official said, ‘The DHP [old legal department] focused on 
compatibility assessment (...) but did not actively initiate legislative work which was 
really essential at that stage. And this is what the DLE [new department] did. They 
looked at the [transposition] process from a different perspective -  what remains to 
be done to achieve legal alignment’ (interview 27, p, 4). Banasinski and his new 
legal staff became actively involved in all inter-ministerial meetings involving 
transposition legislation. The DLE lawyers guided drafts through the legislative 
process and chaired or otherwise facilitated ad hoc conciliations mandated by the 
KIE. They also started to be seconded to line ministries to help with drafting 
(interview 16, p. 6; interview 17, p. 2; interview 25, p. 18). A DLE lawyer said,
‘Our role was not limited to issuing a compatibility assessment. We became 
involved at very early stages, already when the main tenets of a particular 
draft law were being discussed. (...) either [we] were approached by the 
ministry for legal assistance and I seconded a lawyer to that department for 
some time or we took the initiative and approached the ministry to point out 
some problems and offered out assistance’, (interview 11, p. 14)
In some cases, where a ministry was not able to deliver on time, the DLE drafted the 
transposing measure themselves (interview 17, p. 1; interview 18, p. 5; interview 45,
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p. 5). In this, it was helped by the Government Legislative Centre, a new institution 
established in early 2000.
Significantly, the UKIE’s facilitation of EU transposition often went beyond simple 
drafting and extended to assistance with substantive policy choices (cf. Official 
Communication SEkrMinCB/336/2000/mk 2000). Frequently, the DLE lawyers 
developed alternative policy solutions or demonstrated the level of discretion that a 
particular ministry had in regulating a particular issue (interview 12, p. 1-2). An 
UKIE official said, ‘when policy problems arose, (...) (Banasinski ) proposed 
optional solutions to the prime minister and informed him of the position taken by 
the minister’ (interview 11, p. 13). To reinforce his capacity to offer such policy 
advice, minister Banasinski forged strong links with the UKIE’s Accession 
Negotiations Department (DONA) which provided similar analysis principally for 
Kulakowski (Internal Memo 06/07/2000 2000)(interview 12, p. 5; interview 39, p. 5; 
interview 49, p. 4). A DONA official said, ‘Banasinski needed us to provide non- 
legal advice on policy issues (...) He was interested in economic analysis or some 
other comprehensive impact assessments for a particular directive’ (interview 32, p. 
9). The information he received from the DONA enabled Banasinski to rise above 
the legal arguments and embrace the political context (interview 25, p. 19).
Finally, the core executive actors provided close guidance to line ministries on the 
methodology of EU transposition. Banasinski joined forces with the Legislative 
Council to develop a set of original legislative tools for the transposition of the 
Community measures into the Polish legal order (interview 17, p. 3). Departing from 
a modernization or ‘creative transplant’ approach to transposition, the UKIE 
developed a new model of a ‘European’ parliamentary law (Subotic 2000). The 
special ‘EU-related’ laws allowed Banasinski to technically separate transposition- 
related amendments from non-EU-related provisions which lowered the potential 
political salience of parliamentary bills, In many ways, after the AWS-UW coalition 
collapsed in mid 2000, the new ‘EU’ parliamentary law became a necessity for the 
new minority Buzek cabinet because the opposition made its support for 
transposition conditional on a clear separation of EU-related provisions (interview 
15, p. 13). Furthermore, the KIE’s internal byelaws were amended to specify new 
formal requirements that had to be fulfilled by line ministries in preparing such 
special EU laws (cf. UKIE Internal Document 2000).
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Although the institutional rules described above remained unchanged until the 
parliamentary elections in September 2001, numerous political observers and 
government officials noted that the position of the KEE secretary and the UKIE 
declined vis-a-vis line ministries towards the end of the Buzek cabinet (interview 52, 
p. 2; interview 60; interview 6). This seems to have been primarily due to changes in 
the preferences of prime minister Buzek and line ministers that occurred in response 
to the forthcoming elections. In early 2001, Buzek and his ministers realized that the 
AWS was heading for an electoral defeat and this may have dampened their resolve 
to support controversial legislation. Perhaps more importantly, the close and direct 
relationship between Buzek and Saryusz-Wolski faltered in 2001 as the prime 
minister’s chef de cabinet started to wield more influence (interview 7; interview 52, 
p. 2). A public debacle in May 2001 regarding the preferred date of membership 
further undermined Buzek’s confidence in Saryusz-Wolski, as did the latter’s 
decision to join a newly established party, the Civic Platform (Pszczolkowska 2001). 
Last but not least, another contributing factor was the natural reluctance of central 
government officials to engage in policy-making before an impending change of 
government. All in all, the UKIE’s grip on the process of transposition lessened 
towards the end of the Buzek government.
In summary, the period from spring 2000 to autumn 2001 brought another major 
change in position, authority and information rules. As regards position rules, the 
resolution of the intra-coalition deadlock over the appointment of the KIE secretary 
made it possible to activate the institutional rules related to the KIE chair, KIE 
secretary and the KIE committee. As a result, from spring 2000 these rules replaced 
those relating to the parliamentary secretary, chief negotiator and the Negotiation 
Team as the main organizational vehicles for extending selective incentives and 
monitoring to ministers and departments within the area of EU transposition. There 
were also new position rules that became important for EU transposition. The full 
cabinet became increasingly involved in monitoring progress in transposition and a 
position of a junior minister for EU transposition was established within the UKIE.
Besides the position rules, a substantial change occurred at the level of authority 
rules. The KIE secretary and the transposition minister were able to administer 
sanctions by asking the prime minister for direct intervention. They could also name 
and shame non-contributing ministers and departments within the KIE committee or
the full cabinet. Furthermore, from mid 2000 -  after the UW had withdrawn from the 
coalition -  prime minister Buzek’s authority to reward and sanction ministers 
increased substantially in what was now a minority single-party cabinet. Apart from 
administering sanctions/rewards, the KIE secretary and the transposition minister 
started facilitating ministerial contributions to the transposition record by helping 
them to resolve interdepartmental, conflicts and providing methodological guidelines. 
In this context, it is important to note that the UKIE finally translated the screening 
and negotiation commitments into detailed legislative advice on what issues needed 
to be addressed through specific legislation.
The authority rules were also enhanced within the KIE committee and the cabinet. 
The KIE started to function as a dedicated cabinet committee working on EU-related 
legislation. It met weekly and, through regular review mechanisms, exerted peer 
pressure on ministers and departments. It further developed a set-aside mechanism 
by referring conflictual issues for resolution to smaller working groups. It is also 
interesting to note that the new authority rules led to a reinterpretation of the position 
of the KIE committee. The hierarchical relationship between the KIE (as a supreme 
administrative organ) and the non-KIE ministers gave way to a more collective 
relationship as the committee began to function as just another cabinet committee.
As for information rules, the institutional solutions developed between autumn 1999 
and spring 2000 were further enhanced within the framework of the new position 
rules. A rolling catalogue of outstanding legislation was maintained by the UKIE’s 
transposition minister who insisted on making the data on required legislative action 
as detailed as possible. Progress was verified at the start of each KIE session and, 
with time, also at the full cabinet meetings. The changes in the transposition record 
were visible to all KIE members and responsibility for delays or omissions was easy 
to allocate. Finally, it must be mentioned that, unlike under the previous institutional 
regime, at least some of the new authority and information rules were 
institutionalized into legally binding KIE resolutions. This said, the operational force 
of many of the authority rules was heavily dependent on the personal relationship 
between Buzek and Saryusz-Wolski, and hence these rules may have been less 
effective in constraining ministers and departments when that relationship started to 
break down in 2001.
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VII. The Core Consolidates
Pressures for Further Institutional Change
In late 2001 the new Miller government consolidated the UKIE’s central role in 
planning, monitoring and enforcing the transposition of the Community legislation. 
Determined to achieve further progress in EU accession negotiations, prime minister 
Miller -  like Buzek in the second part of his term -  put his personal and institutional 
authority behind the UKIE. It must be noted that, in contrast to Buzek, Miller had a 
higher capacity for strong prime ministerial leadership. This was mainly because he 
combined his post with the leadership of the largest parliamentary party -  the 
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD). The SLD party clearly dominated the cabinet and 
was in a close programmatic alliance with one of its coalition partners, the Labour 
Union (UP). Moreover, Miller was a seasoned political actor with extensive 
parliament and government experience going back to the communist time and had 
served as labour minister and the minister-head of the Office of the Council of 
Ministers under the 1993-1997 SLD-PSL government. All this meant that prime 
ministerial leadership in EU affairs improved further from the late 2001.
Tie new government introduced organizational changes to consolidate the capacities 
of the ‘European’ core executive. Several factors occasioned the redesign of 
institutions. The people who were instrumental in creating and underwriting the 
existing institutional configuration (Kulakowski, Saryusz-Wolski, Banasinski) left 
the government. The new actors -  Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz as foreign minister, 
Danuta Htibner as KIE secretary and Jan Truszczynski as chief negotiator -  brought 
with them new ideas on how European integration should be handled 
oiganizationally at the centre of government. Not without importance was their 
pisvious government experience: Cimoszewicz had been prime minister in 1996-7, 
Hibner had been KIE secretary under Cimoszewicz, Truszczynski had been the 
Polish ambassador to the EU under the Buzek government. More significantly, their 
pe*ception of what had to be changed was shaped by the evidence of institutional 
falures under the Buzek government, resulting in particular from internal 
fhgmentation within the ‘European’ core executive (interview 38, p. 1). Problems 
wire most evident in the organizational separation of competences for accession 
negotiations, foreign affairs and internal adaptation. A close observer said,
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‘The rationale for change was to avoid a situation that was characteristic for 
the previous government, one in which functions and competences in 
European integration were split among the Foreign Office, the Prime 
Minister’s Chancellery and the UKIE. This split was damaging because, 
despite good interpersonal relations, it often resulted in policy discrepancies 
which is inevitable when three institutions deal with the same issues and do 
not operate within clearly defined boundaries’, (interview 37, p. 1)
Another important factor was that the government changeover offered a critical 
juncture for dealing with Saryusz-Wolski’s organizational legacy within the UKIE. 
Entering the office after the 2001 parliamentary elections, the new KIE secretary had 
much greater leeway in shaping the internal structure of the UKIE than her 
predecessor in April 2000. As a result, Hubner quickly moved to bring down the 
parallel structures that Saryusz-Wolski had erected within the UKIE, and sought to 
integrate them with the rest of the secretariat. Finally, it is important to note that the 
core executive institutions had to be adjusted to the new coalition character of the 
SLD-PSL-UP government and, perhaps more importantly, to the much greater 
institutional authority of the prime minister who for the first time since 1989 
combined his office with the leadership of the largest parliamentary party.
In a first step, the organizational units responsible for accession negotiations and 
internal adaptation institutions were integrated. An UKIE official said,
‘The idea was to integrate the three institutions -  KPRM with Kulakowski, 
UKIE and the Foreign Office -  which under the previous government were 
responsible for European integration. Since it was difficult to initiate radical 
structural changes when the new government was being formed, a decision 
was taken to pool competences with one person and channel all actions (...) 
through one institution. And that was done and this is what the UKIE is for’, 
(interview 11, p. 10)
The new KIE secretary, Danuta Hubner, combined her position with that of deputy 
foreign minister, while the chief negotiator was moved from the KPRM to become 
her immediate subordinate in the Foreign Office (MSZ). Integrated through Htibner’s 
double institutional role, the UKIE and the MSZ’s EU pillar started to operate under 
the banner of a ‘European secretariat’. Further integration occurred at the department 
level. The chief negotiator’s staff from the KPRM and the UKIE’s Accession 
Department merged with the MSZ’s EU department. Regular meetings of all 
directors from the UKIE and the MSZ started to be held to reinforce the team spirit 
and facilitate information-sharing (interview 15, p. 12). An official said,
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‘There were two types of meetings. First, there were weekly briefings of all 
department directors [from the UKIE and the MSZ EU pillar] oh Friday 
afternoon where we had a tour de table in which every director briefed 
everyone else on what priorities they had. (...) The idea was to let everyone 
know what was happening in the system and, at the same time, to deal with 
issues that required improvement or resolution. Such meetings were chaired 
by minister Hubner or minister Pietras. And the second type of meetings 
were those of the senior management of the European secretariat, that is, 
minister Hubner, Truszczynski, Pietras, Kozek (...). These meetings were 
also attended by directors who a had special coordinating role -  director of 
the DOKIE and director of the EU department in the MSZ (...) These 
meetings were held ad hoc and their frequency fluctuated with events’, 
(interview 37, p. 2)
Due to an informal arrangement, Hubner, Pietras (UKIE state undersecretary) and 
Truszczynski could issue direct instructions to departments both within the UKIE 
and the MSZ (its EU pillar) circumventing the regular interministerial channels 
(interview 38, p. 6). Within the UKIE, the DLE merged with the DHP department, 
forming a European Law Department (DPE), the UKIE’s second largest department 
employing 36 staff. See Figure 3.6. Significantly, the DPE senior management was 
recruited from the DLE rather than the DHP, thus ensuring that the department 
retained its active profile in EU transposition. Further, Hubner refrained from 
appointing a minister for transposition but split Banasinski’s competences between 
state undersecretary Pietras, the DPE director and a newly established Department 
Supporting the KIE Committee (DOKIE). An UKIE official said,
‘At the moment there is no special minister for transposition, and there is 
only minister Pietras, so we have had to organize our work differently. The 
concern was not to place the entire coordination burden on Pietras or the 
DLE director (...). So under Banasinski we [the DLE] reviewed the 
implementation of the timetable, while now (...) this is done by the 
Department Supporting the KIE Committee (DOKIE) (...) this is because it 
is the KIE committee that accepts the timetable and the full cabinet that 
approves it’, (interview 11, p.6-7)
A principal role for the DOKIE was to ensure cohesive action within the UKIE by 
integrating the inputs from the DPE lawyers, DPI economists and the Foreign 
Assistance Department. An UKIE official said,
‘This department has no competences (...) besides technical coordination.
But this is where many very important issues come together (...) and [our] 
role is to ensure cohesion in the work of [UKIE] departments. There are 
three departments which deal with legislative issues: Department for 
Integration Policy (...) European Law Department (...) and the EU 
Department in the Foreign Office (...). And there has to be a single place
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where [their opinions] come together. Our department fulfils this role since 
all documents come here and leave from here. [Our director] does not 
intervene directly in the work of other directors. (...) But whenever we see a 
problem, we take it up to minister Pietras and he decides’, (interview 27, p. 
7)
Figure 3.6. UKIE’s Organigram in January 2002 (staff levels in brackets)
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Source: own compilation based on Executive Regulation no 1 of the KIE chair of 18 January 2002 and 
Executive Regulation of the KIE chair of 21 January 2002; staff figures were supplied to the author by UKIE
Finally, the weekly KIE meeting at cabinet minister level was replaced by a weekly 
meeting at junior minister level chaired by the KIE secretary (ZPKIE). This was 
essentially an evolutionary change as in many ways the ZPKIE confirmed what 
became the norm in the last months of the Buzek government. An UKIE official 
explained,
‘The ZPKIE was established as a response to the situation that obtained in 
the last few months of the previous government when the prime minister 
would come to the KIE meeting which was not attended by even one full 
cabinet minister and where directors often filled in for junior ministers (...)
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And so we decided to have a formal meeting at a level that would make it 
possible for the KIE secretary to chair it’, (interview 15, p. 8)
Besides practical considerations, the personal preferences of prime minister Miller 
were also crucial for stimulating the change (interview 27, p. 6). A close observer 
said, ‘Buzek would chair the KIE even though it was attended only by 
undersecretaries of state. [But] Miller said he wanted full ministers at the KIE’ 
(interview 11, p. 12). In the event, ZPKIE’s ascendancy marginalized the full KIE 
which met only eight times between October 2001 and December 2002. The latter’s 
role was now more ceremonial, though it sometimes debated strategic issues relating 
to accession negotiations (interview 37, p. 6). The ZPKIE, in turn, became a nodal 
point for processing all EU-related legislation. Although additional review by other 
standing cabinet committees did occur, most transposing drafts were routed only 
through the ZPKIE committee. Hubner and Pietras retained the practice developed 
under Saryusz-Wolski of organizing ad hoc director conferences to tackle most 
sensitive issues (interview 37, p. 5; interview 41, p. 5; interview 46, p. 8). This time, 
however, there was an increasing tendency for such meeting to involve only experts 
and ministerial officials. An UKIE official said, ‘There are no [ad hoc] meetings at 
the state undersecretary level but there are frequent meetings at the expert level 
which have the same function. The only difference is that decisions that have to be 
approved by a minister are [later] passed on to a given minister or state 
undersecretary’ (interview 12, p. 8).
In sum, changes at the centre of government occurred chiefly in response to a shift in 
domestic political circumstances. The urgent need for crisis management which was 
so marked in the second half of the Buzek term had all but disappeared by the time 
the Miller cabinet came to power in late 2001. The parallel structures within the 
UKIE were thus either dismantled or more firmly embedded in general structures. 
Perhaps more importantly, the extensive evidence of inter-organizational rivalries 
between the UKIE secretariat, the Foreign Office and the chief negotiator which 
troubled the Buzek cabinet even in 2000-1 provided the new government with a 
powerful motivation to push for consolidation of the core. The SLD’s dominance 
inside the cabinet made such consolidation possible, though it is interesting that it 
was achieved in large part through personal rather than structural means. Finally, 
Miller’s personal preference for a close prime ministerial control in EU affairs
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provided a further incentive for tightening the European core’s grip over ministerial 
departments.
More Institution-Building
In transposition planning the DPE continued to maintain the rolling catalogue of 
outstanding transposition measures, while paying more and more attention to the 
adoption of secondary laws (cf. UKIE 2002). The catalogue became further 
operationalized to provide for monthly deadlines for the adoption by the KIE and the 
full cabinet. An UKIE official said, ‘I think a positive development was to specify 
planning and monitoring with monthly precision. There are now short-range plans 
for May, June, July etc. which specify a fixed amount of legislation that must be 
adopted’ (interview 26, p. 14). Unlike under Buzek and Saryusz-Wolski, the UKIE 
no longer unilaterally imposed transposition deadlines but, based on negotiation 
positions and the NPAA, put forward proposals which were now much more widely 
consulted (interview 11, p. 8). Perhaps most significantly, the UKIE integrated 
legislative, institutional and financial commitments in a single document. This work 
was undertaken by the DPI department (interview 8. p. 2-3). In November 2001, a 
systematic action plan (bilans otwarcia) was prepared for the following nine months, 
one that prioritized work from the point of view of accession negotiations, legislation 
and financial assistance (UKIE 2001). In mid 2002, a new edition of the action plan 
{bilans przygotowan) was prepared and, in many respects, it replaced the NPAA as a 
fully operational rolling catalogue of all integration-related actions to be undertaken 
before accession (UKIE 2002).
Progress in transposition continued to be monitored on a weekly basis. All the 
ZPKIE sessions started by examining transposition progress and ministers were 
asked to provide explanations for hold-ups. An UKIE official said, ‘A report is 
presented at the ZPKIE stating which laws were planned for adoption by the cabinet 
in a given month and which were in fact adopted. And [if a law has not been 
adopted] [Pietras] asks for explanation and each minister must provide an answer’ 
(interview 12, p. 7). The UKIE developed a rigorous system for collecting the 
information on transposition progress (interview 19, p. 7). The system of regular data 
collection was supported by a dedicated IT software developed by the DOKIE 
(interview 38, p. 3). An official from one line ministry’s EU department said,
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‘[We] sent the entire list of all legislative commitments to other departments 
(...) on Friday afternoon, directors reported back to [us] by Tuesday, and on 
Wednesday we could send the file to [the European Law Department] at the 
UKIE. Based on our files the UKIE prepared a report which was presented at 
the ZPKIE on Friday. (...) After the ZPKIE approved the report, it was 
passed on to cabinet ministers on Monday, and during the Tuesday cabinet 
meeting minister Hubner informed the prime minister which ministers were 
overdue with legislative work’, (interview 43, p. 6)
To bolster the ZPKIE’s authority, prime minister Miller introduced a permanent 
point on the full cabinet’s agenda devoted entirely to reviewing transposition 
progress. This new instrument provided the KIE secretary with an opportunity to 
regularly ‘name and shame’ ministries that do not deliver on time or at all (interview
12, p. 8).
The direct involvement of the prime minister and the weekly review of transposition 
progress at cabinet level were crucial for facilitating enforcement by the UKIE vis-a- 
vis the line ministries (interview 37, p. 5). A line ministry official said, ‘[If delays are 
identified] there is always a risk that the issue may be raised at the cabinet meeting. 
No minister likes to be told in cabinet that one of his documents (...) is overdue’ 
(interview 41, p. 3). The implicit threat of raising an issue at the cabinet meeting 
enabled the UKIE to use ad hoc director conferences as a time-control mechanism as 
did the pre-2002 KIE. In such situations the UKIE would ask line ministries to come 
up with a resolution by a particular deadline lest the matter was referred to the 
cabinet (interview 38, p. 5).
Another official confirmed, ‘the most common instrument is a strong appeal made in 
the presence of other ministers to a minister who is in delay. This may be done rather 
harshly at times (...) and stir ministers’ ambition’ (interview 37, p. 5). This said, in 
late 2002 Hubner and Miller concluded that the ZPKIE needed further institutional 
reinforcement. The first step was to increase the status of the transposition timetable 
by passing a formal cabinet resolution that contained it (interview 39, p. 8). The other 
instrument was the organization of trilateral meetings attended by the prime minister, 
Hubner and the minister concerned at which delays and problems were discussed 
(interview 39, p. 9). Hubner used Miller’s presence at such meetings to increase the 
authority of the commitments that ministers made. An UKIE official said, ‘[at a 
meeting with the prime minister] one tends to be careful with what one says. I can 
agree on a deadline with ministers from some ministry but it will be easy for them to
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write to me some time later and defer the deadline by two months. But when one 
talks to the prime minister, one accepts much greater responsibility for what one 
says’ (interview 46, p. 4).
Finally, the UKIE continued to fulfil the role of a transposition facilitator. This was 
chiefly done at the expert level and mostly had the form of legislative and drafting 
assistance by the DPE lawyers. The DPE was also aided by the Government 
Legislative Centre. An UKIE official said,
[Our] staff got engaged in areas where the line ministries had largest 
problems, weakest professional staff and most pressing deadlines. Our staff 
were seconded there, and frequently were given competence to work and co- 
draft the laws. The good thing about it was that such drafts received our 
compatibility acceptance at that early stage, and most often there were no 
problems later’, (interview 26, p. 15)
The facilitation was also undertaken at political level by minister Hubner or Pietras 
within the context of the ZPKIE. A close observer said, ‘usually we know in advance 
that there is some dispute. So [minister Hubner] or minister Pietras is ready with 
some pre-prepared alternative solutions. Having long experience with these kind of 
problems, they are both able to convince our side or the other’ [interview 27, p. 7]. 
There is, however, some evidence that, unlike under Buzek and Banasinski, 
assistance provided by the UKIE under Hubner was more successful on drafting 
issues than on substantive policy choices. When political issues were at stake, the 
ZPKIE often lacked the necessary authority to resolve them and matters were 
referred to the cabinet standing committee (KRM) or the full cabinet (interview 25, 
p. 14).
To sum up, in 2002, the position, authority and information rules that the core 
executive actors used to mobilize ministers and departments to adopt cooperative 
strategies in the area of EU transposition were further reinforced. As for position 
rules, the Miller government integrated some of the loosely-bound position rules 
within a tighter hierarchical framework. The chief negotiator was made directly 
accountable to the KIE secretary who, in turn, was subordinated to the foreign 
minister. This change made it possible for the KIE secretary to better manage 
selective incentives and monitoring taking into account not only the internal but also 
the external implications of EU transposition. Another transformation of the position 
rules occurred when the KIE committee was replaced by the ZPKIE, a junior
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committee at undersecretary of state level. Although, as observed above, this change 
was a formal endorsement of what had become the norm since the end of the Buzek 
government, it was likely to have further enhanced the collective relationship among 
junior ministers who became permanent members of the committee. Finally, the 
position of the minister for transposition was removed and its competences were 
distributed among other junior ministers and directors within the UKIE and the 
Foreign Office.
As regards the authority rules, like Saryusz-Wolski, the KIE secretary was able to 
refer matters to the prime minister for direct intervention. The trilateral meetings 
between the prime minister, KIE secretary and the minister concerned provided a 
further opportunity to sanction, reward and enforce the behaviour of departments. As 
before, the UKIE junior ministers and departmental staff facilitated the adoption of 
transposing legislation, though perhaps more so at an administrative rather than 
political level. The authority rules were enhanced also within the ZPKIE and the full 
cabinet. The ZPKIE provided a collectivity-enhancing instrument for exerting peer 
pressure on ministers and departments. The set-aside technique was maintained, 
though this time referrals were made more to the technical rather than political level. 
Significantly, prime minister Miller introduced a permanent point on the cabinet 
agenda which made it possible for the KIE secretary to ‘name and shame’ ministers 
at a level higher than the ZPKIE. The information rules were also further enhanced. 
Besides those developed under Buzek and Saryusz-Wolski, two new ones require 
special mention. The transposition plans were extended to cover processes parallel to 
transposition. Perhaps most importantly, reporting requirements for individual 
departments expanded substantially as ministries were expected to provide detailed 
feedback to the UKIE every week using dedicated IT software.
VIII. Conclusion
This chapter has mapped the institutional rules that the Polish ‘European’ core 
executive had at its disposal to provide incentives and opportunity structures to 
ministers and departments in the area of EU transposition. It has demonstrated that 
between 1997 and 2002 six broad configurations of such rules were present. Between 
autumn 1996 and mid 1999, the core adopted three distinct configurations, each 
characterized by rather limited institutional levers for mobilizing departments in EU- 
related law-making. The development of more robust rules was precluded by, most
92
notably, weak leadership from the prime minister and the KIE chair as well as the 
intra-coalition conflict over the organization of the KIE and the UKIE. Between the 
mid 1999 and the end of 2002, the core executive assumed three configurations, each 
characterized by highly developed institutional levers for mobilizing ministers to 
contribute to the collective transposition record. The new rules were developed 
through political entrepreneurship of the prime minister and the KIE secretary as 
well as through collective commitments made by ministers with the KIE committee 
and the ZPKIE. The table below summarizes the evidence of the cross-temporal 
variation in the configuration of the explanatory variable.
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Table 3.4. A Summary of Variation in the Explanatory Variable
Period Position Rules Authority Rules Information Rules Overall
Assessment
autumn 1996 
-  autumn 
1997
KIE committee 
KIE chair/PM 
KIE secretary
■Ad hoc sanctions and 
rewards by prime 
minister
•Ad hoc facilitation by 
the KIE committee
■ The KIE chair/UKIE 
does not participate in 
law-making besides 
EU compatibility 
assessment
■ Transposition plans 
collated from 
ministerial inputs
■ Twice-yearly 
monitoring
Limited 
mobilization 
from core
autumn 1997 
-m id  1998
KIE committee 
KIE chair
■ Limited ad hoc 
sanctions and rewards 
by prime minister
■ The KIE committee 
and KIE chair/UKIE 
do not participate in 
law-making besides 
EU compatibility 
assessment
■ Transposition plans 
collated from 
ministerial inputs
■ Twice-yearly 
monitoring
■ Ad hoc monitoring 
on the margins of 
parallel processes
Limited 
mobilization 
from core
mid 1998 -  
mid 1999
KIE committee 
KIE chair/PM 
KIE secretary
■ Limited ad hoc 
sanctions and rewards 
by prime minister
■ The KIE committee 
and KIE chair/UKIE 
do not participate in 
law-making besides 
EU compatibility 
assessment
■ Transposition plans 
collated from 
ministerial inputs
■ Twice-yearly 
monitoring
■ Ad hoc monitoring 
on the margins of 
parallel processes
Limited 
mobilization 
from core
mid 1999 -  
spring 2000
Negotiation
Team
Parliamentary
secretary
Chief Negotiator
■ Parliamentary 
secretary and prime 
minister provide 
sanctions
■ Parliamentary 
secretary facilitates 
transposition
■ Chief negotiator 
works closely with 
the parliamentary 
secretary
■ Parliamentary 
secretary imposes a 
detailed programme 
with deadlines
■ Parliamentary 
secretary monitors 
daily
■ Negotiation T earn 
requires progress 
reports from 
ministers
High
mobilization 
from core
spring 2000 -  
mid 2001
KIE committee
Full cabinet
KIE chair/PM
KIE secretary
Minister for 
transposition
■ KIE secretary, 
transposition minister 
and prime minister 
provide sanctions
■Transposition 
minister facilitates 
transposition
■ KIE committee is 
involved in work on 
legislation
■ EU compatibility 
assessments extended 
to cover negotiation
■Transposition 
minister provides a 
detailed catalogue 
of legislative 
actions
■ Transposition plans 
specify in detail 
what issues need to 
be addressed
■ The KIE (and often 
the full cabinet) 
verifies progress at 
the start of each
High
mobilization 
from core
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commitments
■ A set-aside 
mechanisms for 
confhctual issues
session
■ Individual record is 
clearly visible to all 
concerned
autumn 2001 
-  end 2002
ZPKIE 
committee 
Full Cabinet 
KIE chair/PM 
KIE secretary
■ KIE secretary and 
prime minister 
provide sanctions
■ UKIE staff facilitate 
transposition
■ ZPKIE committee is 
involved in work on 
legislation
■ Trilateral meetings 
held between prime 
minister, KIE 
secretary and minister 
concerned
■ EU compatibility 
assessments extended 
to cover negotiation 
commitments
■ A set-aside 
mechanisms for 
conflictual issues
■ ZPKIE provides peer 
pressure on ministers
■ KIE secretary to name 
and shame ministers 
at full cabinet meeting
■ Cabinet adopts a 
detailed catalogue 
of legislative 
actions
■ Transposition 
planning extended 
to cover parallel 
processes
■ The ZPKIE and 
cabinet verify 
progress at the start 
of each session
■ Individual record is 
clearly visible to all 
concerned
■ Detailed weekly 
reporting
requirements for all 
ministries
High
mobilization 
from core
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Chapter 4: Measuring Transposition Record Over Time
This chapter finds that in 1997-2002 the Polish government’s transposition record 
varied significantly. In 1997-1999, Poland had a low transposition record. From 
2000, the transposition record had improved and remained at a high level until 2001 
when it deteriorated to a medium level. The year 2002 brought a return to a high 
level of transposition. The chapter closes by concluding that, although policy type, 
actor preferences and ministerial resources were likely to have some impact on the 
variation in the transposition record, the effect of those variables is not sufficient to 
fully account for the variation and leaves ample room for other explanations.
I. Introduction
Transposition is typically taken to denote the incorporation of Community directives 
into the national legal system through the passage of appropriate domestic measures 
(cf. Ramsey 1996; Samuels 1998). Such an incorporation is necessary because, 
unlike regulations and decisions, directives are binding as to the result to be achieved 
but leave the choice of form and methods to the member states (cf. Craig and De 
Burca 1998, p. 108-9). National governments must thus adopt domestic legislation to 
realize the objectives set out in directives (cf. Nicolaides 1999, p. 10-11). For present 
purposes, it is important to note that, in a pre-accession state, transposition is often 
required for Community measures that are not normally subject to it. This extension 
is necessary because domestic institutions need to be prepared in advance for the 
direct applicability of selected Community regulations and decisions. The relevant 
domestic measures are, of course, transitory in character and are repealed when a 
country gains full membership (cf. Hermfeld 1996, p. 102).
In Poland, transposition may take the form of an act of parliament (ustawa) or an 
executive regulation (rozporzadzenie) adopted by the prime minister, the council of 
ministers or an individual minister (cf. UKIE 2003). A rough estimate put the 
number of directives that had to be transposed through parliamentary legislation in 
Poland at 300 out of a total of 980 (EuroPap 2001). The remaining 680 directives had 
to be transposed through secondary law. It must be noted, however, that 
parliamentary legislation is central to transposition since, in a closed system of 
sources of law such as Poland’s, no secondary legislation may be adopted without an 
earlier express delegation of implementing powers in an act of parliament. Thus,
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transposition frequently had to start with parliamentary legislation, while secondary 
legislation could follow only later.
Transposition as defined above began in Poland only in the second half of the 1990s. 
Until then, domestic adaptation to the Community law had been dominated by the 
logic of modernization and had largely proceeded through a mimetic transplantation 
of selected EU and/or member states' policy models into the Polish legal system. 
This had been the time when Polish economic legislation was undergoing a process 
of rapid transformation and national legislators looked to the Community legislation 
and the national laws of the EU member states for policy blueprints. Indeed, the 'pick 
& choose' method of legal adaptation had been strongly advocated by leading law 
professors and practitioners (Rada Legislacyjna 1994; Soltysinski 1996).
Besides creative transplants, legal adaptation had also focused on passive screening 
of all new Polish legislation for compliance with the acquis. This process was 
initiated as early as in 1991 and was gradually extended to cover all government 
legislative drafts (Wojciechowski 1996; Wojciechowski 1998; Jaskiernia 1999). 
Transposition in the strict sense was largely absent, and where it was attempted, it 
rarely succeeded at the adoption stage. A Polish commentator noted 'the major 
problem with [early adaptation plans] was the absence of any reference to specific 
provisions of the Community law that the planned measures sought to implement' 
(Gorka 1997, p. 14). The closest the Polish government came to active transposition 
of the Community legislation was in conceptual preparatory work but its real impact 
was rather limited (Drabczyk 1998, pp. 13-14).
The first significant move towards transposition came when, in mid 1995, the Polish 
government resolved to incorporate into national law 666 directives listed in the 
European Commission’s Single Market White Paper. Ministers and departments 
were required to draw up a list of Polish legislation in areas covered by the White 
Paper directives, examine their compatibility with the Community acquis, and 
specify what legislative actions had to be taken to achieve full compatibility. In a 
second step, legal adaptation was reoriented towards transposition with the onset of 
pre-accession alignment in 1997-8. In response to the 1997 Accession Partnership in 
which the European Commission set out priority areas for Poland's legal adaptation, 
the Polish government prepared a national programme for the adoption of the acquis 
(NPAA). The first such programme was prepared in June 1998 and was subsequently
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revised on an annual basis (1999, 2000, 2001). The NPAA consisted of thirty two 
chapters, each devoted to a separate policy sector. The chapters identified action to 
be undertaken, the ministry or agency responsible, the timetable for implementation, 
and the financial resources available. The first two versions of the NPAA were 
accompanied by detailed annexes listing all legislative tasks assigned to individual 
ministries with deadlines for their adoption.
The final upgrading to a fully-fledged transposition of the Community law occurred 
within the framework of accession negotiations. Launched in March 1998, the 
negotiations focused first on the screening of existing Polish legislation for 
compliance with the acquis. The screening results were subsequently incorporated 
into Polish negotiation positions, which identified areas in which the Polish 
government asked for transitional arrangements to delay transposition. At regular 
negotiation sessions, both at working and official level, the Polish government 
reported on its progress in fulfilling commitments made during the screening and 
negotiation process.
This chapter measures how the Polish government’s transposition record changed 
oyer time. The transposition record is defined here as the extent to which the Polish 
government transposed the Community measures into the Polish law. This definition 
mirrors the concepts applied in existing studies on transposition patterns in the old 
EU member states (see for example Mendrinou 1996; Azzi 2000; Borzel 2001; 
Mbaye 2001; Borzel 2002; Sverdrup 2002). Such research typically measures 
variation in the transposition record in two dimensions. The first such dimension is 
the level of substantive adaptation, i.e. the extent to which EU member states 
correctly transpose a Community directive. Changes in the transposition record are 
mapped using three indicators: the number of letters of formal notice, reasoned 
opinions and referrals to the European Court of Justice.
Tie other dimension is the timeliness of transposition, i.e., the extent to which 
member states transpose a directive within a jointly agreed deadline. Here, the most 
ccmmon proxy is the transposition deficit, i.e. the number of directives not yet 
trmsposed as a percentage of all directives with transposition deadlines up to a given 
point in time. The focus on timeliness is adopted, for example, in the European 
Commission’s Internal Market Scoreboard whose data is based on notifications from 
number states (cf. European Commission 2002).
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Unfortunately, none of the indicators commonly used in the existing transposition 
literature may be readily applied in a pre-accession state since, for obvious reasons, it 
is not possible to rely on such proxies as the initiation of infringement proceedings or 
the violation of formal transposition deadlines. Therefore, although this thesis 
measures the transposition record using the dimensions of substantive adaptation and 
timeliness, it controls for pre-accession specificities by developing own original 
indicators of legislative activity (c'f. Manning, Barma et al. 1999; Evans and Manning 
2000; Evans and Evans 2001). The substantive level of transposition is thus 
measured by looking at two indicators. The first indicator is the number of 
transposition measures adopted by the cabinet over time. The assumption here is that 
the fewer such measures the cabinet adopts, the lower the overall level of substantive 
adaptation. Admittedly, this indicator is a rather crude instrument but it nevertheless 
provides some picture of the transposition dynamic. The other indicator is the 
proportion of Polish domestic measures that are fully compatible with the 
Community law. The assumption here is that the smaller the percentage of such 
measures, the worse the overall transposition record. This indicator permits a more 
sophisticated measurement of substantive adaptation though, significantly, it 
provides a less precise assessment of whether transposition has been completed or 
not.
The timeliness of transposition is mapped using two quantitative indicators. The first 
indicator is the proportion of Polish transposing measures envisaged for adoption in a 
given year (or shorter period) that are actually adopted that year (or within such a 
shorter period). The expectation is that the lower the percentage of such laws, the 
more problematic the overall transposition record. This measure is not without 
problems as deadlines for transposition maybe subject to a strategic manipulation by 
the Polish government or the European Commission. Nevertheless, having been 
publicized, deadline commitments assume additional credibility as they influence the 
domestic assessment of the government. The other indicator of timeliness is the 
length of time required for the cabinet to adopt a transposing measure. The 
assumption here is that the timeliness of transposition will be the lower, the longer it 
takes the cabinet to adopt a transposing measure. See Table 4.5.
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Table 4.5. Dimensions and Indicators of Variation in Transposition Record
Dimensions Indicators
Substantive
adaptation
The number of transposing measures adopted by the cabinet over time.
The proportion of Polish domestic measures that are fully compatible 
with the Community law.
Timeliness of 
transposition
The proportion of Polish transposing measures envisaged for adoption in 
a given year (or shorter period) that are actually adopted that year (or 
within such a shorter period).
The length o f time required for the cabinet to adopt a transposing 
measure.
Source: own compilation
In mapping the values of such indicators over time attention is paid to two principal 
aspects of the dynamic of the transposition record (cf. Monge 1995). The first one is 
the magnitude of change. Magnitude refers to how much the amount of a variable 
changes from one point in time to another. Over time, magnitude may change 
slightly or significantly or remain constant. The second aspect is the rate of change 
which denotes how fast the magnitude changes over time. Magnitude can change 
rapidly or it can increase or decrease over a longer period of time.
II. Evidence
Substantive Adaptation
The first indicator is the nominal number of transposing measures adopted by the 
cabinet between 1997 and 2002. To compile the dataset for this indicator, one must 
first single out EU-related drafts from among all legislation submitted to the cabinet. 
This is rather difficult since, in the period under examination, the Polish government 
did not operate a reliable flagging system that would facilitate such a selection. This 
is particularly true for secondary transposing legislation which incorporated the EU 
legislation almost without any indication that the legislative action was undertaken 
for transposition purposes. Although such information may have been disclosed in 
the explanatory notes, those documents are not publicly available for all secondary 
legislation. The situation looked better for parliamentary bills. Since early 2000, the 
government had formally declared to parliament whether a draft law it submitted was 
a transposing or domestic legislation. This said, that system was started rather late 
and did not systematically cover the years 1997-1999, though the parliamentary and 
government services made some efforts to back trace transposing bills (see for 
example UKEE 2000). Besides limited coverage, it must also be noted that the
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decision to flag a law as a transposing measure was political rather than technical in 
character. This means that, due to strategic calculations, drafts could be submitted to 
parliament as EU-related measures, though, in fact, they did not contain transposing 
provisions, and vice versa (interview 25, p. 17-18).
Given the scarcity of reliable and comprehensive public data, the decision was made 
here to review all draft acts of parliament submitted by the cabinet to parliament 
between 1997 and 2002 and to select those measures whose explanatory notes made 
explicit reference to the Community legislation. In effect, 265 drafts were identified 
as transposing measures out of a total of 840 draft parliamentary laws submitted to 
parliament. Out of the 265 drafts, 216 had a formal government declaration of 
transposition status, while the remaining 49 were included based on the information 
in the explanatory notes. The full dataset is available in Annex 1.
The data demonstrates that between October 1997 and December 2002 transposition 
proceeded unevenly. See Figure 4.7. In 1997 (fourth quarter) and 1998 the Polish 
cabinet adopted a total of 14 draft transposing acts of parliament. There was almost 
no change quarter-on-quarter as the cabinet adopted two or three drafts every three- 
month period. Some increased legislative activity was registered in 1999. Between 
the first and the fourth quarter of that year the cabinet adopted 35 EU-related 
parliamentary bills -  more than twice as many as in the previous five quarters. The 
change was of medium magnitude and its rate was rather incremental (increase from 
three through seven to ten), but the year 1999 marked a clear, though minor, 
departure from the previous pattern. The most significant change in the nominal 
number of transposing drafts came in the year 2000. Between the first and the fourth 
quarter of that year the cabinet adopted 97 draft laws -  three times as many as the 
year before. What is striking is the magnitude of change. The score for the first 
quarter of 2000 stood at 24 drafts up from only nine the quarter before. Also, the 
change occurred at a fairly rapid rate. Whereas in 1998-1999 it took four quarters for 
the number of transposing drafts to treble from three to ten, the jump from nine to 24 
occurred over only two quarters.
The new transposition dynamic was sustained in the first two quarters of 2001, 
though the peak value in the second quarter was lower than the analogous values in 
2000. The cabinet adopted a total of 32 drafts, twice as many as in the equivalent 
period in 1999. The transposition almost halted in the third and the fourth quarter in
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2001 but this was largely due to the pa rliam en t^  elections in September 2001 and 
the changeover from the AWS to SLD-PSL-UP government. In 2002, the 
transposition pattern was back to the high of the year 2000. Between the first and the 
fourth quarter, the cabinet adopted 81 draft parliamentary laws, with the quarterly 
score ranging between 13 and 29 drafts.
The overall picture that emerges from this data is that of rather limited legal 
adaptation in the years 1997-1999, perhaps with a minor acceleration in 1999, and 
rapid transposition in the years 2000-2002, with a slight slowdown in the second half 
of 2001 due to the parliamentary elections. Finally, one needs to notice the prominent 
periodicity of transposition during the years 2000-2002. The peaks in the number of 
transposing legislation seem to alternate every other quarter, and the highest yearly 
scores occurred in the second quarter of the year 2000, 2001 and 2002. Interestingly, 
such periodicity is not found in the data for the years 1997-1999.
Figure 4.7. Nominal Number of EU Transposition Drafts Adopted by the Cabinet (quarterly)
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Source: own compilation based on the data available on www.sejm.gov.pl
The other indicator for substantive adaptation is the proportion of domestic measures 
that are fully compatible with the Community law. To develop a dataset for this 
indicator, one would need to find a way, first, to select domestic measures that cover 
a policy area regulated by the Community legislation and, second, to measure 
substantive compatibility of such measures over time. For the latter, special attention 
would need to be paid to domestic legislation that catches an area covered by more
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than one Community measure. In such cases, one must allow for the possibility that a 
domestic law is compatible with one Community measure but not compatible with 
another. Such information could hardly be drawn from generalized assessments of 
EU compatibility contained in domestic studies or the Commission’s regular 
progress reports (cf. URM 1995; UKIE 1998).
Accordingly, with permission from the Office of the Committee for European 
Integration in Warsaw, access was gained by the author to the data stored in the 
European Commission’s Progress Database. The database was originally developed 
in 1997 by the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Office (TAIEX) in 
Brussels to monitor the adoption of Polish domestic legislation implementing the 
European Commission’s Single Market White Paper. The Progress Database was 
later extended to cover the entire acquis communautaire as well as the screening 
process. The database was updated every two to three months based on inputs from 
the Polish ministries. The information contained in the database was well-suited for 
the present purposes. For one thing it listed all Polish legislation that operated in 
substantive areas covered by Community measures. The database also contained 
information on how compatible domestic measures were with the corresponding 
Community acts. Four degrees of compatibility were used: full, partial, none or 
unknown.
The precision of the data stored in the database must be approached with caution. 
The information on compatibility was updated based on the assessments provided by 
the Polish government, and the quality of these inputs may have varied over time as 
the Polish staff developed their expertise in Community law. In some instances, the 
data may have also reflected strategic games behind the adaptation process. Finally, 
the database does determine the precise time at which measurements were taken 
because there may have been a lag between the compilation of data by the Polish 
authorities and the uploading of the database. Nevertheless, the potential for such 
bias aside, the Progress Database provided the best available source for assessing the 
way in which substantive adaptation changed over time in aggregate terms.
This analysis used Microsoft Word tables generated from nine updates of the 
Progress Database to arrive at comparable information on cross-temporal changes in 
substantive adaptation. A domestic measure was defined as a group of legal 
provisions corresponding to a single Community law rather than as a self-contained
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piece of domestic legislation. In this way, it has been possible to control for cases 
where a domestic law contained provisions corresponding to many different 
Community measures. The analysis was performed on a sample consisting of Polish 
measures corresponding to the Community legislation listed in the European 
Commission’s 1997 White Paper. It was necessary to use a sample because the 
earlier versions of the database did not contain information on the entire acquis.
The analyzed data demonstrates that, between May 1998 and February 2002, the 
level of substantive adaptation varied significantly. See Figure 4.8. Between May 
1998 and December 1999, the percentage of fully compatible measures declined as a 
proportion of all domestic measures corresponding to the White Paper’s acquis. The 
drop was from 39 to 26 per cent over the one and a half year period. As is clear from 
the data in Figure 4.8, the decline in percentage values occurred against the backdrop 
of a rising nominal number of all domestic measures within the catchment of the 
Community laws. After an initial decline, their total number increased from 1,162 in 
May 1998 to 1,658 in May 2000. The new legislative measures were, however, 
partially compatible or non-compatible, which resulted in the lower percentage 
values of the compatibility indicator. Although, after an initial drop, the nominal 
number of fully compatible measures rose too, from 323 to 424, the rate of change 
was not high enough to compensate for the rapid increase in the overall legislative 
activity. This trend was reversed from May 2000. Although the Polish government 
continued to add substantially to the total number of domestic measures 
corresponding the White Paper’s acquis, the legislative measures adopted between 
May 2000 and February 2002 had a higher compatibility with the Community acquis 
on average. The total number of domestic measures increased by more than a third 
from 1,658 to 2,538, but the nominal number of fully compatible measures also rose 
sharply from 424 to 1,153. This resulted in a relatively high increase in the 
proportion of fully compatible domestic measures from 26 to 45 per cent.
It is interesting to note that the change to higher levels of adaptation occurred at a 
rate slightly higher than the rate of decline in the period from May !  998 to December
1999. This data seems to be consistent with the information presented in Figure 4.7. 
Between 1997 and 1999, the Polish government adopted very few draft 
parliamentary laws whose primary objective was to bring domestic legislation in line 
with the Community law. New domestic legislation, though falling within the
104
catchment of the White Paper’s acquis, served mainly domestic purposes and less 
attention was paid to compatibility issues. Hence, the proportion of fully compatible 
laws declined. This changed in 2000 when the Polish government began to adopt 
more draft laws specifically aimed at transposing the Community acquis. Hence, the 
proportion of fully compatible measures increased.
Figure 4.8. Percentage of Fully Compatible Domestic Measures (White Paper Sample) Based on 
Data from Progress Database
50 |  -  ----------_ _ _ _ _ ---------------------— --------_ _ ---------  n ;
May 1998 September March 1999 December May 2000 December April 2001 November February
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
n= 1162 949 1086 1394 1658 1959 2308 2495 2538
v - 452. 323 360 365 424 604 915 1113 1153
Source: own conpilation (v = nominal number offiilly compatible measures)
Timeliness
The first indicator for timeliness is the proportion of Polish transposing measures 
envisaged for adoption in a given year (or shorter period) that were actually adopted 
that year (or within such a shorter period). To develop a dataset for this indicator, one 
needs to find reliable deadlines against which deviation from schedule could be 
captured. In addressing the issue, this thesis uses the data on transposition deadlines 
contained in the four consecutive national programmes for the adoption of the acquis 
(1998, 1999, 2000, 2001). Admittedly, this choice is not without problems. Besides 
the credibility problems mentioned at the end of the previous section, the precision of 
the transposition deadlines as well as the quality of the information on what 
transposing measures would be adopted varied both across policy areas and across 
programmes. The problem was addressed by limiting the focus of the analysis only
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to bills to be submitted to parliament and by selecting measures that were clearly 
identified by name and deadline. Excluded from the selection were (i) measures with 
no deadlines (ii) measures which had been passed before the date of the programme, 
and (iii) measures with deadlines dependent on an external event (e.g. economic 
situation). Also, only deadlines for cabinet adoption were used.
Another problem with the data arose because, as a rule, the NPAA programmes were 
adopted in mid-year and, though planned transposition for the following one and a 
half years, were updated in yearly cycles. As a result, there was an overlap of around 
six months, and deadlines for many measures were provided simultaneously in two 
consecutive programmes. The problem was solved by selecting only the transposing 
measures that were scheduled for adoption during the half-year period until the end 
of the year in which the programme was adopted. So, for example, the score for 1999 
is based on the sample of measures to be adopted between mid-1999 and the end of 
that year. Besides the yearly NPAA programmes, our analysis also uses data on 
deadlines derived from short-range planning instruments. Those took the form of 
internal transposition agendas adopted by the cabinet or the KIE committee for 
periods ranging from three to twelve months. Four such plans were used (January- 
May 2000, May-September 2000, January-September 2000, January-December 
2002).
Having selected transposing measures scheduled for adoption in a given year (or a 
shorter period), their individual transposition record was traced using data from three 
principal sources. First, the parliament’s on-line database was searched, and where 
two or more acts with similar names were adopted, reference was made to the 
explanatory notes. Second, the transposition statistics were cross-checked with the 
information contained in the official annual reports on the implementation of the 
transposition programmes. Finally, reference was made to the dataset developed for 
the indicator presented in Figure 4.7 above.
The data demonstrates that the extent to which transposition deadlines were kept 
changed very considerably over time. See Figure 4.9. Between 1998 and 1999, the 
proportion of the domestic measures scheduled for adoption that were indeed passed 
by the cabinet remained at a relatively low level. The scores were 16 and 31 per cent 
respectively. In 1998, only four measures were adopted out of the scheduled 24. The 
score improved in the following year as 14 out of 45 measures were adopted within
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deadline. See Annex 2 for detailed listings and scores. The most significant change in 
the value of the timeliness indicator occurred in the year 2000. Out of the 63 drafts 
scheduled for cabinet adoption in 2000, 51 were submitted to parliament. In effect, 
the percentage score rose to 81 per cent. As compared to the earlier shift between 
1998-9, the magnitude of change in 1999-2000 was slightly higher -  the percentage 
score in 2000 was two and a half times higher than that in 1999 relative to a twofold 
increase in 1998-99. Significantly, timeliness took a major dip in 2001. The 
percentage of measures adopted within the deadline declined to a low level of 21 per 
cent. This change is, however, likely to have been due to the parliamentary elections 
in September 2001 that disrupted the flow of the government’s business in the 
second half of that year. The score was back to a high level in the year 2002. As 
many as 8 out of the 13 parliamentary measures scheduled for adoption were passed 
by the cabinet. As a result, the percentage score rose to 61 per cent.
Figure 4.9. Compliance with Transposition Commitments (Percentage of Adopted Drafts) based 
on Data from the NPAAs
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The results for 2000-2002 are confirmed by the data derived from the short-range 
planning instruments. See Figure 4.10. The first thing to note is that all four plans 
were implemented to a high degree. The whole-range score varied between 60 and 
87 per cent. Between January and May 2000, 33 out of 38 scheduled transposing 
measures were adopted by the cabinet during the five-month period. The May- 
September plan contained 38 measures out of which 31 were adopted on time. In 
January-September 2001, 29 out of 48 measured were adopted, while in 2002 the 
score was 51 out of 63 measures.
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Figure 4.10. Compliance with Short-Range Transposition Commitments (Percentage of Adopted 
Drafts)
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The second observation is that the quarterly and monthly deadlines were more likely 
not to have been complied with. The score for the former remained within the range 
of 45-66 per cent, while that for the latter was between 18-46 per cent. This said, it is 
possible to discern an upward tendency in such short-range timeliness. The monthly 
and quarterly scores rose from a low level in 2000-2001 to a much higher level in 
2002. Finally, it is important to notice a relative decline in the values of the indicator 
for the first three quarters of 2001. This seems to indicate that the drop identified in 
Figure 4.9 for the implementation of the 2001 NPAA was part of a more general 
downward trend that started already in the first half of 2001.
The other timeliness indicator is the length of time required for the cabinet to adopt a 
draft transposing law. To develop a dataset for this indicator, one would need to 
measure cross-temporal variation in the time between formal submission to cabinet 
and final cabinet adoption of domestic transposing measures. In compiling this data, 
the author gained authorized access to the written records maintained by the Cabinet 
Agenda Department at the Prime Minister’s Chancellery. These records contained 
information about all draft laws submitted to cabinet as well as their submission and 
adoption dates, sponsoring ministry, evidence of comments and remarks by other 
ministries, and progress updates.
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The dataset was compiled using two selection criteria: (i) draft parliamentary 
legislation identified as a transposing measure in the dataset prepared for the 
indicator in Figure 4.7, and (ii) legislation submitted and adopted by the cabinet 
between 1 October 1997 and 30 December 2002. Excluded were transposing 
measures that the cabinet adopted according to a written procedure, since this may 
have introduced a bias into the time scores for such legislation. The time score was 
determined using the NETWORKDAYS function in Microsoft Excel which returns 
the number of whole working days between start date and end date. Working days 
exclude weekends and any dates identified as holidays. See Annex 1.
The data shows that the timeliness of transposition changed in two major shifts 
between 1998 and 2002. See Figure 4.11. The box plot presents mean values as well 
as the first and third quartiles for thirteen consecutive periods. The scores of 56 days 
and over were disregarded as 95 per cent of all cases were within the range of 1-55 
days. Until the end of 1999 draft transposing legislation that reached the cabinet 
spent on average between 9 to 15 days before adoption. The longest 25 per cent spent 
between 13 and 36 days between submission and adoption by cabinet. This pattern 
changed from the first half of 2000. The mean cabinet time dropped to between 3 and 
6 days. The longest 25 per cent of bills spent between 7 and 25 days at cabinet level.
The scores for 2001 show a deterioration, though there is no reversal to the pre-2000 
values. The mean rose to between 7 and 8 days and the third quartile was between 8 
and 22 days. The other major change in the length of time needed for cabinet 
adoption occurred from the first quarter of 2002. The mean times fell to just 3 to 4 
days. The longest 25 per cent of cabinet times remained within a range of 5 and 13 
days. It is important to note, however, that the improvement was gradual as the score 
for the first half of 2002 shows an unusually high number of outliers and extremes 
(represented as circles and crosses in the graph).
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Figure 4.11. Means and Quartiles for Length of Time between Cabinet Submission and 
Adoption
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Source: own compilation based on the records made available by the Prime Minister’s Chancellery. 
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The circles and stars denote outliers and extremes respectively.
Overall Assessment
The picture that emerges from the above data demonstrates that the period between 
1998 and 2002 may be divided into four consecutive stages each characterized by a 
distinct pattern of the transposition record. See Table 4.6. First, in 1998 and 1999, the 
Polish government had a low transposition record. Three out of four indicators 
registered low scores for the whole period. Although the first indicator (nominal 
number of transposing measures) had a slightly improved score for 1999, this does 
not provide sufficient evidence for a major upgrading in the overall assessment.
Second, the year 2000 was characterized by a high transposition record. Three out of 
four indicators registered a high score. Indicator 2 showed a negative score until May 
2000 as the compatibility of domestic legislation with the White Paper acquis 
continued to decline but the score improved for the rest of that year. Third, in the 
year 2001, the Polish government had a medium transposition record. Except for 
Indicator 2, two indicators had a medium score and one had a medium to high score.
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Fourth and finally, the year 2002 was characterized by a high transposition record. 
All the four indicators showed a highly positive score.
Table 4.6. A Summary of Variation in the Dependent Variable
Period Indicator 1 
All over time
Indicator 2 
Compatibility
Indicator 3
Deadline
Compliance
Indicator 4 
Cabinet Time
Overall
Assessment
1998 low low low Low
1999 Low to 
medium
declining level 
of substantive 
adaptation
low low Low
2000 high high high High
2001 medium to 
high
Increasing 
level of 
substantive 
adaptation
medium medium Medium
2002 high high high High
Source: own compilation
III. The Effects of Policy Type, Actor Preferences and Ministerial Resources
This section explores the effect of variables that do not constitute the main focus of 
the study but nevertheless have been identified in Chapter 2 Section II as having 
potential impact on the resolution of collective dilemmas in the improvement of the 
transposition record.
Policy Type
The first such variable that may affect the likelihood that ministers and departments 
solve the collective action problem in the improvement of transposition record is the 
nature of the policy issue to be transposed. The theoretical prediction under this 
heading is that the likelihood that ministers and their staff contribute to the 
transposition record is positively related to the opportunities for deriving an 
individual benefit from transposing legislation. For present purposes, it is assumed 
that the ability to derive an individual benefit is the lower, the higher the cost of
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production of a law. To check for the impact of production costs, this thesis uses the 
nominal word count of individual laws as an indicator of production costliness. The 
assumption here is that the longer a law is, the most costly its production is since it 
tackles more complex issues and more ministers must be involved. Admittedly, the 
choice of the indicator is not without problems (Tsebelis 1999; Huber and Shipan 
2002). For instance, a simple word count will not reflect complexity where a law 
contains a large number of small administrative details. Nevertheless, the length of a 
law provides a convenient, if crude, way of checking whether the complexity 
variable provides some insight into cross-temporal variation in the transposition 
record. To create a data set for this indicator, the word count was calculated for all 
transposing legislation between 1997 and 2002. This was done based on the final 
texts of these laws available at the Polish parliament’s website using the automatic 
word count function supported by Microsoft Word 2000. See Annex 1.
The obtained word count is used to look for correlation with the length of time taken 
by the cabinet to adopt a transposing measure. The latter indicator thus serves as a 
proxy for the entire transposition record. The analysis aims to capture situations in 
which the cross-temporal variation observed in the dependent variable is caused by 
variation in the complexity of transposition issues addressed by the executive. Figure 
4.12 plots the length of time (in days) on the vertical axis and the total word count 
along the horizontal axis. To improve statistical significance, the outlier scores (56 
days and over) in the length of cabinet time were disregarded (95 per cent of all cases 
lie within the range of 1-55 days). The regression line is specified using the least 
squares regression model. The analysis demonstrates that there is a positive linear 
relationship between the two variables. Longer laws tend to require more time for 
cabinet adoption. It is interesting to note that most cases are located within the lower 
ranges of the horizontal axis and yet are still fairly variable in the number of cabinet 
time required. The relationship between the two variables is a modest one. The 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient is 0.157 and is significant at the .05 level. The 
coefficient of determination (r squared) is .025, which means that legislative 
complexity explains 2.5 per cent of the variation in the time required for cabinet 
adoption. It is important to note that if the scores of 56 and over in the length of 
cabinet time are included, the correlation coefficient drops to 0.093 but is not 
statistically significant (.181). All in all, it seems that although complexity of
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legislation does indeed have some impact on the likelihood that the collective 
transposition record is improved, this effect is rather small and leaves ample room 
for other explanations.
Figure 4.12. Length of Cabinet Time by Legislative Complexity
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Opportunities for deriving a private benefit may be further related to how costly 
transposition is for domestic addressees. To check for the impact of adaptation 
costliness, one would need to find a way to measure cross-temporal variation in the 
extent to which legislation entailed adaptation costs. A quantitative measurement 
over many cases may prove difficult since, in the strict sense, it would require the 
substantive examination of individual laws as well as preference tracing for domestic 
regulatees. Faced with such difficulties, a decision has been made to use a much 
simpler indicator by exploring the ministry distribution of planned transposing 
measures. Given that some ministries are generally considered to have a more cost- 
intensive acquis to implement than others (cf. Rada Ministrow 2000; UKIE 2003), 
such data should make it possible to capture cross-temporal shifts in costliness for 
domestic addressees. See Table 4.7. The obtained data shows the association 
between adaptation costliness and transposition record to be at best limited, In 1998- 
2002, the bulk of transposition measures were invariably planned in areas in which 
the acquis entailed high adaptation costs (transport & telecoms, finance, economics 
and agriculture). Although the proportion of commitments made in areas in which
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transposition was less cost-intensive (justice, home, culture, education) increased 
gradually, it is important to note that in 2000 -  the year in which the transposition 
record improved substantially -  the share of such measures in planned transposition 
actually declined.
Table 4.7. Ministry Distribution of Planned Transposing Measures
Ministry 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Transport & Telecoms 12 10 5 2 11
Finance 5 6 12 5 8
Economics 3 2 10 8 7
Agriculture 3 8 14 M 12
Labour Q 0 4 4 3
Environment 0 1 2 1 3
Health 0 0 6 4 5
Competitions Office 0 10 2 0 2
Justice 0 6 3 6 4
Home Affairs 0 0 3 2 4
Culture 1 2 0 1 3
Education 0 0 2 1 1
Foreign Affairs 0 0 0 1 0
State Treasury 0 0 0 3 0
Total 24 45 63 49 63
Source: own compilation based on the NPAA programmes (1998, 1999, 2000) and short-term plans 
(2001, 2002). The score for economics ministry covers measures allocated to the Public Procurement 
Office, Measures Office, Exchange Commission, Standardization Office, Regional Ministry. The 
score for justice ministry covers measures assigned to Personal Data Protection Office.
Actor Preferences
The second variable is actor preferences. The theoretical prediction here is that the 
likelihood that ministers and their staff contributed to the transposition record may 
have been related to their individual preferences and capabilities. For example, some 
ministers may have had a higher personal desire to be seen as strong champions of 
European integration or wanted to be perceived as team players complying with 
collective decisions. Similarly, some ministers may have had better management 
skills than others. To check for the impact of such idiosyncratic factors, one would 
need to identify all personal qualities that are likely to have affected transposition, 
measure the incidence of such qualities in the population of Polish ministries over 
time and then cross-tabulate it with evidence of the transposition record. For present 
purposes, a simpler test is employed by checking whether any of the cross-temporal 
changes has been associated with a prior major cabinet reshuffle. Admittedly, this a 
rather crude measure but nevertheless it gives us some idea regarding the potential 
impact of individual preferences.
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The data on ministerial replacements indicates that in 1997-2002 there were four 
major cabinet reshuffles. The first one occurred in early 1999 when four ministers 
were changed. The second shake-up came in the second quarter of 2000 when the 
Freedom Union withdrew six ministers. Interestingly, the fourth round o f changes 
took place in the third quarter of 2001, when Buzek replaced four ministers only 
months before parliamentary elections. The last major reshuffle occurred in the third 
quarter of 2002 when prime minister Miller replaced three ministers. This data 
tentatively suggests that ministerial replacements may have had some impact on the 
transposition dynamic. For example, the cumulative effect of cabinet changes in 
1999 may have altered the constellation of actor preferences within the cabinet. The 
change of UW ministers may also have added a further boost to transposition in mid
2000. This said, the cabinet reshuffles either in late 2001 and in 2002 do not seem to 
have coincided with changes in the transposition record. All in all, although actors 
preferences may have had some effect, their impact seems at best limited.
Figure 4.13. Cabinet Reshuffles and Adoption of Parliamentary Bills by the Cabinet
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Ministerial Resources
The third variable is resource endowment. The theoretical assumption is that the 
more resources a minister has at his or her disposal, the higher the likelihood that he 
or she makes voluntary donations to collective action. The resource that is likely to
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have a significant effect on the transposition record is the number of staff that deal 
with EU-related legislation in line ministries. These officials played a crucial role in 
supporting line departments in transposition, and it seems logical to expect that their 
- resource endowment should affect the transposition record. To create a data set for 
this indicator, all Polish ministries were approached for information on cross­
temporal changes in the semi-annual staff figures for EU Divisions. Nine out of the 
fourteen ministries provided the data: ministries for economics, labour, home affairs, 
transport, communications, justice, agriculture, health and education. Three 
ministries (economics, labour and agriculture) provided only annual figures for 
periods ending December each year. In those latter cases, a decision was taken to 
retain the semi-annual periodicity and use the annual figure for both half-year 
periods. Staff levels have been measured in full-time equivalents rather than in head 
count, with the exception of the Home Affairs Ministry. To control for the impact of 
resource endowment of departments other than the EU departments, the data on the 
total number of staff in ministries was obtained. Finally, the data on staff changes has 
been compared over time with variation in the transposition record.
The data demonstrates that there is some positive association between transposition 
record and staff levels in European integration departments. See Table 4.8. The first 
observation is that the two upward shifts in the transposition record did coincide with 
increases in the level of EU-related staffing. In the first half of 2000, the full-time 
staff increased to 244 from 227 in the previous half-year period and the high level 
persisted in the following six months. In the first half of 2002, the staff level rose to 
270 from 231 in the second half of 2001 and increased further in the following six 
months. The other observation is that a decline in the transposition record in 2001 is 
associated with a reduction in staffing. The number of staff declined in the first half 
of 2001 to 233 from 244 in the previous half-year period. The finding is confirmed 
by the data on total ministerial staff levels. The largest growth in all staff occurred in 
the first half of 2000, when the number of personnel increased by 246 staff, and in 
the first half of 2002, when it increased by more than 180 staff. The data for 2001 is, 
however, ambiguous with the total staff increasing in the first half of 2001 but falling 
in the second half.
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Table 4.8. Ministerial Staff Numbers and Transposition Record
Ministry 1-1997 11-1997 1-1998 11-1998 1-1999 11-1999 1-2000 11-2000 1-2001 11-2001 1-2002 11-2002
Economics 33,67* 33,67 35,5* 35,5 38,67* 38,67 41* 41 44* 44 43* 43
Labour 26,88* 26,88 29* 29 25* 25 26* 26 21* 21 45* 45
Home Affairs 14* 14 20 23 26 25 28 30 31 32 35 44
Transport 14,5 17,05 18,75 25,75 25,75 21,75 21,75 18,75 21,75 27,75 28,75 27,75
Communications 15,5 17,5 20 21 18,5 16 19 18 13
Justice 25,5 25,5 25 31 33 35,5 36,5 37,5 37 41 42,5 47,5
Agriculture 37* 37 21* 21 27* 27 32* 32 26,5* 26,5 34,8* 34,8
Health 0 12 11 15 13 12 13 13 15 14 16 16
Education 28 30 31 31 23 26 27 26 24 25 25 28
Total EU Departments 195,05 213,6 211,25 232,25 229,92 226,92 244,25 242,25 233,25 231,25 270,05 286,05
All Staff 4084,98 4155,53 4239,14 4396,16 4404,91 4429,47 4675,91 4577,15 4730,89 4610,1 4792,82 4833,62
Transposition Record Low Low Low Low Low Low High High Medium Medium High High
Source: own compilation based on the data obtained from individual ministries under the Freedom of Information Act
* annual figures are used to fill in semi-annual gaps
shaded area -  in autumn 2001 the Communications Ministry was merged with Transport to form the Infrastructure Ministry
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This said, there are four major problems with treating these observations as evidence of 
a causal relationship. First, the transposition record remained unchanged despite fairly 
high staff increases in EU departments in mid 1997 and mid 1998 (9,5 and 10 per cent 
respectively). It was only from the year 2000 that staff variation started to be associated 
with changes in the transposition pattern. This would suggest that there was some other 
factor that activated the personnel variable. Second, personnel changes have had 
asymmetric effects. A staff increase by 10 per cent led to a major change from low to 
high transposition record, while the change from medium to high record was 
accompanied by a 17 per cent rise in staff numbers. Third, none of the changes in the 
EU-related staff levels marked a major departure from the overall growth trend and 
amounted, at best, to an average increase of two to four full-time equivalents per 
ministry. As such, they were unlikely to make a substantial contribution to the 
resolution of the collective action problem. Fourth and finally, the lack of time lag 
between the movements in staff numbers and the changes in the transposition record 
casts some doubts on the direction of the causality. Though staff increases may have led 
to higher transposition record, it is just as probable that higher transposition record 
necessitated staff growth. In that latter case, some external variable may have been 
responsible for the transposition effect, while ministries may have used the 
sustainability of transposition to justify new recruitment. All in all, the result is 
inconclusive and, as such, invites further research.
Besides changes in absolute terms, resource endowment may also vary over time in 
relative terms. In the present context, this means that resources available to 
transposition would be the higher, the less non-EU-related demands are placed on the 
total government resources. To check for the effect of relative changes in resource 
endowment, one may examine cross-temporal changes in the proportion of legislative 
output devoted to transposition. The theoretical prediction is that improvements in the 
transposition record would be associated with major increases in the relative resources 
committed to transposition. In developing a data set for this indicator, the data in Annex 
1 was supplemented with information about all non-EU related draft parliamentary laws 
adopted by the Polish cabinet between 1997 and 2002.
The data confirms that changes in relative resource endowment are indeed associated 
with variation in the transposition record. See Figure 4.14. The upward shift from low to 
high transposition record in the year, 2000 occurred against the backdrop of a major
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reallocation of government resources to transposition. Almost 70 per cent of the 
cabinet’s total legislative output in parliamentary drafts was devoted to the transposition 
of the Community legislation. Similarly, the shift from medium to high record in 2002 
was, in part, due to a relative increase in resources committed to transposition. The 
proportion of transposing laws rose from 11 per cent in the second half of 2001 to 44 
per cent in the first six months of 2002. Conversely, a decline in the relative share of 
government resources devoted to transposition coincided with a downward shift in the 
transposition record which started already in the second half of 2000. Yet, as already 
indicated above, although changes in relative resource endowment may have led to 
higher transposition record, it is just as probable that higher transposition record 
necessitated shifts in resources. In that latter case, some external variable may have 
been responsible for inducing ministers to assign relatively more resources to 
transposition.
Figure 4.14. Transposing Laws as a Percentage of the Cabinet’s Total Legislative Output of Draft 
Parliamentarv Laws
100%
50% -
2-1997 1-1998 2-1998 1-1999 2-1999 1-2000 2-2000 1-2001 2-2001 1-2002 2-2002 
■ T ransposing Legislation Non-T ransposing Legislation 
Source: own compilation based on data from www.sejm.gov.pl
IV. Conclusion
This chapter has mapped cross-temporal variation in the Polish government’s 
transposition record in two principal dimensions: substantive adaptation and timely 
compliance with transposition commitments. It has first shown that transposition per se 
had not started until autumn 1997. Although some early attempts had been made since 
1991, they had been mainly informed by the logic of policy modernization and creative 
transplant of EU policy models. The chapter has further demonstrated that in the period
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under investigation the transposition record varied significantly. In 1997-1999, the 
Polish government had a rather low record in both substantive adaptation and timely 
transposition of EU legislation. From 2000, the transposition record had improved and 
remained at a high level until 2001 when it deteriorated to a medium level. The year 
2002 brought a return to a high level of transposition. Last but not least, the chapter has 
analyzed the effect of variables that do not constitute the main focus of the study but 
have been identified in Chapter 2 Section II as having a potential impact on the 
resolution of collective dilemmas in the improvement of the transposition record. The 
key findings from that analysis are that policy type, actor preferences and ministerial 
resources were likely to affect the changes in the transposition record. This said, the 
effect of these three variables is not sufficient to fully account for the variation in the 
transposition record, and hence leaves ample room for other explanations.
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Chapter 5: The Impact of Core Executive Rules on Transposition
This chapter brings together the data presented in the two preceding chapters. It finds, 
first, that the variation in core executive rules has been over time consistent with 
changes in the transposition record. To further substantiate such congruence, the chapter 
provides process-tracing evidence of causal mechanisms that linked the two variables. 
The analysis also finds that incentives and opportunity structures originating outside the 
executive had an effect on the transposition record. Out of the three variables 
considered, the EU incentives and party configurations provide the most insight.
I. Consistency with Theoretical Predictions and Causal Mechanisms
The picture that emerges from the data presented in Chapter 3 and 4 indicates that the 
theoretical predictions formulated in Chapter 2 find confirmation in the empirical 
evidence (see Table 5.9). The impact of configuration one (1996-7) is not discussed 
since transposition of EU legislation per se had not started until mid 1997 and, even 
then, was immediately interrupted by parliamentary elections in September 1997.
The Impact o f Configuration Two: Autumn 1997- Mid 1998
Between late 1997 and mid 1998, limited core executive mobilization coincided with a 
low transposition record. This is consistent with the theoretical prediction that collective 
dilemmas are likely to hinder transposition if institutional rules are absent that would 
allow the core executive to extend selective incentives and monitoring to ministerial 
departments. Three causal mechanisms lend support to the above claim of consistency 
with theory. First, limited mechanisms for sanctioning and rewarding ministers for 
transposition could have hardly solved the problem of high opportunity costs that arises 
when ministers must improve a collective transposition record. At the planning stage, in 
the absence of central prioritization, ministers and line departments paid only limited 
attention to the practical necessities of transposition and the feasibility of plans. An 
UKIE official thus described the implications of such limited mobilization from the 
centre,
‘The way in which the timeline [for transposition] was specified was 
ridiculous... But this problem arose because we did not have any way or 
institutional lever with which to discipline ministerial departments and make 
them commit, for example, to transposing this or that directive in 1998’. 
(interview 19, p. 3)
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Table 5.9. Congruence of Empirical Findings with Theoretical Predictions
Period Core Executive Theoretical Prediction Transposition outcome Overall Congruence
autumn 1997 -  mid 1998 Limited mobilization from 
core executive
Unresolved collective 
dilemmas and low 
transposition record
■ Low number of transposition drafts
■ Declining level of substantive adaptation
■ Low compliance with transposition deadlines
■ High average time before cabinet adoption
+
+
+
+
mid 1998-m id  1999 Limited mobilization from 
core executive
Unresolved collective 
dilemmas and low 
transposition record
■ Medium number of transposition drafts
■ Declining level o f substantive adaptation
■ Low compliance with transposition deadlines
■ High average time before cabinet adoption
-/+
+
+
+
mid 1999 -  spring 2000 High mobilization from Resolved collective dilemmas ■ High number of transposition drafts +
core executive and high transposition record ■ Declining level of substantive adaptation
• High compliance with transposition deadlines +
■ Low average time before cabinet adoption +
spring 2000 -  mid 2001 High mobilization from Resolved collective dilemmas ■ High to low number of transposition drafts +/--
core executive and high transposition record ■ Increasing level of substantive adaptation +
■ High to low compliance with transposition deadlines +/--
■ High to medium average time before adoption +/-
autumn 2001 -  end 2002 High mobilization from Resolved collective dilemmas ■ High number of transposition drafts +
core executive and high transposition record ■ Increasing level of substantive adaptation +
■ High compliance with transposition deadlines +
■ Low average time before cabinet adoption +
Source: own compilation
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Neither did the prime minister or the KIE sanction or reward transposition at the 
implementation stage. Hence, ministers and departments tended to devote only a small 
share of their resources to transposition saving larger donations for more pressing and 
beneficial tasks. A high-ranking official at the Prime Minister’s Office thus described 
the reason why transposition had been delayed,
‘It is likely that the emphasis on other policy issues such as (...) the four social 
reforms (...) led to the neglect of the active verification of adaptation tasks. (...) 
Some work was underway and had been begun in most areas, but there was 
likely to be an insufficient supervision over whether such work had been in fact 
completed’, (interview 6, p. 13)
The limited mobilization thus caused the nominal number of transposing legislation to 
remain within a low range (indicator 1) and the level of substantive adaptation to 
decline as new legislation was not compatible or partially compatible with the 
Community acquis (indicator 2).
Second, limited monitoring precipitated widespread shirking. The twice-yearly 
reporting cycle, combined with the poor precision of transposition programmes, offered 
ministers and their staff ample opportunities to ffee-ride on the efforts of other 
departments. This causal linkage was further confirmed by the UKIE minister who said, 
‘If one could report once a year that some things had not been implemented, and there 
were no consequences, then one had limited incentives to make any major efforts in that 
area’ (interview 15, p. 6). Another official explained,
‘The [transposition delays] occurred because the cabinet was not well 
organized. (...) When the council of ministers decided on something, ministers 
[often] forgot about that. (...) The implementation of the decisions was not 
exacted from them. Political decisions were made but these did not translate 
into action at the bureaucratic level’, (interview 46, p. 4)
Unsurprisingly, the implementation of the NPAA commitments proved patchy and 
difficult, with only 16-31 per cent of them actually realized (indicator 3).
Finally, limited facilitation from the centre did little to lower coordination costs 
associated with transposition. Given the cross-cutting nature of transposition as well as 
the high learning costs, the executive actors took much longer to work out compromises 
and push legislation through interministerial consultation and committees. 
Consequently, EU-related legislation was found to provoke prolonged debates at cabinet 
level, if it ever got pushed that far (indicator 4). Speaking about the causes of
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transposition delays, a lawyer at the UKIE secretariat thus described what had been a 
major shortcoming in the centre’s role in 1997-1998,
‘As well as urging them [ministerial departments] to adopt and change laws, we 
should have followed this up with concrete substantive assistance. For example, 
we could have provided more detailed guidance on what should be transposed 
by not only identifying the titles of directives but also by specifying which 
problems should be addressed in a given amendment. This would have been 
helpful since at that early time ministerial departments did not have strong legal 
expertise while such knowledge was concentrated within the UKIE’. (interview 
26, p. 9)
The cost of contributions to the transposition record was further increased since the core 
executive agencies kept most negotiation-related documents highly confidential and did 
not inform ministerial departments about the precise nature of transposition 
commitments. As a result, any ministerial official working in that area had to expend 
additional resources on simple identification of adaptation tasks. An internal 
government memo thus described the key reason behind delays in transposition,
‘Draft negotiation positions are prepared and reviewed by only a small circle of 
people which means that the precise nature of the final commitments 
undertaken in these documents is not generally known to staff within the 
administration. This, in turn, means that those staff that prepare government 
programmes and draft legislation in individual ministries and central agencies 
do not take such negotiation commitments into account. (...) These problems 
cause adaptation commitments that Poland makes vis-a-vis the European 
Community to be implemented in an untimely manner’. (UKIE Internal 
Document 12/07/1999 1999)
The Impact o f Configuration Three: Mid 1998 - Mid 1999
The efforts to bolster the pace of legal adaptation between mid 1998 and mid 1999 (see 
chapter 3 section III) were taken without prior institutional change to the position of the 
core executive. This was because the intra-coalition impasse over the appointment of 
the KDE secretary had prevented both Karasinska-Fendler and, later, prime minister 
Buzek from reinforcing the institutional levers available to the European core. The data 
on the transposition record demonstrates that the collective dilemmas in the 
improvement of the transposition record continued to persist. This result is consistent 
with the theoretical expectation.
Three general causal mechanisms may be identified in this context. First, despite a 
closer involvement by the prime minister, his practical ability to shift ministerial 
attention to transposition continued to be limited. This was because, as one would
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expect, Buzek’s interventions could only be undertaken sporadically, while the 
operational responsibility for extending the threats of sanctions and/or prospects of 
rewards to ministers and departments was with the KIE secretary and the UKIE 
secretariat. The latter, however, lacked the necessary institutional tool-kit to undertake 
such actions. In effect, ministers continued to commit only limited resources to 
transposition. Even if they did react to Buzek’s new ambition, the new interest was 
likely to be short-lived given that the new agenda was not translated into action at the 
operational level. A minister said,
‘Ministries made declaratory statements but then it was not the full minister 
who supervised concrete actions but a junior minister responsible for that area.
And there was frequently a problem with the translation of that verbal 
commitment by the head of ministry into concrete action which was within the 
competence of a junior minister or department director. This problem persisted 
even when the prime minister started to chair the KIE’. (interview 20, p. 3)
Second, the free-rider problem associated with transposition was left unaddressed as 
monitoring mechanisms remained provisional and ministers and departments had many 
opportunities to obfuscate the real extent of their contribution to the collective 
transposition record. The passive compatibility checks by the UKIE did not provide the 
necessary incentives to ministerial departments. An UKIE minister said,
‘when a draft law was sent to the UKIE, the UKIE assessed whether it was 
compatible or not but did not check whether that same minister was supposed to 
draft ten or twenty other laws which were needed to close a given negotiation 
chapter’, (interview 17, p. 1)
Another official confirmed, ‘The UKIE and the KIE committee’s role was (...) to 
collate [documents from ministries] (...) but neither had the power to push a ministry to 
undertake work on a draft law if that ministry did not want to do that’ (interview 13, p. 
4). In effect, the implementation of the new commitments continued to be patchy, with 
only two out of the six promised laws adopted on time and the overall score for the 
1999 at 31 per cent.
Finally, the KIE secretary and the UKIE continued to lack effective instruments to 
undertake facilitation at operational level. The UKIE lawyers did not take active interest 
in the law-making processes involving transposing legislation. In effect, coordination 
costs remained high and, combined with a short-lived intensification of transposition 
work, produced the worst result in the average length of time needed for cabinet to 
adopt legislation (mean 15 days) in the entire period under examination.
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The Impact of Configuration Four: Mid 1999-Spring 2000
From mid 1999, the institutionalization of stricter core executive constraints vis-a-vis 
line ministers lay foundations for a definitive shift in the transposition record starting 
from the year 2000. This finding is in congruence with the theoretical expectation 
outlined in Chapter 2. The core executive effect was mediated through a number of 
causal mechanisms. Thanks to the new instruments for sanctioning and rewarding that 
became available with the involvement of the parliamentary secretary and the chief 
negotiator in transposition, the Polish core executive was able to impose a stricter 
framework on the legislative priorities of individual ministers and departments. The 
centre took over the transposition planning function from the line ministry level and 
harnessed it to the negotiation process. The close relationship between Arkuszewski and 
prime minister Buzek as well as the former’s political standing within the AWS party 
lent sufficient credibility to the threats of sanctions and prospects of reward. In effect, 
the nominal number of transposing legislation rose to a high level (indicator 1). A 
minister said, I
‘[Arkuszewski] would go to the prime minister and would say [he] had a 
problem. The prime minister would yell at the minister, and things started 
rolling. (...) The problem was that they were all stuck in a general malaise. And 
when one started pushing (...) redirecting the focus of line ministries on a given 
draft legislation, then the entire process started moving on’, (interview 29, p. 
i4>
Second, the regular week-to-week monitoring from the Prime Minister’s Office helped 
shift the attention from non-EU to EU-related legislation. Perhaps more importantly, it 
also made the transposition record of individual ministers and their departments clearly 
visible and measurable. This limited any opportunities for shirking and free-riding that 
hitherto dampened the incentives to contribute to the collective transposition record. A 
minister at the Prime Minister’s Office thus described the nature of the problem and the 
effect of Arkuszewski’s institution-building,
‘The problem is in the internal flow of documents since the same administrative 
machinery processes now five to six times as many documents as twelve years 
ago. (...) This is a very significant increase. The time that officials previously 
had available to work on a single document must now suffice to deal with six to 
eight such documents. So how did they deal with this problem? (...) he or she 
selected the document that they thought was the most important, and wrote ‘no 
comments’ on the remaining ones. (...) The draft laws that officials wrote ‘no 
comments’ on were then passed on further up, and were soon blocked for lack 
of agreement. (...) And so, if one wanted to deal with this problem [in
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transposition], then either one had to modify the system through which 
document passed -  this [we] could not do -  or ensure that some documents 
moved more quickly than others. The latter was simple. One had to draw up a 
list of required drafts and start calling ministers every week to remind them.
(...) Of course [Arkuszewski] did not haven any special powers but it was 
enough for some junior minister to receive a regular call from the Prime 
Minister’s Office for things to get moving’, (interview 29, p. 7)
The close monitoring improved compliance with transposition deadlines. As a result, 
the implementation of the transposition commitments rose to a high level of above 80 
per cent (indicator 3).
Third, the PMO became involved in the facilitation of transposing legislation, thus 
lowering the coordination costs. Arkuszewski had sufficient authority to cut through 
drawn-out conflicts that in many instances blocked interministerial consultations for 
long years. As a result, the average length of time the cabinet needed to pass transposing 
legislation dropped to between two to seven days (indicator 4). A minister at the Prime 
Minister’s Office gave the following example,
‘The best case in point is the water law. (...) The work on that law started in 
early 1990s. But because there was some serious dispute with the environment 
ministry there was no progress for several years (...) No one [at the centre] took 
any interest in what was really blocking it and it was only [Arkuszewski] who 
intervened and made all the parties drop objections. (...) Two months later 
work was resumed on the law. It was enough to scold someone for things to 
start moving’, (interview 29, p. 13)
Although, on the whole, the empirical evidence seems consistent with the theoretical 
prediction, it is nevertheless interesting to note the speed with which the new 
institutions affected the behaviour of line ministers and their staff. The emergence of 
new institutional rules preceded the change in the transposition record by only three to 
six months. Some doubts may arise whether the new core executive institutions alone 
could have exerted so deeply transformative an impact on actor preferences and 
transposition outcomes over such a short period of time. One explanation may be that 
weakly institutionalized rules may create stronger effects than deeply entrenched 
institutions incentives but this interpretation would run counter to much of institutional 
theory. Another explanation ^ which will be Explored in the next section -  is that 
ministers and their staff were concurrently subject to other mobilizing incentives 
originating outside the executive.
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The Impact of Configuration Five: Spring 2000-Mid 2001
While the next wave of institutional change in spring 2000 had a significant effect on 
the configuration of institutional rules, it did not reduce the intensity and scope of the 
selective incentives and monitoring the core executive extended to ministers and 
departments. Hence, in keeping with the theoretical expectation, configuration five had 
a largely consolidating effect on transposition outcomes, though its impact was not 
constant over time. The causal mechanisms at work were as follows. The problem of 
opportunity costs was tackled through the setting of clear transposition priorities by the 
KIE secretary and their formal endorsement through a resolution by the KIE committee. 
An UKIE official thus described what unblocked the transposition process, ‘The trick 
was rather simple and consisted in the detailed planning of transposition and then 
regular exacting of implementation from ministries’ (interview 52, p. 4). Another 
official confirmed,
‘In my view the crucial contributing factor was that some organizations were 
forced to undertake efforts which they should have expended as a matter of 
course but had not. This change was achieved through institutional mobilization 
and coordination of the process; earlier (...) work [on transposition] had not 
been as centrally planned and vigorously enforced as later. So, in brief, the key 
element was to provide an over-arching framework, plan the process, enforce, 
monitor... ’. (interview 11, p. 16)
The commitment to the transposition priorities was sanctioned and rewarded by the 
prime minister with operational assistance from the KIE secretary and the minister for 
transposition. In effect, the nominal number of transposing legislation remained high 
throughout the year 2000 (indicator 1).
The free-rider problem was addressed through close monitoring. Regular reporting to 
the KIE and the full cabinet made it difficult for ministers and departments to conceal 
the real size of their contribution to the collective transposition record. An official said,
‘The system of regular verification and the methodical processing of individual 
drafts (...) took us to the point where adaptation timetables which were adopted 
by the [KIE] committee (...) were implemented at 100 per cent or with only 
slight delay, whereas other government programmes had a 50 per cent or lower 
implementation record. The regular routine proved a very effective instrument 
of pressure’, (interview 12, p. 3)
The impact of close monitoring by the UKIE was confirmed by a line ministry official 
who thus described the way in which central pressures entered law-making processes at 
the ministry level, ‘we organized regular meetings at ministry level to review draft
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legislation which was to be discussed at the KIE committee (...). If any of our line 
departments was found to be in delay or otherwise in default, its representative was 
asked to provide explanation at that intra-ministerial meeting’ (interview 19, p. 9). 
Unsurprisingly, compliance with transposition commitments stayed at high level 
(indicator 3) and the percentage of fully compatible domestic measures finally began to 
climb (indicator 2).
The coordination cost problem received perhaps the most attention. The close 
professional support from the UKIE lawyers at all stages of the law-making process 
helped to lower the costs of reaching consensus. The new time-control techniques 
provided a further incentive for junior ministers to solve problems at lowest possible 
level and to avoid taking up matters in cabinet unless it was really of fundamental 
importance. As a result, the length of the average time needed for cabinet adoption was 
reduced to an all-time low of two days (indicator 4). The causal link between the UKIE 
substantive involvement and the pace of transposition was confirmed by a line ministry 
official who said,
‘They [UKIE lawyers] started to take interest in what was happening outside 
their secretariat. (...) Until then the legal department only provided written 
compatibility assessments. (...) But later UKIE lawyers started to attend 
interministerial meetings where many line departments were represented. This 
was a very good practice because it allowed us to solve a given problem right 
away’, (interview 19, p. 9-10)
The positive impact of configuration five faltered in 2001, despite there being no 
evidence of a major institutional reconfiguration at the centre of government in that 
year. Does this observation run against the theoretical expectation? Not necessarily. It is 
possible to argue that, while the configuration of the authority and information rules 
remained intact, important changes occurred in the extent to which such rules could be 
invoked. Recent in origin, the new rules were underwritten by individuals rather than 
through valued internalized conventions. Hence, when the position of the prime minister 
and the KIE secretary declined in 2001, so did the operational force of the new rules 
they had created. The credibility crisis occurred because Buzek’s authority crumbled as 
the AWS ministers realized that they were heading for an electoral defeat and, no matter 
what they did, the prime minister could not deliver re-election. This said, it is clear that 
the core executive variable cannot fully account for the transposition outcome in 2001. 
As will be seen in the next section, the effect of other variables, most notably the
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changes within the Polish party system on the eve of parliamentary elections in 
September 2001, must be considered to capture countervailing influences on the 
preferences of ministers and departments.
The Impact o f Configuration Six: Autumn 2001-End 2002
In 2002, the consolidation of the position, authority and information rules under the 
Miller government coincided with a second upward shift in the transposition outcomes. 
Several causal mechanisms were at work. First and foremost, new prime minister Miller 
and his KIE secretary Hiibner lent new credibility to the authority and information rules 
that had lost their operational force towards the end of the Buzek government. These 
included, among others, the prime minister’s powers to sanction and reward ministers, 
transposition facilitation by UKIE lawyers, a set-aside mechanism for conflictual issues, 
and regular monitoring by the UKIE and the KIE committee. In a press interview, prime 
minister Miller said,
‘After a few weeks into the government’s term, I introduced a practice that all 
cabinet meetings should start with minister Hiibner’s presentation about the 
accession negotiations and related interministerial consultations. This was 
because I realized that not only the negotiation issues but also the adoption of 
draft laws, decrees and other decisions, was subject to such controversies and 
line ministries were putting up such opposition, that progress could only be 
assured at the cabinet level’. (Paradowska and Wladyka 2002)
An UKIE official confirmed, ‘[Progress] is reviewed weekly in cabinet. There is a 
permanent point on the cabinet agenda and the prime minister receives full information 
on who did not do what. This system is very effective (...) because insubordinate 
behaviour towards the prime minister is a serious problem. And everyone does their 
best to avoid it’ (interview 12, p. 8). Besides hierarchical instruments, the Miller cabinet 
reinforced collectivity-based rules through the creation of the ZPKIE committee which 
further helped the UKIE to enforce the transposition timetable (interview 41, p. 3; 
interview 46, p. 8). A minister said,
‘A collective pressure in the form of appropriate decisions by the ZPKIE 
imposing deadlines for preparing transposition measures was an effective 
instrument because a deputy minister for European integration [at a line 
ministry] could apply not only his own pressure but also the collective pressure 
of the ZPKIE on his colleagues within the ministry’, (interview 37, p. 4)
Thanks to increased mobilization from the core, the transposition record returned to a 
high level. The nominal number of transposing legislation increased to between 13 and
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29 drafts per quarter (indicator 1). Similarly, timely compliance with transposition 
commitments rose to a higher level (indicator 3).
But, besides honing the legacy rules, both the prime minister and the KIE secretary 
introduced new institutions which paved the way for additional improvements to the 
collective transposition record. First, the problem of high coordination costs was 
addressed by a combination of the deeper involvement of the UKIE technical level and 
more extensive punishments for unnecessary referrals to the cabinet. The coordination 
costs were further lowered through a practice of trilateral meetings between the premier, 
KIE secretary and the minister concerned. Second, the new monitoring mechanisms 
combined with peer pressure within the ZPKIE committee to reduce opportunities for 
shirking and free-riding. The written reporting system locked ministries in a rigid 
routine which allowed all hold-ups to be quickly identified and made visible to all the 
parties concerned. Another significant instrument was provided by the set-aside 
technique employed to manage the timely resolution of inter-ministerial conflicts.
The new rules contributed to major improvements in the transposition outcomes. The 
reliability of transposition commitments rose substantially, especially at the monthly 
and quarterly level (indicator 3). The length of time needed for cabinet adoption was 
also characterized by the lowest means ever of between two and five days (indicator 4). 
On the one hand, the exceptional character of such improvements in the transposition 
record was likely to have been due to a progressive institutionalization of the core 
executive rules that were employed to extend selective incentives and monitoring to 
departments. But, on the other hand, such a gradual institutionalization must have been 
made more difficult by a change of government, the arrival of new political actors, and 
the organizational changes to the Prime Minister’s Office, the UKIE and the Foreign 
Office. Hence, it seems that, again, the effect of other contextualizing variables must be 
explored to more fully explain the size of the changes in the transposition record.
II. Contextualizing the Impact of the Core Executive
This section analyzes the depth of the causal relationship between core executive and 
transposition outcomes by exploring the influence of incentives and opportunity 
structures originating outside the executive: (i) the European Union institutions, (ii) 
political parties and (iii) non-executive state and non-state organizations.
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The Impact of EU Incentives
The theoretical expectation outlined in Chapter 2 is that, where institutional rules exist 
that enable EU actors to extend selective incentives and monitoring to Polish ministers 
and their staff, then such rules should facilitate the resolution of collective action 
problems and the improvement of the transposition record. Indeed, since mid 1998, the 
European Union had developed an increasing array of institutional levers which should 
have allowed it to make the collective dilemmas in transposition much less pronounced. 
These rules included, first and foremost, sanctions and rewards within the technical 
assistance programmes. The EU provided financial resources to the Polish government 
on the condition that it demonstrated progress in legal adaptation. Such conditionality 
was particularly emphasized during the 7th association committee in April 1999. An 
internal government document noted that, ‘the EU delegation (...) made it clear that the 
financial assistance for Poland in this [internal market] area was conditional on further 
legislative progress’ (UKIE Internal Document June 1999 1999, p. 10-11). Besides 
conditionality, the Commission had more direct instruments to extend selective 
incentives. One such instrument was provided by personal interventions by EU officials 
with Polish ministers. This took the form of letter exchange and personal contact. The 
members of the negotiation team personally travelled to negotiation sessions in Brussels 
and were subject to direct pressure from the EU officials. Also, Poland had many visits 
by the EU officials who held talks in line ministries and put strong pressure on ministers 
(interview 49, p. 5).
From mid 1998, the European Commission had acquired institutional tools to facilitate 
transposition through the screening process. At multilateral screening sessions, held 
jointly with other acceding countries, the Commission provided Polish officials with 
educational guidance on how the acquis should be understood and implemented. 
Between 1998 and 1999, over eighty such sessions were held in Brussels (KPRM 1999). 
Such close exchanges with the Commission services and member states’ officials 
provided incentives for domestic ministers and their staff to identify individual benefits 
in transposing legislation. The on-going negotiation process allowed the Commission to 
develop new instruments to exert pressure on Polish government ministers and 
departments. For one thing, the Commission could take advantage of the natural 
competition among acceding states and harness peer pressure to mobilize Polish 
decision-makers. But most importantly it could affect the Polish government by the
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threat of reopening, or delaying the closure of, negotiation chapters. A Commission 
official thus explained its logic,
I remember one chapter (...) where they [Poland] promised to adopt by a 
particular date some law that would go in this and that direction. There had 
been experts working together with them, sitting around the table and telling 
them what exactly had to be done, so they said “ok we will do it” and that was 
taken as a commitment in the negotiation draft common position and the 
common position. We closed the chapter provisionally but six months later the 
experts who had been working on that chapter became alarmed realizing that 
they [Poland] were not going to do what they told us. The big alarm bell started 
ringing, the member-states were informed and asked us what the Commission 
was going to do now as Poland was not doing what it had promised. So we sent 
very high level letters to whatever minister was in Poland telling them that if 
you were not going to rectify the situation, we would be obliged to re-open the 
chapter’, (interview 51, p. 3)
The European Commission also had instruments to function as an external monitor for 
Polish ministers keeping a watchful eye on their progress in EU transposition. The 
Commission had the opportunity to name and shame Polish ministries in its regular 
progress report. The accession negotiations offered the Commission further 
opportunities to undertake monitoring. During the negotiations, the Commission 
developed new monitoring tools ranging from general tables to specific transposition 
databases (Official Communication SekrMInJSW/5558/2000 2000; Official 
Communication SekrMinJSW/7041/2000 2000). The Commission services could also 
act as competitive agenda-setters in domestic law-production since Polish ministries 
often sent draft legislation to Brussels for a final check before adoption (interview 10, p. 
2; interview 51, p. 5). A Commission official said,
‘if there was good cooperation, dialogue and confidence, then the ministry 
would send the draft to us for opinion, especially, when the directive was not 
easy to transpose (...). But the member states themselves also wanted to see the 
draft and to provide comments. This happened very, very frequently’, 
(interview 53)
These EU incentives were likely to have an independent impact on transposition. 
Although a detailed analysis of cross-temporal congruence of the EU incentives with 
patterns of transposition is beyond the scope of this study, the effects of external 
mobilization seem to have been broadly in line with the theoretical predictions. The 
transposition record improved from early 2000 after the EU had begun to extend 
selective incentives and monitoring to Polish ministers and departments. The process- 
tracing material also reveals that the EU incentives did play an important role in shaping
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the actions of ministers and their departments. It has been argued, for example, that the 
absence of EU mobilization in 1997 and 1998 may have adversely affected the 
individual preferences of ministers and their staff. A line ministry official said,
‘The perception that these tasks should be undertaken was not very high among, 
government officials (...) This [lack of awareness] was perhaps due to the 
limited importance of the negotiations process [in their work]. It is 
understandable that when the [accession] process went slowly, then nobody 
here was in a hurry to carry out these tasks’, (interview 19, p. 8)
The incentives originating from the accession negotiations may have further contributed 
to a higher transposition record in 2000. An official said, ‘Later [after the negotiations 
had started] when the effects of one’s work were immediately visible, then the 
commitment of staff increased’ (interview 16, p. 8). A crucial function in changing 
expectations of ministers and their staff was fulfilled by the screening of domestic 
legislation which opened the negotiations process. For the first time, Polish ministerial 
officials came into intensive contact with the Commission officials and, where 
necessary, had to supply information on how they intended to transpose EU measures. 
By addressing the problem of high opportunity costs of transposition, the screening had 
a clearly mobilizing effect on line ministries (interview 21, p. 4). An UKIE official said,
‘I think [the negotiations] introduced a significant change (...). The line 
ministries became closely engaged in the screening process, since the Polish 
delegation was composed of line ministry officials responsible for a particular 
policy area. The delegation was headed by a line minister who bore 
responsibility for political and technical positions that were taken. And so all 
became stakeholders in the process, all became involved’, (interview 26, p. 5)
The institutional levers originating within the negotiation process clearly shaped the 
calculations of ministers and their staff. The Commission’s threat of reopening, or 
delaying the closure of negotiation chapters was a particularly effective instrument 
(interview 16, p. 9; interview 7, p. 12). An official confirmed,
‘The Commission employed instruments that shaped the actions of Polish 
actors. It could always exert political pressure by declining to close or open a 
particular negotiation chapter. And then we looked what the problem was and 
(...) some official had to quickly work to close the gap’, (interview 52, p. 4)
It has also been argued that domestic actions were responsive to monitoring by the 
European Commission. This causal link was confirmed by an UKIE minister who said,
‘The EU was very good at verifying our compliance with transposition 
commitments. If we declared that we would do something is six months, then
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the EU would come back in six months time and ask if we have done it. (...)
This was an important element of pressure on our administration’, (interview 
16, p. 9)
Perhaps most importantly, the EU contributed to the improvement of the Polish 
transposition record by threatening Poland with ejection from the first round of 
enlargement in mid 1999. As a result, the mounting evidence of serious delays in 
transposition combined with a credible external threat produced a widespread sense of 
national crisis in late 1999. If Poland had been denied EU membership, this would have 
been considered the most serious setback in foreign affairs for decades. The special 
circumstances are likely to have made it incumbent on ministers and their staff to 
contribute to the transposition record as a patriotic obligation. That EU membership was 
considered at the time as an objective of utmost national importance is attested to by 
unprecedented written agreements concluded by, on the one hand, the executive and 
parliament, and on the other hand, by all major political parties (Pakt 2000; 
Trojporozumienie 2000). A PMO official said,
‘the acceleration of transposition work in 2000 reminded me sometimes of the 
1989-1990 transformation when the cabinet was caught in a fever of legislative 
work. Many drafts were submitted to cabinet spontaneously in response to 
developments in the accession negotiations, (interview 7, p. 12)
In sum, the above evidence demonstrates that the EU incentives were likely to have an 
independent effect on the behaviour of individual ministers and hence to affect the 
transposition outcomes. Indeed, the EU effect may help to explain, for example, the 
rapid nature of the change in transposition patterns in early 2000. This is because, by 
gradually redirecting the attention of Polish governmental ministers to EU transposition 
since the late 1998, the Commission may have created conditions favourable for a 
strong and immediate reversal in the path of transposition that occurred once the core 
executive had been strengthened. This linkage would thus help to explain the puzzle 
indicated in the preceding section of weak institutions having quick and strong effects. 
The impact of EU incentives may have also become more pronounced closer to the 
accession date, thereby facilitating the exceptionally high levels of the transposition 
record. Having said that, it must be noted that the process-tracing evidence in Chapter 3 
demonstrates that the EU incentives alone were not sufficient to unblock transposition 
in mid 1999. It was only after the new core executive rule had been in place that the 
trajectory of the legal adaptation changed. Furthermore, the EU incentives are not able
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to explain the sudden decline in the transposition record in the year 2001. Even though 
the on-going accession negotiations provided the European Commission with a growing 
array of new institutional levers, the domestic transposition declined that year.
The Impact o f Party Constellations
Another variable that needs to be considered here is the incentives and opportunity 
structures originating within political parties. The theoretical prediction presented in 
Chapter 2 is that where party-based rules exist that allow party leaders or the coalition 
as a group to extend selective incentives and monitoring to individual ministers and 
their staff, then such rules should facilitate the resolution of the collective dilemmas 
and, hence, should contribute to a better transposition record. In the period under 
investigation, Poland had three governments, each characterized by a different 
configuration of party discipline and intra-coalition cooperation. The AWS-UW 
government (autumn 1997-mid 2000) was characterized by limited rules for party- 
based mobilization (cf. Zubek 2001; Rydlewski 2000, 2002). Although the UW had 
fairly well-developed internal party controls, the AWS party -  the senior coalition 
member -  was a loose conglomerate of small parties and had extremely scant 
institutional levers with which to mobilize its members towards collective policies. 
More significantly, major policy differences in the area of EU-related domestic 
alignment (see Chapter 3 Section II) prevented the coalition from developing internal 
party-based rules for coalition management in that area.
The minority AWS cabinet established after the UW withdrew from the coalition in 
June 2000 was characterized by limited internal party controls within its supporting 
party. For a brief spell, in the second half of 2000, prime minister Buzek was able to 
reinforce his grip on the party when he replaced Marian Krzaklewski at the AWS’s 
helm (interview 35, p. 6-7). Yet, that improvement turned out to be rather short-lived. 
Already in 2001, the AWS party began to disintegrate and the internal discipline 
declined substantially. The internal dissention within the AWS was mainly caused by a 
widespread realization among its members that their party was heading for an electoral 
defeat in the forthcoming parliamentary elections. As a result, many of the AWS’s 
constituent parties began to dissociate themselves from the government, starting to run 
independent election campaigns. The AWS’s disintegration was further facilitated by a 
parallel split within the UW party. In January 2001, a large number of UW members set 
up a new party, the Civic Platform, which acted as a magnet for many AWS members.
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The SLD-UP-PSL government was able to rely on relatively well-developed internal 
party controls and institutional procedures for inter-coalition cooperation (Zubek 2005 
forthcoming). The SLD and the PSL had a highly centralized internal organization 
inherited from the apparatus of their communist predecessors. Leszek Miller, SLD 
leader, further tightened his grip over the party after in April 1999 the SLD had 
transformed from a coalition of several parties into a unitary political party. The internal 
cohesiveness of the SLD, the UP and the PSL facilitated the development of more 
centralized coordination mechanisms under the Miller government. The SLD entered 
into a stable electoral coalition with the UP, and the two parties were widely expected to 
run together in the next elections. Although there were major policy differences 
between the SLD and the PSL, the two parties had governed together in 1993-1997 and 
were quick to develop institutions that would facilitate cooperation, including party 
summits and coalition management conferences.
The empirical evidence confirms that the party-based configurations had some direct 
impact on actions of individual ministers in the area of EU-related legal adaptation. The 
direction of that relationship is consistent with the theoretical predictions made in 
Chapter 2. It has been pointed out, for example, that the absence of cooperation within 
the coalition adversely affected the tempo of transposition in 1998-1999 (interview 46, 
p. 4). An official confirmed that individual parties often bound their ministers to realize 
party ideal point policies,
‘The coalition nature of the government had an impact. Many different interests 
collided here, and [legal adaptation] did not always match the interests of the 
environment or agriculture minister because their own party opposed a 
particular solution. (...) So it all depended on [personal] relations between 
ministers, particularistic interests, and on whether EU requirements ran with or 
against one’s preferences’, (interview 26, p. 5)
The party configurations are perhaps less well-placed to explain the acceleration of 
transposition in early 2000. The new transposition dynamic emerged despite that there 
were no major changes in internal party controls or inter-party cooperation. There is 
some evidence, however, that the temporary improvement in Buzek’s ability to control 
the AWS in late 2000 may have positively affected the transposition process to some 
extent. A senior advisor at the Prime Minister’s Office said,
‘After the Freedom Union had left the government (...) the cabinet’s operation 
became smoother for a while (...) the government was more cohesive, the 
decision chains became shorter and so certain decisions could be taken more
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quickly, though we did not succeed every time because that government was 
not cohesive in ideological terms’, (interview 35, p. 7)
The disintegration of the AWS in 2001 may also largely account for the decline in the 
transposition record. The lower enforceability of party-based sanctions and rewards was 
certain to produce increased shirking on the part of line ministers and their staff. This 
was especially likely given that relative benefits from private interest actions became 
more attractive for ministers who wished to individually avoid the collective electoral 
fate of the AWS party. Another contributing factor was that Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, the 
KIE secretary, joined the new Civic Platform in 2001 which eroded his relationship 
with the prime minister and, consequently, his ability to rely on the latter’s authority in 
relations with line ministers. Finally, under the SLD-PSL-UP government, the 
reinforced party-based lines of accountability facilitated the solution of the collective 
dilemmas in the transposition of EU legislation. Prime minister Miller combined 
premiership with the leadership of the SLD and was able to heavily rely on party-based 
lines of accountability to sanction and reward his ministers, though his powers in this 
area were somewhat constrained by the coalition nature of his government.
The Impact o f Parliament and Non-State Organizations
Two other variables that need to be considered here are institutional incentives 
originating from parliament and non-state actors. With regard to the former, there is 
evidence that the parliament had shaped the actions of ministers in the transposition of 
EU legislation. In 1997-1998 ministers and departments were subject to limited 
mobilization from parliament. The European integration committee dealt with legal 
adaptation only a few times a year when it reviewed the government’s reports. The 
actual work on transposition was decentralized and conducted by individual sectoral 
committees. That limited mobilization from parliament was likely to contribute to 
delays in transposition. A parliamentary observer was sceptical about the effects of 
parliamentary work during that time,
‘The parliament did not block or hinder [transposition] but perhaps the Sejm did 
not fully grasp what it was all about. (..) Since 1995 the Europe Agreement 
Committee, later the European integration committee, had moved into this area 
with difficulty, and every year devoted one session to transposition but it was 
more of a ritual than real decision-making’, (interview 18, p. 2-3).
The impact of selective incentives and monitoring may be also traced in 1999-2000. 
The change in the transposition record from the start of 2000 had been preceded by an
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institutionalization of new constraints on the executive by the Polish parliament 
(interview 18, p. 6). In October 1999, the European Integration Committee in the lower 
chamber debated the Commission’s progress report and, dissatisfied with what it found, 
required the executive to present a list of all transposing laws that had to be 
implemented until the mid 2000 and to take rapid remedial action to accelerate the pace 
of legislative work (Sejm RP 1999). The parliament’s most vital contribution to the 
improvement of the transposition record came in the first half 2000. In February-March 
2000, the lower and upper chambers passed resolutions asking the government to 
prioritize transposing legislation and to prepare a detailed legislative programme (Sejm 
RP 2000; Senat RP 2000). In mid 2000 the lower chamber set up a special 
parliamentary committee to work exclusively on transposition which mobilized and 
monitored government ministers to prepare and submit relevant draft legislation 
(interview 1; interview 33). An official said,
‘It was parliament who demanded outstanding drafts to be calculated, required 
detailed lists [of planned legislative activity] to be developed, identified delays 
in the submission of such drafts, and forced the government to take action. So 
this is a clear success of the [European Law] committee’, (interview 18, p. 8-9)
The parliamentary incentives are perhaps less useful in explaining the improvement in 
transposition patterns in 2002. The upward shift in that year was not associated with the 
institutionalization of any new constraints from parliament. Indeed, one could argue that 
such parliamentary mobilization declined as the lower chamber decided not to set up a 
special committee to work on transposition only.
As regards the impact of non-state actors the picture is rather mixed. It is possible to 
argue, on the one hand, that the Polish executive operated within a dense network of 
socio-economic entanglements and that such embeddedness may have hindered the 
process of transposition since many sectoral groups were able to persuade ministers to 
delay costly adaptation. That the executive-society linkage is rather porous in Poland is 
well-documented (Staniszkis 1999; Hausner, Marody et al. 2000; Staniszkis 2000; 
Pedersen and Zubek 2003). The causal linkage between such embeddedness and 
transposition patterns has been identified by some interviewees. For example, a line 
ministry official said,
‘I think that there was a strong pressure from different lobbies (...) miners, steel 
workers, farmers (...). These lobbies are part of the electorate (...) and, if a 
government has the prospect of a four-year term, if it is that lucky, then not
139
everyone wants to (...) risk their political future. And so, it required a lot of 
effort to push some things through*, (interview 39, p. 3)
On the other hand, the years 1998-2002 did not bring any moves towards greater 
executive autonomy that could contribute to improvements of the transposition record in 
situations where domestic constraints blocked policy change. Neither was institutional 
connectedness reinforced in such a way as to generate new incentives and monitoring 
facilitating transposition (interview 31; interview 57). In sum, the impact of institutional 
incentives originating from parliament and non-state actors, though evident, seems to be 
slightly less pronounced that in the case of the previous two contextualizing variables.
III. Conclusion
This chapter has assessed the consistency of the theoretical predictions outlined in 
Chapter 2 with the empirical data presented in Chapters 3 and 4. In doing so, it has 
found that the variation in transposition has been over time causally related with the 
changes in core executive rules. Between late 1997 and mid 1998 the limited core 
mobilization contributed to a poor transposition record by failing to address the 
collective action dilemmas that impinged on the adoption of transposing measures. 
Between mid 1998 and mid 1999, despite prime ministerial efforts, the failure to 
reinforce the core executive rules prevented the Polish cabinet from improving its 
transposition record. It was only the institutionalization of stricter core executive 
constraints vis-a-vis line ministries in mid 1999 that pushed the transposition record 
onto a new trajectory. The chapter has also found that the core executive variable is not 
sufficient to fully account for the cross-temporal variation in the transposition record. 
The incentives and opportunity structures originating outside the executive have 
significantly affected the depth of the impact of the core executive. Two variables that 
provide the most insight are EU incentives and party constellations. The EU incentives 
have been particularly helpful in explaining the rapid character of the shift in 
transposition from 2000. The party constellations have been best placed to account for 
the slowdown in transposition in 2001.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
This chapter assesses the research findings in the context of their contribution to the 
wider theoretical debates in the literature on Europeanization and core executives. It 
first draws on the secondary evidence from other CEE countries and the old member 
states to demonstrate that core executive institutions may be considered a necessary 
condition for improving a country’s transposition record. The cross-sectional data help 
to contextualize the principal findings of this study and explore their broader 
implications for research on EU compliance. The chapter then considers the factors that 
facilitate the emergence of stronger core executives against the existing findings of the 
literature on the Europeanization of national governments. In doing so, it develops a 
narrative that systematically links the impact of external and domestic factors on 
institutional development. The chapter concludes by assessing theoretical, conceptual 
and normative implications that this study holds for research on executive institutions 
and state capacity to formulate and implement public policies.
I. A Strong Core As a Necessary Condition for Better Transposition?
Comparison with Other Accession Countries
The preceding chapter has shown that variation in core executive institutions has been 
over time congruent with changes in Poland’s transposition record. This result has been 
further substantiated with process-tracing evidence of causal links between core 
executive and transposition. However, the analysis has found that incentives and 
opportunity structures originating outside the executive have also had an effect on the 
transposition record. The question then arises about the status of the core executive 
explanation. Is the core executive variable a necessary condition for the improvement of 
a country’s transposition record? This issue, of course, is difficult to resolve within a 
single-case research design. To address it effectively, one needs to compare across 
cases, checking whether the same transposition outcomes may arise even in the absence 
of the reinforced domestic core executive.
A comparison with other countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) that joined the 
EU in May 2004 seems to be particularly well-suited for this purpose. If any of the 
accession states in CEE is found to have transposed the acquis communautaire even in 
the absence of core executive mobilization, such a result would suggest that this 
independent variable is not a necessary condition for achieving a better transposition
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record. A comprehensive cross-sectional comparison is of course beyond the scope of 
this research project. Some evidence, however, may be drawn from other research 
projects on EU compliance in CEE. Although this literature is still in early stages of 
development, a brief survey of its preliminary findings indicates a linkage between core 
executive institutions and transposition outcomes. Writing about the reasons for 
transposition delays in Lithuania, Nakrosis has found that both the formulation and 
implementation of the NPAA programme had been seriously hindered by the lack of 
central coordination and control. He wrote,
‘In an environment characterised by a high degree of ministerial autonomy and 
weak control by the political executive, sectoral institutions were not willing to 
present detailed measures, which would have to be formally executed in a 
tightly controlled process. (...) The European Committee, which was formally 
responsible for the NPAA’s administration did not check (and actually had no 
capacity to check) the extent to which the implementation of sectoral measures 
was consistent with the Accession Partnership priorities. (...) As a solution, 
some officials suggested more effective monitoring of the NPAA, possibly 
including regular reports on the NPAA’s implementation’. (Nakrosis 2003)
Other scholars explicitly linked the reinforcement of the Lithuanian core executive 
between 1998 and 2000 to an improved legislative performance. In their view, the 
closer involvement of the prime minister and his office guaranteed a swift progress in 
EU transposition (Dimitrova and Maniokas 2004).
A similar finding has been made by Scootla and Scootla in the case of Estonia (Scootla 
and Scootla 2004). Their research indicates that in 1994-1999 the fragmentation of the 
Estonian core executive and weak political coordination contributed to rendering EU- 
related policy-making ‘too slow and too dependent on experts’ advice to ensure targeted 
outputs’ (ibid, p. 13). Scootla and Scootla further find that the acceleration of domestic 
adaptation from 1999 had been preceded by a major upgrading of core executive 
institutions, in particular at the political level. They wrote that, ‘[prime minister] Laar 
called ministers to full responsibility for the preparation of Estonian proposals at 
negotiations and harmonization of Estonian legislation with the acquis. (...) This made 
collegial decision-making at the closed cabinet meetings (...) very fast’ (ibid, p. 14). 
Thus, like in the Polish and Lithuanian case, transposition seems to have been 
unblocked when the Estonian prime minister acquired institutional levers for mobilizing 
his ministers.
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The Czech and Hungarian cases provide further evidence that the transposition of the 
acquis before accession was hardly possible without some reinforcement of central 
control and coordination. Kabele and Linek note, for example, that the Czech cabinet 
delegated extensive powers to the deputy prime minister for legislation who controlled 
the timing and substance of EU-related legislative output (Kabele and Linek 2004). 
Evidence for the Hungarian case is provided by two separate studies by Agh and Vida 
(Vida 2002; Agh and Rozsas 2003). Agh points out that, since mid 1995, the Hungarian 
government had delegated strong coordination powers to the Minister of Justice who 
monitored line departments and kept the cabinet well-informed of the transposition 
progress (Agh and Rozsas 2003, p. 34). Vida confirms,
‘The Ministers of Justice and Foreign Affairs draw up a quarterly report about 
the timely implementation of the programme by all ministries, and inform the 
government about it when necessary. The government regularly (at least once a 
year) evaluates the progress made in the legal harmonisation process and the 
NPAA. While preparing draft laws, the government pays special attention to the 
tasks arising from the preparations for membership, in particular regarding 
commitments made to the EU during the accession negotiations. All these 
measures help eliminate or prevent serious delays in the legal harmonisation 
process across the Hungarian public administration’. (Vida 2002, p. 61)
Although, as demonstrated above, the European core has been reinforced in Poland, 
Lithuania, Estonia, Hungary and the Czech Republic, the nature of that centralization 
has been by no means identical. It seems that the key differentiating factor is the extent 
to which the core executive rules have been institutionalized (cf. Laffan 2003, p. 19; 
Brusis 2004). In countries such as Poland, Hungary and Lithuania, the new position, 
authority and information rules employed by the European core to extend selective 
incentives and monitoring to line ministries have undergone a progressive 
bureaucratization and formalization (see Chapter 4, Agh 2004; Dimitrova and Maniokas 
2004). In contrast, the Estonian and Czech cabinets continued to rely on weakly 
institutionalized rules attached to individual political actors (prime minister, minister for 
legislation, foreign affairs minister) (Kabele and Linek 2004, p. 16-18; Scootla and 
Scootla 2004, p. 15-16). This variation in the development of European core executives 
across the CEE states is likely to have been caused by different domestic administrative 
traditions and political party constellations (cf. Dimitrov, Goetz et al. 2005 
forthcoming). The states in which line ministries enjoyed extensive statutory autonomy 
and incohesive parties or coalitions blocked administrative reform (the Laar cabinet in 
Estonia and the Zeman and Spidla cabinets in the Czech Republic) resolved collective
143
dilemmas through recourse to personal and political levers of mobilization. The 
countries in which both administrative traditions and party configurations had been 
more conducive to the emancipation of the central agencies (the Buzek minority 
government and the Miller government in Poland, the Orban government in Hungary) 
moved towards higher institutionalization of the new core executive rules.
The variation in the level of institutionalization significantly influenced the core 
executive trajectories after accession. Once the political and media attention has turned 
away from EU membership to domestic concerns, political coordination and control 
mechanisms were quick to unravel in the states with weakly institutionalized European 
cores. Estonia offers a striking example in this regard. Scootla and Scootla note that the 
Estonian cabinet has reverted to ministerial-type governance in the area of EU 
transposition. Once the accession has been completed, ‘there are no devices of 
administrative coordination and even no regular system of information feedback to 
central coordinating institutions about the preparation of directives and proposals at 
ministries’ (Scootla and Scootla 2004, p. 16). In contrast, where core executive rules 
were more deeply institutionalized, the end of the pre-accession did not have a 
significant transformative effect. Agh estimates that the role of the Hungarian centre in 
EU-related policy-making will continue to be ‘the strongest part of the Hungarian EU 
management’ (Agh 2004, p. 42). Poland has also retained a tight system of central 
coordination control and coordination at both cabinet and pre-cabinet levels (Bielecki 
2004).
In line with the theoretical expectations outlined in Chapter 2, one may expect that the 
states which have developed and continued to operate highly institutionalized systems 
for core executive mobilization in EU transposition would have on average better 
transposition records. Arguing a contrario one may assume that the countries whose 
European cores had fewer or less institutionalized instruments would perform less well 
in the area of transposition. The preliminary evidence of variation in post-accession 
transposition records among the new member states seems to confirm this theoretical 
expectation. The data published in November 2004 demonstrates that Lithuania, Poland 
and Hungary (countries which retained strong European cores) are among the 
transposition leaders while Estonia and the Czech Republic (countries with weaker 
European cores) are among the worst laggards. See Figure 6,15. This evidence lends
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further credence to the argument that the core executive should be treated as a necessary 
condition for the improvement of the transposition record.
Figure 6.15. The Number of Non-Transposed Directives by Country as of 15 November 2004
250 -I 
200  - 
150 - 
100  - 
50 -
Source: http ://europa. eu. int/comm/secretariat_general/sgb/droit com/index_en.htm 
Application o f the Present Findings to Old Member States
Although the preceding section has observed that the core executive variable played a 
critical role in shaping transposition patterns in CEE, some doubts may arise as to 
whether this lesson has broader application. It is possible that the special conditions of 
Eastern enlargement may have made the operation of the core executive variable more 
pronounced. If this has been the case, the core executive variable will hold a more 
limited explanatory power beyond the CEE states. Two features of the accession 
process may point in this direction. First, as already indicated in Chapter 2, the CEE 
ministers and their staff lacked the experience of policy formulation and had limited 
expertise in EU law which made it difficult for them to identify private benefits related 
to EU transposition. These conditions do not normally arise in the old EU member 
states where the EU transposition is often undertaken by ministries to realize their 
private sectoral interests. In such cases the core executive mobilization would not, 
strictly speaking, be a necessary condition for a better transposition record. Second, it 
has often been noted that the essential role of European core executives for shaping 
transposition patterns in the CEE states may be due to the relative under-development of 
other institutional levers that facilitate the adaptation of public policy such as electoral 
competition, bureaucratic autonomy, coalition management devices, and external socio-
o
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economic networks (cf. Dimitrov et al., 2005 forthcoming). The operation of these 
institutional variables in more mature democracies in Western Europe may thus further 
undermine the status of the core executive as a necessary condition. for better 
transposition results.
To examine the wider applicability of this research, it is important to check how the 
present findings resonate with the literature on EU compliance in the old member states. 
The first thing to note is that an explicit core executive focus has been so far largely 
absent from research on legal adaptation in the European Union. There are, however, 
two interesting exceptions that provide some interesting parallels with the approach 
taken in this study. The first work is a cross-temporal analysis of the Greek 
transposition patterns by Dimitrakopoulos (Dimitrakopoulos 2001). In his assessment, 
Dimitrakopoulos has emphasized the role of organizational factors within the central 
administration for shaping Greek transposition outcomes in the 1980s and 1990s. He 
writes,
‘The process of transposition illustrates clearly that the Greek central 
government was, and partly remains, dominated by sectoral logics which 
transform the policy process into a power struggle between ministries and 
ministers. Repeated calls for a co-ordinated approach to transposition are 
frequently ignored by major actors, who seem to be more interested in pursuing 
their narrow goals rather than acting as parts of a larger body’. 
(Dimitrakopoulos 2001, p. 616)
In his view a critical change in the transposition patterns occurred due to the emergence 
of ‘steering’ mechanisms that helped to overcome the fragmentation of the Greek 
central administration. The steering levers enabled ministerial decision-makers to 
influence EU transposition and implementation in the desired direction 
(Dimitrakopoulos 2001, p. 613). It is interesting to note the striking parallels between 
Dimitrakopoulos’s analysis of the obstacles to transposition in Greece and the 
arguments made earlier about the Polish case. Furthermore, it is hard to overlook the 
similarity between the concept of ‘steering’ and that of selective incentives and 
monitoring employed in this research.
The other relevant contribution is Hallerberg’s recent study of national adaptation to the 
budget deficit criteria of the Economic and Monetary Union (Hallerberg 2004a). 
Although not dealing with transposition per se, this work applies theoretical insights 
based on collective action theory to studying the Europeanization of public policy. 
Hallerberg argues that, although the European Union provided inducements for member
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states to adjust their fiscal policies, it was the presence or absence of specific 
coordination mechanisms at the domestic level that determined the pattern of national 
convergence. The cabinets which delegated budgetary powers to finance ministers or 
coordinated policy through ‘fiscal contracts’ were able to bring their budget deficits 
below 3 % of GDP. In contrast, the cabinets which adopted a fiefdom form of internal 
governance -  characterized by extensive ministerial autonomy -  found it extremely 
difficult to maintain the required fiscal rectitude. Although Hallerberg does not use the 
concept of the core executive, it is interesting to note that delegation and fiscal contracts 
imply the reinforcement of the core executive rules through hierarchical and 
collectivity-based instruments. Furthermore, cabinets with a fiefdom structure 
presuppose a limited availability of central institutional levers for extending selective 
incentives and monitoring to line departments.
The above findings from the Western variant of the Europeanization literature show 
that, notwithstanding the reservations voiced earlier, the core executive variable may 
have a broader application in the study of EU compliance. Indeed, it is not difficult to 
see that it is compatible with -  and may be used to improve the predictive power o f -  
the two models that have recently come to dominate the literature on EU compliance. 
The first model relies on the predictive power of the veto player theory (Tsebelis 1995; 
Tsebelis 2002). Following Haverland (Haverland 2000), Giuliani has analyzed the 
transposition patterns in the old 15 member states to find that a country’s record is 
strongly related to the number of veto players (Giuliani 2003). This finding is 
compatible with our results to the extent that ideologically incohesive cabinets with 
many supporting parties may find it difficult to develop and maintain a strong core 
executive. But difficult does not necessarily mean impossible. As shown in Chapter 3, 
administrative traditions, critical junctures and external pressures may combine to 
facilitate the reinforcement of the core even where cabinets are characterized by many 
veto players and are ideologically incohesive. The Buzek majority government in late 
1999 is a case in point. A focus on the core executive may thus contribute to the 
explanatory power of the veto point approach.
The other model has been proposed in a recent study by Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp, Leiber 
(Falkner, Hartlapp et al. 2004; Falkner, Treib et al. 2005 forthcoming see also Sverdrup 
2004). Inspired by insights from normative institutionalism* Falkner et al. argue that 
variation in the transposition records may be explained with reference to a ‘domestic
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compliance culture in the field of EU law’ Falkner, 2005 forthcoming #46, p. 306]. 
Accordingly, they categorize all of the old EU member states into three worlds of law 
observance, domestic politics and neglect. A key differentiating factor is the political 
importance of compliance with EU law which, in turn, is contingent on whether the 
society expects compliance and exerts relevant pressures on the political elites. In brief, 
transposition depends on the ‘political will’ of the national government. An issue on 
which Falkner et al. are perhaps less specific is how political systems organize to give 
effect to political intentions. If the findings from the present study may be of any 
guidance, it is to show that national governments must organize internally before they 
achieve better levels of transposition. Hence, an explicit focus on the core executive 
may offer interesting insights about factors that determine the effectiveness of political 
determination in the area of EU compliance.
II. Europeanization of Core Executive Institutions
If a strong core executive is the answer to better transposition, what are the factors that 
facilitate the emergence of such favourable institutional arrangements? The literature on 
adaptation of national executives usually starts with the notion of an institutional misfit 
between the demands of EU membership and the performance of national executives 
(cf. Knill and Lenschow 1998a; Knill 1998b; Knill 2001; Knill and Lenschow 2001). 
Such a misfit -  if it exists -  generates adaptational pressures that may or may not 
translate into domestic alignment depending on four groups of mediating factors. First, 
the EU institutions such as the European Commission may change the relative weight of 
the misfit by exerting pressure on national governments. For example, in the context of 
the old EU member states, Dimitrakopoulos has argued that the Commission may act as 
a ‘fixer’ to facilitate the development of steering mechanisms (Dimitrakopoulos 2001). 
In the case of new member states, studies by Schimmelfenning and Grabbe demonstrate 
how the EU may use ‘accession conditionalities’ to increase the local value of the misfit 
in the eyes of the national political actors (Grabbe 2001; Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2005 forthcoming).
The second group of mediating factors is related to whether domestic actors perceive 
change to core executive institutions (and adaptation to the EU more generally) as an 
appropriate course of action and a promising avenue for pursuing their own private 
interests (Goetz 2003; Radaelli 2003). The third mediating factor is the 'reform capacity' 
of political institutions which is mainly determined by the number of political parties
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supporting the cabinet, the ideological distance between them, the influence of 
bureaucrats and the entrenchment of administrative structures (Heritier and Knill 2001; 
Knill 2001; Bursens 2002; Dimitrov, Goetz et al. 2005 forthcoming). The final group 
relates to the dynamic of European integration as a factor mediating the effect of 
institutional misfits. It is argued that the constantly evolving structure of the European 
Union creates new challenges for domestic governance thus affecting the relative 
weight of institutional misfits. The same argument may be made for the accession states 
whose institutions came under increasing adaptational pressures as they became 
increasingly integrated into the EU system (Agh 1999).
The findings from the present study confirm that all these factors identified in the 
literature on Europeanization played an important role in the development of the Polish 
core executive. But, perhaps more significantly, they also make it possible to develop a 
narrative that systematically links all these factors into a comprehensive account of 
Europeanization. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, the narrative starts when the dynamic 
of the EU accession increases the institutional misfit between domestic executive 
arrangements and the new external challenges. Domestic actors realized that the existing 
coordination rules did not guarantee an effective response to the new stage of EU- 
Poland relations. The operation of the plenipotentiary’s office in 1991-1995 was a 
crucial learning experience for the Polish political actors, while more immediate 
problems with the implementation of the Commission’s White Paper in late 1995 had a 
further catalytic effect. For the reconfiguration itself to occur, however, it had to be 
actively supported by domestic actors. A domestic window of opportunity opened when 
the SLD-PSL cabinet decided to undertake a comprehensive overhaul of the centre of 
government. The European core was thus reinforced in 1996 as part of a more general 
push towards tighter central control and coordination when domestic actors. It must be 
noted, however, that the extent of that strengthening was blunted by the coalition nature 
of the cabinet, opposition from PSL ministers and the constitutional principle of 
collegiality in cabinet decision-making.
Further adaptation was, however, blocked by party configurations within the Buzek 
government. The incohesiveness of the AWS, ideological differences within the 
coalition, and the expectation that both governing parties would run independently in 
the next elections combined to downgrade the core executive institutions in the area of 
EU-related alignment. Neither hierarchical nor collective institutions were a viable
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option. Delegation of control and coordination powers to the KIE secretary was blocked 
by the UW party because Czamecki was expected to implement the ideal point policy of 
the most eurosceptic faction of the AWS. Similarly, delegation to the Foreign Minister 
did not occur since Geremek was not trusted by the AWS. The cabinet also found it 
difficult to enter into credible collective commitments in the area of EU transposition 
because of the widely disparate preferences of the AWS and UW ministers. Finally, 
prime minister Buzek had too weak a political position to act as a successful 
entrepreneur for new core executive rules. His failure to support Karasinska-Fendler’s 
attempts to bolster central control and coordination serves as a case in point. In effect, 
party configurations pushed his cabinet towards ministerial-type government with a 
weak European core executive.
The increasing misfit between domestic arrangements and the exigencies of EU 
accession (and the resulting performance problems) activated direct EU pressures which 
affected the cost and benefit calculations of the Polish government. Three channels of 
influence may be discerned in this context. First, changes in the external opportunity 
structures increased the potential private benefit that could be derived by the prime 
minister and chief negotiator from organizing the cabinet to solve collective dilemmas 
in transposition. In doing so, they opened up opportunities for domestic rule 
entrepreneurship. In effect, Buzek and Kulakowski availed themselves of the 
opportunity to act as political entrepreneurs, establishing new rules for core executive 
control and coordination. The impending accession crisis in late 1999 changed the 
relative value of the institutional misfit for both these actors, and the failed attempt to 
bolster the transposition within the existing institutional set-up reoriented their focus to 
institution-building. In organizing his cabinet for transposition, prime minister Buzek 
knew that he could capture a leader’s profit. If successful, he would avoid a collective 
bad of a major accession debacle and reinforce his leadership within the AWS party. 
Chief negotiator Kulakowski and his staff were aware that they too stood to gain from 
stronger core executive institutions. Any reinforcement to the existing rules would 
benefit them directly since they would be able to revitalize the accession process.
Second, the EU external incentives helped to empower central government actors to 
force changes to the institutional status quo. This causal mechanism is best illustrated 
by an official at the Prime Minister’s Office who said,
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‘Many drafts were submitted to cabinet spontaneously in response to 
developments in the accession negotiations. The chief negotiator would say this 
is where the EU thinks we have a problem with a given law, and so the cabinet 
would require a particular minister to accelerate work on that draft law’, 
(interview 7, p. 12)
Another official confirmed,
‘When the delays in legal adaptation and accession negotiations began to push 
Poland towards the bottom of the league, the prime minister would [go abroad 
and] be reprimanded by (...) President Prodi or some other Chancellor or prime 
minister (...), and he would come back and reprimand us’, (interview 35, p. 1)
Third, the EU institutions facilitated the diffusion of institutional templates. Most 
significantly, the chief negotiator’s team and the UKIE staff modelled their monitoring 
tools on those developed by the Commission (Official Communication 
SekrMInJSW/5558/2000 2000; Official Communication SekrMinJSW/7041/2000 
2000). An official said,
‘During the negotiations they [the Commission] developed new monitoring 
tools ranging from general instruments to very specific databases (...) and 
gradually we adopted the tools developed by the Commission. This was 
sensible because (...) if we had to report in their format, we could just as well 
use their tools in practice’, (interview 30 p. 2)
But, while such EU mobilization clearly helped to change the core executive rules, the 
transformation itself occurred when a combination of domestic factors produced another 
window of opportunity. The key element here was a strong sense of a national crisis that 
developed in late 1999. Most domestic political actors agreed at the time that if Poland 
had been denied EU membership, this would have been considered the most serious 
setback for the country in many decades. These special circumstances were likely tp 
reduce the ideological gap between the AWS and the UW and thus unblock the intra­
coalition impasse over the European core (cf. Tsebelis, 1999, note 12). That EU 
membership was considered as an objective of utmost national importance is attested to 
by unprecedented written agreements concluded by, on the one hand, the executive and 
parliament, and on the other hand, by all major political parties (Pakt 2000; 
Trojporozumienie 2000). The domestic crisis was further fuelled by parliamentary calls 
that pointed to EU transposition delays as a major political problem. The parliament 
was also key in reorienting Buzek’s attention to institution-building by identifying the 
absence of central control and coordination within the executive as a major impediment
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to transposition. For example, the February 2000 resolution explicitly asked the 
executive to appoint a junior minister for transposition who would coordinate all issues 
related to legal adaptation (Sejm RP 2000). The centre was able to use such incentives 
strategically to legitimize the move to a more forceful role of the core executive in 
transposition.
In 2002 the consolidation of the European core was driven by a combination of external 
and domestic considerations. The urgent need for crisis management that was marked in 
1999-2000 disappeared as the transposition backlog was being cleared. The accession 
negotiations entered a stage in which high-level diplomacy started to play a crucial role 
and so the European core was reorganized to reflect this change in external conditions. 
The reinforcement was also aided by the internal cohesiveness of the SLD, its close 
relationship with the UP, and Miller’s position as both prime minister and SLD leader. 
The party configurations facilitated delegation of authority and information powers to 
the Foreign Minister and the KIE secretary. Previous coalition experience with the PSL 
further helped the Miller cabinet to reinforce collective decision-making mechanisms 
such as the ZPKIE.
In sum, the cross-temporal variation in the core executive variable has been caused by a 
combination of external and domestic factors. The changes in the accession dynamic 
increased the relative value of the institutional misfit in the eyes of the local political 
decision-makers. Effective adaptation was, however, hindered, and later blocked, by 
political party constellations. As the accession process accelerated, the relative level of 
the institutional misfit increased. This, in turn, triggered direct pressures from EU and 
domestic institutions. Yet, neither EU nor domestic pressures were successful in 
inducing institutional change. Only when the misfit between the challenges of 
Europeanization and the domestic institutional set-up created a domestic crisis by 
seriously threatening the prospect of Poland’s accession did a critical juncture facilitate 
domestic alignment. A key role in shaping the institutional developments was played by 
the prime minister’s and the chief negotiator’s rule entrepreneurship, whereas the party 
constellations under the Miller government facilitated the consolidation of the new core 
executive rules.
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III. Implications for Further Research on Core Executive
This study holds interesting implications for further research on core executives and 
their impact on state capacity to formulate and implement public policies. From an 
empirical perspective, an attractive avenue for further research would be to develop a 
more sophisticated categorization of core executive rules that may be employed to 
extend selective incentives and monitoring to line ministries. The empirical findings in 
Chapter 3 already offer some preliminary ideas in the regard. For example, the authority 
rules may be further subdivided into rules that specify powers to act as agenda-setters or 
arbiters, and the rules that specify powers to sanction and reward. A promising new 
category of ‘temporal rules’ may be created to cover mechanisms such as the ‘set-aside’ 
practice developed under the Buzek and Miller governments for dealing with more 
contentious issues. The core executive mobilization may also take the shape of 
‘restrictive rules’ through which the prime minister and the cabinet may make it 
increasingly difficult to amend legislative drafts as they move through the governmental 
machinery. The development of more sophisticated typologies of core executive rules 
will facilitate a more informed investigation of how such instruments vary across 
countries and time. Better typologies of core executive rules should, in turn, make it 
possible to measure the effects of such institutional configurations with greater 
precision.
The findings of this research resonate well with the existing theoretical propositions in 
the literature on core executives. They lend support to a long-standing argument about a 
strong positive correlation between the success of policy reform and centralization of 
authority in the executive (cf. Hall 1983; Boston 1992; Geddes 1994; Brusis and 
Dimitrov 2001). Above all, this proposition stresses the importance of 'change teams' 
located at the heart of the executive and operating with strong political backing but in 
relative isolation from bureaucratic and societal demands. Yet, at the same time, this 
study recognizes that the radical nature of the policy reforms required by the EU 
accession may have rendered the operation pf the core executive variable more 
pronounced. Poland and other acceding countries had to transpose in a few years the 
legislation that the EU took over four decades to develop. It is thus possible that strong 
centres (core executives) tend to be necessary for implementing radical policy reforms, 
while gradual policy change could be undertaken without a major reinforcement of the 
centre (cf. Stark and Bruszt 1998; Lindquist 1999).
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The latter proposition ties in with arguments that the effectiveness of organizational 
designs depends on ‘selective centralization on a small number of functions and a good 
deal of decentralization on the rest’ (Aucoin 1990, p. 130). Centralization within the 
executive is said to work best when it applies to a small number of issues that should be 
managed personally by the prime minister and the cabinet, whereas decentralization is a 
favourable solution when priorities are not sufficiently specific. Further research on core 
executives configurations and their impact on policy would thus benefit from a more 
contextualized approach. It would, for example, need to be sensitive not only to 
examples of under-centralization but also to cases in which governments tend to over­
centralize by extending central coordination and control too widely. The risk of over­
centralization may be particularly high in governments which have limited capacities at 
the ministerial level since core executive agencies may then have a natural proclivity for 
accumulating more tasks in order to address resource problems at lower levels. The 
need to demonstrate selectivity in institutional design also raises the issue of the core 
executive capacity to ‘distinguish between pressing political problems and specific 
political priorities’ (Aucoin 1990, p. 130).
Last but not least, besides empirical and theoretical considerations, the present study 
holds some interesting implications for the normative notion of ‘good government’. It 
argues that the key problem with effective democratic governance is related to the 
resolution of the institutional tension between collective and sectoral rationalities within 
government. To achieve maximum democratic responsiveness, parliamentary and 
executive actors need to produce policies that bring diffuse benefits to many voter 
constituencies. But, individually, all have strong incentives to maximize the interests of 
narrow geographical, sectoral or other voter constituencies. This is because the electoral 
mechanism increases the diversity of interests that government actors stand for. 
Democratic parliaments consist of hundreds of deputies, each of whom represents a 
distinct geographical or other voter constituency. The same applies to ministers who 
come under pressure to cater for the interests of sectoral or party clientele. To solve 
such tension between collective and sectoral rationalities, institutional mechanisms must 
be developed that mobilize individual actors towards achieving collective goals. The 
present Study identifies the existence of a strong core executive as a necessary 
precondition for the resolution of such collective action dilemmas and, consequently, 
for effective democratic governance.
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Annex 1: Parliamentary Bills Transposing European Community Measures (dataset compiled based on data obtained from the Prime 
Minister’s Chancellery and the Sejm’s webiste www.sejm.gov.pl)
Cabinet Number Sejm
Number
Title of the Draft Law Cabinet
Submission
Cabinet
Adoption
Days Word
Count
Transposition
Record
RM-10-19-1997 248 Draft the industrial property law 1997-04-14 1998-03-03 232 N/a -
RM-10-36-1997 151 Draft law on chemical substances and preparations 1997-05-05 1997-11-25 147 N/a -
RM-10-46-1997 741 Draft law to amend the law on testing and certification 1997-07-14 1998-11-03 342 N/a -
RM-10-104-1997 64 Draft law to amend the law on goods and services tax and excise tax 1997-11-24 1997-11-25 2 446 L
RM-10-107-1997 58 Draft law to amend the law on prices 1997-11-24 1997-11-25 2 280 L
RM-10-9-1998 227 Draft law to amend the law on goods and services tax and excise tax 1998-03-06 1998-03-10 3 1302 L
RM-10-18-1998 299 Draft foreign exchange law 1998-03-26 1998-03-31 4 6811 L
RM-10-29-1998 357 Draft law to amend Customs Code 1998-04-15 1998-05-12 20 4580 L
RM-10-35-1998 479 Draft law on arms and ammunition 1998-04-28 1998-06-16 36 5847 L
RM-10-36-1998 342 Draft law on public finance 1998-05-05 1998-05-14 8 21741 L
RM-10-52-1998 1118 Draft law on permissibility of and supervision over public aid for 
undertakings
1998-06-15 1999-02-16 177 6261 L
RM-10-58-1998 1368 Draft law on commercialization, restructuring and privatization of state 
undertaking “Polskie Koleje Panstwowe”
1998-06-29 1999-09-08 313 13871 L
RM-10-72-1998 624 Draft law to amend the law on corporate income tax with amendment 
submitted by promoters of the draft
1998-08-28 1998-09-25 21 4970 L
RM-10-63-1998 638 Draft law to amend the law on insurance business 1998-09-10 1998-09-22 9 3293 L
RM-10-93-1998 715 Draft business activity law 1998-10-07 1998-10-27 15 9910 L
RM-10-124-1998 988 Draft law on fertilizers and fertilization 1998-12-11 1999-03-02 58 16145 L
RM-10-125-1998 1050 Draft law on customs service 1998-12-15 1999-04-13 86 8664 L
RM-10-126-1998 943 Draft the telecommunications law 1998-12-28 1998-12-30 3 23025 L
RM-10-127-1998 945 Draft law on remote contracts and contracts executed outside business 
premises and on amendments to Civil Code, Code of Civil Procedure and 
Misdemeanours Code
1999-01-06 1999-01-09 3 4580 L
RM-10-95-1998 897 Draft law to amend the law on certified auditors and their professional 
association
1999-01-13 1999-01-20 6 3787 L
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RM-10-8-1999 986 Draft law to amend the law on regulation of sugar market and ownership 
transformations in sugar industry
1999-02-11 1999-02-16 4 4396 L
RM-10-13-1999 1002 Draft law on agricultural producer groups and their associations 1999-02-22 1999-03-09 12 2152 L
RM-10-20-1999 1051 Draft law to amend the law on seed production 1999-03-04 1999-03-18 11 5786 L
RM-10-25-1999 1605 Draft law on patent attorneys 1999-03-12 1999-11-17 179 6458 L
RM-10-40-1999 1346 Draft law on principles of supporting regional development and on 
amendments to certain laws
1999-05-05 1999-07-22 57 8318 L
RM-10-41-1999 1269 Draft law on maritime security 1999-05-14 1999-06-08 18 8884 L
RM-10-45-1999 1235 Draft law to amend the law on combating unfair competition and on 
amendments in radio and television law
1999-05-28 1999-06-22 18 649 L
RM-10-46-1999 1193 Draft law on personal income tax 1999-06-02 1999-06-18 13 n/a L
RM-10-47-1999 1192 Draft law on corporate income tax 1999-06-02 1999-06-18 13 n/a L
RM-10-48-1999 1190 Draft law to amend the law on goods and services tax and excise tax 1999-06-02 1999-06-18 13 2824 L
RM-10-52-1999 1213 Draft law to amend the law on games of chance and wagers and to amend 
certain laws
1999-06-14 1999-06-22 7 4625 L
RM-10-54-1999 1292 Draft law on the system of authorization, accreditation and compliance of 
goods, processes or services with fundamental requirements, other 
requirements and technical specifications, and on amendments to certain 
laws
1999-06-14 1999-06-29 12 5002 L
RM-10-55-1999 1260 Draft law on general product safety 1999-06-21 1999-06-22 2 2186 L
RM-10-69-1999 1297 Draft law to amend the law on bonds and certain other laws 1999-07-09 1999-07-22 10 4687 L
RM-10-73-1999 1311 Draft law to amend the law on accounting 1999-07-19 1999-07-27 7 30591 L
RM-10-75-1999 1407 Draft law to amend the mining and geology law 1999-07-28 1999-09-14 35 11951 L
RM-10-76-1999 1433 Draft law to amend the road traffic law 1999-07-30 1999-09-07 28 2772 L
RM-10-81-1999 1378 Draft law to amend certain laws related to the functioning of public 
administration
1999-08-13 1999-09-14 23 21553 L
RM-10-91-1999 1380 Draft law to amend Customs Code and Code of Civil Procedure 1999-08-27 1999-09-23 written
procedure
written
procedure
L
RM-10-92-1999 1447 Draft law to amend the law on Teacher’s Charter and to amend certain 
other laws
1999-08-27 1999-09-28 23 11357 L
RM-10-101-1999 1382 Draft law to amend the law on copyright and neighbouring rights 1999-09-10 1999-09-14 3 2330 L
RM-10-106-1999 1471 Draft law to amend the law on radio and television and the law on 
communication
1999-09-14 1999-10-19 L
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RM-10-110-1999 1437 Draft law on the functioning and associations of co-operative banks, their 
association banks, and on amendments to certain laws
1999-09-15 1999-10-05 15 4819 L
RM-10-130-1999 1498 Draft law on civil transaction tax 1999-10-04 1999-10-19 12 3692 L
RM-10-133-1999 1476 Draft law to amend the law on environmental protection 1999-10-06 1999-10-12 5 9627 L
RM-10-134-1999 1478 Draft law on counteracting introduction into the financial system of 
proceeds coming from illicit or undisclosed sources
1999-10-11 1999-10-12 2 5556 L
RM-10-137-1999 1573 Draft law on the ratification of Energy Charter Treaty and Energy Charter 
Protocol on Energy Efficiency and Related Environmental Aspects
1999-10-14 1999-12-08 written
procedure
written
procedure
L
RM-10-138-1999 1547 Draft law on the ratification of Convention Against Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions
1999-10-17 1999-11-22 written
procedure
written
procedure
L
RM-10-156-1999 1708 Draft law on professional associations of architects, civil engineers and 
urban architects/town planners
1999-10-26 2000-02-08 76 6282 L
RM-10-162-1999 1721 Draft aviation law 1999-11-29 2000-02-08 52 32630 L
RM-10-166-1999 1616 Draft law on environmental impact assessment procedures and on access to 
environmental and environmental protection information
1999-12-01 1999-12-14 10 9601 L
RM-10-173-1999 1687 Draft Commercial Companies Code 1999-12-16 2000-01-18 24 48318 L
RM-10-175-1999 1686 Draft law to amend the road traffic law 1999-12-23 2000-01-04 9 15271 L
RM-10-176-1999 1696 Draft law on inland navigation 1999-12-24 2000-01-25 23 8020 L
RM-10-178-1999 1722 Draft postal law 1999-12-31 2000-02-15 33 n/a L
RM-10-2-2000 1681 Draft law on the ratification o f Agreement between parties to North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization regarding co-operation on atomic energy 
information, done in Paris on 18 June 1964
2000-01-12 2000-01-18 written
procedure
written
procedure
H
RM-10-3-2000 1720 Draft law on public procurement 2000-01-12 2000-02-15 25 n/a H
RM-10-6-2000 1707 Draft law to amend the law on toll motorways 2000-01-31 2000-02-08 7 5210 H
RM-10-8-2000 1705 Draft law to amend the law on special enterprise zones and to amend 
certain laws
2000-02-01 2000-02-08 6 2919 H
RM-10-7-2000 1702 Draft law on Road Transport Inspection 2000-02-04 2000-02-08 3 n/a H
RM-10-9-2000 1700 Draft law on establishment of Polish Business Development Agency 2000-02-04 2000-02-08 3 2519 H
RM-10-10-2000 1703 Draft law on waste 2000-02-04 2000-02-08 3 17308 H
RM-10-11-2000 1699 Draft law to amend Civil Code 2000-02-04 2000-02-08 3 3290 H
RM-10-12-2000 1701 Draft law on the protection of purchasers of the right to use a building or an 
apartment within a specific time each year and on amendments to Civil 
Code, Misdemeanours Code and the law on real estate registers and
2000-02-04 2000-02-08 3 2376 H
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mortgage
RM-10-13-2000 1723 Draft water law 2000-02-10 2000-02-15 4 28562 H
RM-10-14-2000 1724 Draft nuclear law 2000-02-11 2000-02-15 3 14487 H
RM-10-15-2000 1718 Draft law to amend Criminal Code, Code of Criminal Procedure, the law on 
combating unfair competition, the law on public procurement, and banking 
law
2000-02-11 2000-02-15 3 2994 H
RM-10-16-2000 1719 Draft law on the ratification of annexes B.2, B.3, B.4, B.5, B.6, B.7, B.8, 
B.9, C, D and E to Convention on Temporary Admission (so-called 
Istanbul Convention)
2000-02-11 2000-02-15 written
procedure
written
procedure
H
RM-10-17-2000 1768 Draft law on the ratification of Agreement concerning the Adoption of 
Uniform Conditions of Approval and Reciprocal Recognition of Approval 
for Motor Vehicle Equipment and Parts, done in Geneva on 20 March 
1958.
2000-02-17 2000-03-07 written
procedure
written
procedure
H
RM-10-20-2000 1791 Draft law on the ratification of Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, 
and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime
2000-02-21 2000-03-22 written
procedure
written
procedure
H
RM-10-21-2000 1769 Draft law to amend the energy law 2000-03-06 2000-03-14 written
procedure
written
procedure
H
RM-10-23-2000 1856 Draft law on environmental protection 2000-03-16 2000-03-21 4 47121 H
RM-10-24-2000 1864 Draft law on introduction of law on environmental protection and law on 
waste and on amendments to certain laws
2000-03-16 2000-03-21 4 14752 H
RM-10-27-2000 1819 Draft law on the common agricultural census 2002 2000-03-20 2000-04-04 12 1037 H
RM-10-30-2000 1859 Draft law on insurance business 2000-03-24 2000-04-04 8 27563 H
RM-10-31-2000 1860 Draft law on insurance intermediation 2000-03-24 2000-04-04 8 4588 H
RM-10-32-2000 1857 Draft law on mandatory insurance, Insurance Guarantee Fund and Polish 
Traffic Insurance Bureau
2000-03-24 2000-04-04 8 14828 H
RM-10-34-2000 1895 Draft law on protection against imports into Polish customs area of goods at 
dumping prices
2000-03-27 2000-04-18 17 11332 H
RM-10-35-2000 1891 Draft law on protection against excessive imports of goods into Polish 
customs area
2000-03-27 2000-04-26 23 4715 H
RM-10-36-2000 1893 Draft law on protection against excessive imports of goods into Polish 
customs area in relation to certain textiles and clothes
2000-03-27 2000-04-26 23 16422 H
RM-10-37-2000 1858 Draft law to amend the law on foreigners and to amend certain laws 2000-03-31 2000-04-11 8 17747 H
RM-10-40-2000 1879 Draft law on method to calculate the value of annual gross domestic 2000-04-03 2000-04-18 12 409 H
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RM-10-43-2000 1894 Draft law on ecological agriculture 2000-04-05 2000-04-18 10 4122 H
RM-10-41-2000 1934 Draft law on requirements for undertakings related to management of 
certain waste and on product and deposit fees
2000-04-06 2000-04-11 4 5540 H
RM-10-42-2000 1892 Draft law to amend the law on protection of cultivated plants 2000-04-07 2000-04-11 3 7499 H
RM-10-52-2000 2048 Draft law to amend the law on standardization 2000-04-12 2000-06-27 55 331 H
RM-10-44-2000 1888 Draft law to amend the law on establishment of Agency for Restructuring 
and Modernization of Agriculture and to amend certain laws
2000-04-13 2000-04-18 4 n/a H
RM-10-49-2000 1887 Draft law on packaging and package waste 2000-04-17 2000-04-18 2 2462 H
RM-10-48-2000 1881 Draft law on animal feeds 2000-04-17 2000-04-21 written
procedure
written
procedure
H
RM-10-50-2000 1996 Draft law on protection of competition and consumers 2000-04-17 2000-04-26 8 12776 H
RM-10-46-2000 1995 Draft law on prices 2000-04-17 2000-05-09 17 3914 H
RM-10-47-2000 1992 Draft law on the organization of certain agricultural markets 2000-04-17 2000-05-16 22 8142 H
RM-10-55-2000 1989 Draft Maritime Code 2000-04-28 2000-05-16 13 26423 H
RM-10-56-2000 1990 Draft law on provisions introducing Maritime Code 2000-04-28 2000-05-16 13 683 H
RM-10-54-2000 1965 Draft law to amend Customs Code and certain other laws 2000-05-05 2000-05-09 3 16879 H
RM-10-58-2000 1994 Draft law to amend the law on investment funds 2000-05-05 2000-05-23 13 15265 H
RM-10-51-2000 1991 Draft law on protection against inports into Polish customs area of 
subsidized goods
2000-05-22 2000-05-23 2 n/a H
RM-10-68-2000 2015 Draft law on technical inspection 2000-06-02 2000-06-06 3 5862 H
RM-10-69-2000 2013 Draft law to amend Labour Code and to amend certain laws 2000-06-02 2000-06-06 3 7118 H
RM-10-66-2000 2014 Draft law to amend the law on Border Guard 2000-06-12 2000-06-13 2 13902 H
RM-10-74-2000 2117 Draft law to amend the law on export contract insurance guaranteed by 
State Treasury
2000-06-20 2000-06-27 6 1629 H
RM-10-75-2000 2115 Draft law on interest subsidies for fixed-rate export credit 2000-06-21 2000-06-27 5 2695 H
RM-10-79-2000 2060 Draft law on trading quality o f agricultural and food products 2000-06-26 2000-06-30 5 4147 H
RM-10-80-2000 2049 Draft law on Trade Inspection 2000-06-26 2000-06-30 5 3477 H
RM-10-78-2000 2127 Draft law on controlling cross-border trade in goods, technologies or 
services o f strategic importance for national security and for maintenance 
of international peace and security and on amendments to certain laws
2000-06-30 2000-07-14 11 5431 H
RM-10-82-2000 2088 Draft law on alignment to the laws of European Union of the law on 2000-07-07 2000-07-11 3 21808 H
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administrative enforcement procedure, the law on local taxes and charges, 
the law on interest subsidies for certain bank credits, the public trade in 
securities law, the Tax Ordinance, the law on public finance, the law on 
corporate income tax, and the law on commercialization and privatization 
of state undertakings
RM-10-85-2000 2089 Draft law on alignment to the laws of European Union of the law on higher 
education, the law on schools of higher vocational education, the law on 
export contract insurance guaranteed by State Treasury, the law on 
transport by rail, and the law on tourist services
2000-07-12 2000-07-18 5 5708 H
RM-10-76-2000 2214 Draft law to amend the law on goods and services tax and excise tax 2000-07-13 2000-07-14 2 n/a H
RM-10-88-2000 2190 Draft law on alignment to the laws of European Union of the law on 
acquisition of real estate by foreigners, the law on games of chance, wagers 
and automatic gaming machines, the law on radio and television, the law on 
tax consulting, the law on Polish language and the business activity law
2000-07-20 2000-08-07 13 n/a H
RM-10-89-2000 2287 Draft law to amend the law on combating infectious animal diseases, health 
inspection of cull animals and meat and Veterinary Inspection and to 
amend certain other laws in connection with alignment of Polish veterinary 
law to the laws o f the European Union
2000-07-24 2000-08-01 7 n/a H
RM-10-92-2000 2152 Draft law on alignment to the laws of European Union of the law on tax 
audits and the law on Customs Inspection
2000-07-31 2000-08-01 2 302 H
RM-10-102-2000 2315 Draft law on structural benefits 2000-08-29 2000-10-21 39 2543 H
RM-10-103-2000 2268 Draft law on collection and use of accounting data from farms 2000-09-01 2000-09-20 14 1041 H
RM-10-104-2000 2286 Draft law on health conditions of food and catering 2000-09-04 2000-09-12 7 10104 H
RM-10-106-2000 2240 Draft law to amend the law on Bank Guarantee Fund and banking law 2000-09-11 2000-09-20 8 2729 H
RM-10-108-2000 2316 Draft law on community water supply and waste water disposal 2000-09-14 2000-10-03 14 4834 H
RM-10-111-2000 2241 Draft law to amend the law on National Court Register, the bankruptcy law, 
the law on administrative enforcement procedure, and the business activity 
law
2000-09-22 2000-09-26 3 7533 H
RM-10-112-2000 2242 Draft law to amend the business activity law and the law on provisions 
introducing the law on National Court Register
2000-09-22 2000-09-26 3 1680 H
RM-10-110-2000 2282 Draft law to amend the law on the profession of nurse and midwife 2000-09-22 2000-10-12 15 1969 H
RM-10-125-2000 2280 Draft law to amend the law on the system of education 2000-10-11 2000-10-12 2 809 H
RM-10-127-2000 2376 Draft law on the manufacture of spirit, manufacture and bottling of spirits 2000-10-11 2000-10-24 10 1067 H
179
and manufacture of tobacco products
RM-10-124-2000 2281 Draft law on cosmetics 2000-10-12 2000-10-12 1 2783 H
RM-10-132-2000 2326 Draft law on the treatment of substances that impair the ozone layer 2000-10-20 2000-10-21 1 6363 H
RM-10-133-2000 2300 Draft law to amend the law on security of persons and property 2000-10-20 2000-10-21 1 77 H
RM-10-134-2000 2302 Draft law on alignment of the law on acquisition of real estate by foreigners 
to the laws of European Union
2000-10-20 2000-10-21 1 722 H
RM-10-135-2000 2301 Draft law on alignment to the laws of European Union of the law on games 
of chance, wagers and automatic gaming machines
2000-10-20 2000-10-21 1 n/a H
RM-10-136-2000 2304 Draft law on alignment of the law on radio and television with the laws of 
European Union
2000-10-20 2000-10-21 1 n/a H
RM-10-137-2000 2303 Draft law on alignment of the law on tax consulting with the laws of 
European Union
2000-10-20 2000-10-21 1 n/a H
RM-10-139-2000 2331 Draft law to amend the law on establishment of Agricultural Market 
Agency and the law on establishment of Agency for Restructuring and 
Modernization of Agriculture and to amend certain other laws
2000-10-20 2000-10-21 1 1531 H
RM-10-140-2000 2361 Draft law on regulation of market for milk, dairy products, meat and certain 
cultivated plants
2000-10-20 2000-10-21 1 6687 H
RM-10-150-2000 2392 Draft law to amend the law on mortgage bonds and mortgage banks 2000-11-13 2000-11-14 2 89 H
RM-10-151-2000 2680 Draft law on medical products 2000-11-13 2000-11-30 14 4285 H
RM-10-154-2000 2519 Draft law on principles of recognizing regulated profession qualifications 
obtained in European Union member states
2000-11-20 2000-11-28 7 7254 H
RM-10-160-2000 2587 Draft law on genetically modified organisms 2000-11-27 2000-12-05 7 8556 H
RM-10-161-2000 2527 Draft law on agricultural market research 2000-11-27 2000-12-05 7 987 H
RM-10-157-2000 2677 Draft pharmaceutical law 2000-11-27 2001-02-06 52 19949 H
RM-10-166-2000 2510 Draft law to amend Criminal Code, Code of Criminal Procedure, Post- 
Sentencing Code and certain other laws
2000-11-30 2000-12-08 7 32596 H
RM-10-164-2000 2604 Draft law on fisheries 2000-12-01 2000-12-05 3 7285 H
RM-10-167-2000 2566 Draft law on measures 2000-12-04 2000-12-12 7 3431 H
RM-10-169-2000 2536 Draft law to amend the law on the National Bank of Poland 2000-12-08 2000-12-12 3 n/a H
RM-10-168-2000 2577 Draft law on pursuit of the business activity o f manufacturing and trading 
in explosives, arms, ammunition and products or technologies having 
military or police applications
2000-12-08 2000-12-20 9 4994 H
RM-10-170-2000 2535 Draft law to amend banking law 2000-12-11 2000-12-12 2 12142 H
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RM-10-174-2000 2646 Draft law on consumer credit and on amendments to certain laws 2000-12-15 2000-12-20 4 2870 H
RM-10-177-2000 2521 Draft law to amend the law on public procurement in connection with 
alignment to the laws of the European Union
2000-12-19 2000-12-20 2 5643 H
RM-10-178-2000 2676 Draft law on biocide products 2000-12-19 2000-12-20 2 n/a H
RM-10-175-2000 2644 Draft law on transport by road 2000-12-20 2000-12-20 1 13881 H
RM-10-176-2000 2575 Draft law on forest reproductive material 2000-12-20 2000-12-20 1 6819 H
RM-10-7-2001 2678 Draft law on provisions introducing the pharmaceutical law, the law on 
medical products, the law on biocide products and the law on the office of 
the President of the Office for Registration of Medical, Medicinal and 
Biocide Products
2001-01-17 2001-02-06 15 3008 M
RM-10-6-2001 2681 Draft law on the office of the President of the Office for Registration of 
Medical, Medicinal and Biocide Products
2001-01-17 2001-02-06 15 1245 M
RM-10-8-2001 2645 Draft law to amend the law on financial restructuring of undertakings and 
banks and certain laws, the law on national investment funds and their 
privatization and the law on the commercialization and privatization of 
state undertakings
2001-01-22 2001-01-30 7 423 M
RM-10-14-2001 2828 Draft law on provision of legal assistance in the Republic of Poland by 
foreign lawyers
2001-01-30 2001-03-15 33 n/a M
RM-10-15-2001 2651 Draft law on electronic signature 2001-01-31 2001-02-06 5 8702 M
RM-10-17-2001 2732 Draft law on historical monuments 2001-02-12 2001-03-13 22 n/a M
RM-10-18-2001 2834 Draft law to amend the law counteracting drug addiction and on 
amendments to other laws
2001-02-14 2001-02-20 5 2299 M
RM-10-19-2001 2733 Draft law on electronic payment instruments 2001-02-16 2001-02-27 8 n/a M
RM-10-21-2001 2709 Draft law to amend the law on sea ports and harbours and certain other laws 2001-02-23 2001-03-06 8 1803 M
RM-10-30-2001 2944 Draft law on the national record of farms and farmed animals and on 
amendments to certain laws
2001-03-15 2001-03-20 4 1927 M
RM-10-32-2001 2953 Draft law on final settlement in payment systems, on securities clearing and 
settlement systems and on principles governing supervision over those 
systems
2001-03-23 2001-04-03 8 3239 M
RM-10-34-2001 2854 Draft law on materials and goods designed to have contact with food 2001-04-03 2001-04-10 6 1984 M
RM-10-44-2001 2954 Draft law on the manufacture, bottling and trading of wine products 2001-04-11 2001-05-22 written
procedure
written
procedure
M
RM-10-49-2001 2984 Draft law to amend the building law 2001-04-23 2001-05-08 12 1697 M
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RM-10-48-2001 2916 Draft law to amend Labour Code and to amend certain other laws 2001-04-23 2001-05-12 written
procedure
written
procedure
M
RM-10-50-2001 2963 Draft law on pre-packaged products 2001-04-23 2001-05-22 written
procedure
written
procedure
M
RM-10-53-2001 2965 Draft law on working time of drivers 2001-04-24 2001-05-22 written
procedure
written
procedure
M
RM-10-54-2001 2967 Draft law on combating infectious diseases and infections 2001-04-26 2001-05-22 written
procedure
written
procedure
M
RM-10-58-2001 3109 Draft law to amend the law on the profession of medical doctor and on 
amendments to other laws
2001-04-27 2001-05-15 13 5010 M
RM-10-56-2001 3110 Draft law on the profession of pharmacist 2001-04-27 2001-05-23 19 n/a M
RM-10-57-2001 3111 Draft law on Pharmacists’ Chambers 2001-04-27 2001-05-23 19 n/a M
RM-10-64-2001 3133 Draft law on explosives for civil uses 2001-05-14 2001-06-05 17 n/a M
RM-10-63-2001 3053 Draft law on the organization of fish market 2001-05-15 2001-05-23 7 n/a M
RM-10-69-2001 3035 Draft law on payment deadlines in commercial transactions 2001-05-16 2001-05-23 6 467 M
RM-10-70-2001 3121 Draft law on database protection 2001-05-17 2001-06-05 14 1262 M
RM-10-73-2001 3147 Draft law to amend the law on state reserves and mandatory fuel reserves 
and to amend certain laws
2001-05-28 2001-05-29 2 2603 M
RM-10-77-2001 3093 Draft law to amend the law on goods and services tax and excise tax 2001-06-01 2001-06-13 9 n/a M
RM-10-79-2001 3197 Draft law to amend the law on the protection of animals 2001-06-05 2001-06-08 4 n/a M
RM-10-81-2001 3123 Draft law to amend the law on the profession of veterinary medical doctor 
and Veterinary Chambers, the law on combating infectious animal diseases, 
health inspection of cull animals and meat and Veterinary Inspection and 
the law on organization of breeding and rearing of farmed animals
2001-06-08 2001-06-08 1 18075 M
RM-10-85-2001 3171 Draft law to amend the law on personal data protection 2001-06-20 2001-06-27 6 1140 M
RM-10-86-2001 3265 Draft law to amend the law on radio and television 2001-06-20 2001-06-27 6 n/a M
RM-10-89-2001 3267 Draft law on European works councils and procedures in Community-scale 
undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes 
of informing and consulting employees
2001-06-28 2001-07-03 4 n/a M
RM-10-90-2001 3301 Draft law on the principles of recognizing qualifications obtained in 
European Union member states for taking up or pursuing certain activities
2001-07-02 2001-07-11 8 n/a M
RM-10-91-2001 3274 Draft law on the organization of market for processed fruits and vegetables 2001-07-06 2001-07-17 8 n/a M
RM-10-100-2001 3289 Draft law to amend the law on goods and services tax and excise tax 2001-07-31 2001-08-07 6 703 M
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RM-10-140-2001 51 Draft law on European works councils and procedures in Community-scale 
undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes 
of informing and consulting employees
2001-11-09 2001-11-12 2 4678 M
RM-10-145-2001 332 Draft law on explosives for civil uses 2001-11-13 2002-02-26 written
procedure
written
procedure
M
RM-10-169-2001 352 Draft law on the provision of legal assistance in the Republic of Poland by 
foreign lawyers
2001-11-22 2002-03-19 84 6625 M
RM-10-173-2001 156 Draft law to amend the law on goods and services tax and excise tax 2001-11-27 2001-12-03 5 5863 M
RM-10-178-2001 248 Draft law on standardization 2001-12-14 2002-01-15 23 2792 M
RM-10-2-2002 249 Draft law to amend the industrial property law 2002-01-07 2002-01-15 7 3642 H
RM-10-13-2002 267 Draft law to amend the law on games of chance, wagers and automatic 
gaming machines
2002-02-14 2002-02-19 4 n/a H
RM-10-15-2002 333 Draft law to amend the law on the profession of medical doctor 2002-02-14 2002-02-19 4 727 H
RM-10-16-2002 268 Draft law on the principles o f recognizing qualifications obtained in 
European Union member states for taking up or pursuing certain activities
2002-02-14 2002-02-19 4 6732 H
RM-10-20-2002 373 Draft law on the ratification of agreement between the European 
Community and the Republic of Poland concerning Poland’s participation 
in the European Environment Agency and the European Environment 
Observation and Information Agency
2002-02-14 2002-04-08 written
procedure
written
procedure
H
RM-10-12-2002 269 Draft law on electronic payment instruments 2002-02-15 2002-02-19 3 6960 H
RM-10-14-2002 271 Draft law to amend the law on the professional association of nurses and 
midwives
2002-02-15 2002-02-19 3 210 H
RM-10-18-2002 300 Draft law to amend the industrial property law 2002-02-15 2002-02-19 3 3642 H
RM-10-17-2002 367 Draft foreign exchange law 2002-02-15 2002-02-26 8 8320 H
RM-10-21-2002 317 Draft law to amend the law on employment and counteracting 
unemployment
2002-02-18 2002-02-26 7 1055 H
RM-10-24-2002 368 Draft law to amend the law on Pharmacists’ Chambers and the 
pharmaceutical law
2002-03-08 2002-03-12 3 4345 H
RM-10-25-2002 339 Draft law to amend the law on the protection of animals 2002-03-11 2002-03-12 2 4262 H
RM-10-27-2002 395 Draft law to amend the law on health conditions of food and catering and to 
amend other laws
2002-03-15 2002-03-19 3 3953 H
RM-10-28-2002 350 Draft law to amend the law on chemical substances and preparations 2002-03-15 2002-03-19 3 1281 H
RM-10-29-2002 353 Draft law on the protection of certain services provided electronically and 2002-03-15 2002-03-19 3 820 H
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accessible conditionally and on the services of providing conditional access
RM-10-33-2002 341 Draft law to amend the law on radio and television and other laws 2002-03-15 2002-03-19 3 n/a H
RM-10-32-2002 351 Draft law to amend the energy law 2002-03-18 2002-03-19 2 4714 H
RM-10-34-2002 403 Draft law to amend the law on regulation of sugar market 2002-03-19 2002-03-26 6 551 H
RM-10-36-2002 366 Draft law to amend the law on the protection of competition and 
consumers, the law on combating unfair competition and Code of Civil 
Procedure
2002-03-25 2002-03-26 2 2149 H
RM-10-40-2002 505 Draft law to amend the pharmaceutical law 2002-03-29 2002-04-02 3 9405 H
RM-10-41-2002 508 Draft law to amend the law on medical products 2002-03-29 2002-04-02 3 2477 H
RM-10-42-2002 466 Draft law to amend the law on the provisions introducing the 
pharmaceutical law, the law on medical products and the law on the Office 
for Registration of Medical, Medicinal and Biocide Products
2002-03-29 2002-04-02 3 1145 H
RM-10-39-2002 517 Draft law on compliance system assessment and on amendments to certain 
laws
2002-03-29 2002-04-09 8 7087 H
RM-10-46-2002 465 Draft law on specific terms of consumer sale and on amendments to Civil 
Code
2002-04-04 2002-04-30 19 2180 H
RM-10-51-2002 377 Draft law on protection against imports into Polish customs area of 
subsidized goods
2002-04-05 2002-04-09 3 13756 H
RM-10-50-2002 380 Draft law to amend the industrial property law 2002-04-05 2002-04-09 3 162 H
RM-10-48-2002 453 Draft law on the organization of fish market 2002-04-05 2002-04-16 8 n/a H
RM-10-49-2002 464 Draft law on principles and conditions of entry and exit of European Union 
citizens and their families on territory of the Republic of Poland
2002-04-05 2002-05-07 23 4352 H
RM-10-67-2002 450 Draft law to amend the law on the National Bank of Poland 2002-04-15 2002-04-16 2 2310 H
RM-10-72-2002 409 Draft law on the provision of electronic services 2002-04-15 2002-04-16 2 3304 H
RM-10-65-2002 411 Draft law to amend the law on corporate income tax 2002-04-15 2002-04-16 2 5502 H
RM-10-77-2002 492 Draft law on permissibility o f and supervision over public aid for 
undertakings
2002-04-22 2002-04-30 7 7415 H
RM-10-79-2002 533 Draft law on the ratification of Amendment to Basel Convention on the 
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their 
Disposal
2002-04-24 2002-05-22 written
procedure
written
procedure
H
RM-10-78-2002 656 Draft law on spirits 2002-04-24 2002-06-18 40 4589 H
RM-10-84-2002 624 Draft law on historical monuments 2002-05-10 2002-05-28 13 16481 H
RM-10-87-2002 732 Draft law to amend the law on waste, the law on packaging and package 2002-05-11 2002-07-09 42 8528 H
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waste, the law on requirements for undertakings related to management of 
certain waste and on product and deposit fees, the law on introduction of 
the environmental protection law, the law on introduction of the law on 
waste, and to amend certain laws
RM-10-91-2002 544 Draft law on insurance business 2002-05-13 2002-05-14 2 31564 H
RM-10-94-2002 585 Draft law on insurance intermediation 2002-05-13 2002-05-14 2 5443 H
RM-10-93-2002 543 Draft law on mandatory insurance, Insurance Guarantee Fund and Polish 
Traffic Insurance Bureau
2002-05-13 2002-05-14 2 19775 H
RM-10-95-2002 557 Draft law to amend the law on public finance 2002-05-13 2002-05-14 2 2020 H
RM-10-92-2002 584 Draft law on insurance and pension supervision and Insurance Ombudsman 2002-05-13 2002-05-28 12 3323 H
RM-10-96-2002 658 Draft law on the organization of market for processed fruits and vegetables 2002-05-15 2002-06-18 25 1039 H
RM-10-97-2002 582 Draft law to amend the law on establishment of the Agency for 
Restructuring and Modernization of Agriculture (relates to SAPARD)
2002-05-16 2002-05-21 4 729 H
RM-10-98-2002 583 Draft law on biocide products 2002-05-17 2002-05-21 3 6963 H
RM-10-99-2002 743 Draft law on postal services 2002-05-17 2002-07-05 36 15050 H
RM-10-104-2002 779 Draft law to amend the telecommunications law 2002-05-24 2002-07-09 33 11463 H
RM-10-109-2002 660 Draft law on port facilities for receipt of waste and load residues from ships 2002-06-03 2002-06-04 2 3251 H
RM-10-108-2002 739 Draft law on Inland Navigation Fund and Reserve Fund 2002-06-03 2002-07-09 27 3185 H
RM-10-111-2002 707 Draft law on the ratification of Act of 29 November 2000 revising the 
Convention on the Grant of European Patents
2002-06-04 2002-07-10 written
procedure
written
procedure
H
RM-10-117-2002 703 Draft law on transport of dangerous goods by road 2002-06-17 2002-06-18 2 5857 H
RM-10-121-2002 706 Draft law on criminal liability of collective entities 2002-06-18 2002-06-25 6 4518 H
RM-10-124-2002 771 Draft law on games of chance, wagers and automatic gaming machines and 
on amendments to certain other laws
2002-06-21 2002-07-09 13 8177 H
RM-10-126-2002 687 Draft law on the organization of fish market 2002-06-24 2002-06-25 2 4900 H
RM-10-132-2002 735 Draft law to amend the law on copyright and neighbouring rights 2002-06-28 2002-07-02 3 3001 H
RM-10-138-2002 1154 Draft law on European patent filings and effects of European patent in the 
Republic o f Poland
2002-07-08 2002-07-09 2 1063 H
RM-10-141-2002 803 Draft law on transport by rail 2002-07-08 2002-07-09 2 10446 H
RM-10-145-2002 856 Draft law on the organization of certain agricultural markets 2002-07-08 2002-07-16 7 2921 H
RM-10-151-2002 804 Draft law on administration of cross-border trade in goods and on 
amendments to Customs Code and other laws
2002-07-15 2002-07-16 2 9500 H
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RM-10-155-2002 786 Draft law to amend the road traffic law and to amend certain other laws 2002-07-22 2002-07-23 2 1368 H
RM-10-162-2002 966 Draft law to amend the law on work onboard sea-going merchant ships 2002-08-05 2002-08-06 2 1785 H
RM-10-166-2002 809 Draft bankruptcy and corporate recovery law 2002-08-09 2002-08-13 3 37167 H
RM-10-173-2002 917 Draft law on the organization of fish market and financial assistance in 
fishing industry
2002-08-14 2002-08-20 5 2982 H
RM-10-180-2002 1012 Draft law to amend the law on combating infectious animal diseases, health 
inspection o f cull animals and meat and veterinary inspection and to amend 
certain other laws
2002-08-30 2002-09-03 3 8489 H
RM-10-179-2002 1044 Draft law to amend the law on transport by road and to amend certain laws 2002-08-30 2002-10-24 written
procedure
written
procedure
H
RM-10-181-2002 869 Draft law to amend Criminal Code, Code of Criminal Procedure, Post- 
Sentencing Code, the law on crown witness and banking law
2002-09-02 2002-09-03 2 3487 H
RM-10-187-2002 1010 Draft law on the system of quality monitoring and control for liquid fuels 2002-09-17 2002-09-24 6 1835 H
RM-10-217-2002 1048 Draft law to amend the law on arms and ammunition 2002-09-30 2002-10-01 2 5113 H
RM-10-225-2002 1173 Draft law to amend certain laws in connection with recycling of 
decommissioned vehicles
2002-10-11 2002-10-29 13 n/a H
RM-10-232-2002 1052 Draft law to amend certain laws in connection with alignment to the laws of 
European Union
2002-10-22 2002-10-30 written
procedure
written
procedure
H
RM-10-233-2002 1118 Draft law to amend the law on the profession of medical assistant 2002-10-23 2002-10-29 5 2096 H
RM-10-234-2002 1162 Draft law to amend Labour Code and to amend certain other laws 2002-10-28 2002-10-29 2 12702 H
RM-10-235-2002 1155 Draft law on specific principles of terminating employment for reasons that 
do not concern employees individually
2002-10-28 2002-10-29 2 3103 H
RM-10-239-2002 1116 Draft law to amend the law on the treatment of substances that impair the 
ozone layer
2002-10-31 2002-11-05 4 583 H
RM-10-244-2002 1223 Draft law to amend the law on the profession of nurse and midwife 2002-11-13 2002-11-27 11 4886 H
RM-10-246-2002 1224 Draft law to amend the law on the profession of medical doctor 2002-11-22 2002-11-27 4 2688 H
RM-10-248-2002 1263 Draft law to amend Customs Code 2002-11-27 2002-12-03 5 7727 H
RM-10-250-2002 1287 Draft law on legal protection for plant varieties 2002-12-09 2002-12-17 7 4842 H
RM-10-251-2002 1281 Draft law to amend the law on public procurement 2002-12-11 2002-12-17 5 1580 H
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Annex 2: Implementation of NPAAs and Short-Range Transposition Programmes (dataset compiled based on data obtained from the 
UKIE Secretariat and the Sejm’s website www.sejm.gov.pl)
NPAA 1998 Deadline Score
Postal law 1998 0
New the telecommunications law 1998 1
Law on the establishment of State Financial Information Agency and on counteracting introduction into the financial system 
of proceeds coming from illicit or undisclosed sources
1998 0
Ratification of the convention on customs treatment of pool containers 1998 0
Law on customs service 1998 0
Amendment to Customs Code or to the law on establishment o f a customs exemptions system 1998 0
Law on numerical real estate cadaster 1998 0
Law on real estate tax and general appraisal of real estate 1998 0
Amendment to the law on public procurement 1998 0
Law on fertilizers and fertilization 1998 1
Law on permissibility of and supervision over public aid for undertakings 1998 0
Law on sea fisheries 1998 0
Law on Sea Fisheries Agency 1998 0
Law on the system of fishing control 1998 0
Law on Road Transport Inspection 1998 0
Law on the restructuring of state undertaking PKP 1998 1
Amendment to the law on commercialization and privatization of state undertakings 1998 1
Aviation law 1998 0
Amendment to the law on Maritime Chambers 1998 0
Law on inland navigation 1998 0
Law on safety at sea 1998 0
Amendment to the law of 16 March 1995 on pollution from ships 1998 0
Amendment to Maritime Code 1998 0
Amendment to the law on radio and television 1998 0
4
16 per cent
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NPAA1999 Deadline Score
Amendment to the law on copyright and neighbouring rights 1999 1
Companies law 1999 1
Amendment to Civil Code (agency agreement) 1999 0
Law on the national system of compliance assessment 1999 1
Law on insurance business 1999 0
Law on insurance intermediation 1999 0
Law on mandatory insurance 1999 0
New law on the protection of competition and consumers 1999 0
Postal law 1999 1
Amendment to the law on radio and television 1999 1
Law on protection of plants 1999 0
Enactment of the law on Unified System of Farm Accountancy 1999 0
Law on production of potato starch 1999 1
Law on tobacco market 1999 0
Law on organization of market for hops 1999 0
Draft Polish feeds law 1999 0
Amendment to the law of 20 August 1997 on the organization of breeding and rearing of farmed animals 1999 0
Law on sea fisheries of 18 January 1996 1999 0
The law on commercialization, restructuring and privatization of state undertaking “Polskie Koleje Panstwowe” 1999 1
Aviation law 1999 1
The law on safety at sea 1999 1
Law on Maritime Chambers 1999 0
The law on International Register of Ships (PMRS) 1999 0
Amendment to the law on toll motorways 1999 0
Amendment to the law on sea ports and harbours 1999 1
Law on Road Transport Inspection with secondary legislation 1999 0
New law on environmental protection 1999 1
Laws on general product safety requirements 1999 1
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Amendment to the law on combating unfair competition 1999 1
Law on consumer credit 1999 0
Introduction of changes in Civil Code, Code of Civil Procedure and Misdemeanours Code concerning prohibited contractual 
clauses and their control and product liability
1999 0
The law on purchase of time sharing rights to use residential buildings or premises 1999 0
Amendment to the law on prices 1999 0
Law regulating relations between the state and consumer organizations 1999 0
Regulations on simplified procedures for enforcement of claims at courts and on out-of-court procedures 1999 0
Amendment to nuclear law 1999 0
Amendment to Criminal code (bribery of foreign public officials) 1999 0
Amendment to Post-Sentencing Code (execution of foreign judgements on forfeiture of property) 1999 0
Amendment to banking law (information privileged for courts) 1999 0
Law on counteracting introduction into the financial system of proceeds coming from illicit or undisclosed sources 1999 1
Amendment to the law on public procurement (persons convicted of bribery banned from tenders) 1999 0
Amendment to the law on combating unfair competition (criminal liability of legal entities for bribery) 1999 0
Ratification of the Convention on POOL containers 1999 0
Ratification o f Annexes to the Istanbul Convention 1999 0
Amendment to the road traffic law 1999 0
14
31 per cent
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NPAA 2000 Deadline Score
Law on medical products 2000 1
Law on measurements 2000 1
Law on technical inspection 2000 1
Amendment to the law on standardization 2000 1
Law to amend the law of 10 Oct 1991 on pharmaceuticals, medical materials, pharmacies, wholesalers and pharmaceutical 
supervision
2000 1
Law on Agency for Medicines (Office for Registration of Medicinal Products) 2000
Law on prices 2000 1
Law on cosmetics 2000 1
Law to amend the law of 26 November 1970 on health conditions of food and catering 2000 1
Law on principles of recognizing regulated profession qualifications obtained in European Union member states 2000 1
Amendment to the law of 21 Dec 1990 on the profession of veterinary medical doctor and Veterinary Chambers (Journal o f  
Laws No 8, item 27)
2000
Amendment to the law of 5 Jul 1996 on the professions of nurse and midwife (Journal o f Laws No. 91, item 410) and law of 19 
Apr 1991 on the professional association of nurses and midwives (Journal o f Laws No. 41, item 178)
2000 1
Amendment to banking law 2000 1
Amendment to the law on mortgage bonds and mortgage banks 2000 1
Amendment to the law on Bank Guarantee Fund 2000 1
Amendment to bankruptcy law 2000 1
Amendment to the law on public trading in securities 2000 1
Amendment to the law on investment funds 2000 1
Amendment to the law of 29 Aug 1997 on tourist services 2000 1
Amendment to the law on national court register 2000 1
Law on the protection of competition and consumers 2000 1
Law on structural benefits 2000 1
Amendment to the law of 24 April 1997 on combating infectious animal diseases, health inspection of cull animals and meat 
and on Veterinary Inspection
2000 1
Amendment to the law of 21 August 1997 on protection of animals 2000 0
Amendment to the law of 20 August 1997 on the organization of breeding and rearing of farmed animals 2000 0
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Amendment to the law on establishment of the Agricultural Market Agency 2000 1
Law on regulation of market for milk and dairy products 2000 1
Amendment to the law on comity authorities 2000 1
Amendment to the geodesic and land survey law 2000 0
New law on introduction o f Integrated Management and Control System with secondary legislation 2000 0
Law on the organization of agricultural market research 2000 1
Law on trading quality o f food products 2000 1
Law on the organization of certain agricultural markets (including the markets for hops, fruits, dried feed, tobacco, etc.) 2000 1
Law on sea fisheries 2000 1
Publication of the law on transport by road 2000 1
Amendment to the law of 2 August 1997 on the requirements for international transport by road 2000 1
Amendment to the law of 27 June 1997 on transport by rail 2000 1
Publication of Maritime Code 2000 1
Amendment to the law on goods and services tax and excise tax 2000 1
Amendment to Labour Code 2000 1
Amendment to the law of 28 Dec 1989 on specific principles of terminating employment for reasons attributable to the 
employing establishment
2000 1
Law on European works councils and procedures in Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of 
undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting employees
2000 0
Law on preventing, detecting, treating and combating infectious diseases 2000 0
Law on public benefit activities 2000 0
Amendment to the law on system of education 2000 1
Amendment to the law on tax audits 2000 1
Law on water supply and waste water disposal 2000 1
Law on genetically modified organisms 2000 1
Law on trading in forest reproductive material 2000 1
Draft law on consumer credit 2000 1
Amendment to the law on border guard 2000 1
Amendment to the law on protection of national border 2000 1
Amendment to Customs Code 2000 1
New law on the protection against excessive imports 2000 1
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New law on protection against excessive imports o f certain textiles and clothes 2000 1
New law on protection against subsidized goods 2000 1
Amendment to the law of 7 July 1994 on export contract insurance guaranteed by State Treasury 2000 1
Draft law on the official financial support for exports with medium- and long-term credit based on fixed CIRR rates 2000 1
Law on control in public administration 2000 0
Law on the system of cadaster 2000 0
Amendment to the law on agricultural tax 2000 1
Draft law on forest tax 2000 1
Law authorizing the President to ratify the Arbitration Convention on the elimination o f double taxation in connection with the 
adjustment of profits or associated enterprises
2000 0
51
81 per cent
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NPAA 2001 Deadline Score
Law of 14 December 1994 on employment and counteracting unemployment - Amendment 2001 0
Amendment to law on Teacher’s Charter 2001 0
Law on the principles of recognizing requirements for taking up or pursuing professions other than regulated professions in 
relation to nationals of European Union member states (working title)
2001 1
Amendment to law of 19 Apr 1991 on the professional associations of nurses and midwives {Journal o f Laws No. 41, iteml78) 2001 0
Law to amend the foreign exchange law 2001 0
Law to amend industrial property law 2001 0
Law on the ratification o f Act of 29 November 2000 revising the Convention on the Grant o f European Patents 2001 0
Law to amend the law of 29 Dec 1993 on establishment of Agency for Restructuring and Modernization of Agriculture 2001 0
Law on administration of cross-border trade in agricultural and food products 2001 0
Law on the organization o f market for processed fruits and vegetables 2001 1
Law on the manufacture and examination of spirits 2001 0
Law to amend the law on pollution from ships 2001 0
Amendment to law of 12 January 1991 on local taxes and charges 2001 0
Amendment to law on goods and services tax and excise tax 2001 1
Amendment to law of 23 May 1991 on trade unions 2001 0
Law on European works councils and procedures in Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of 
undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting employees
2001 1
Amendment to law of 23 May 1991 on work onboard sea-going merchant ships 2001 0
Amendment to energy law 2001 0
Amendment to law on radio and television 2001 1
Amendment to law on public finance 2001 0
Law on forestation of forest land 2001 0
Amendment to law on standardization 2001 0
Law on the execution of agri-community programs 2001 0
Amendment to the telecommunications law 2001 0
5
21 per cent
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NPAA 2001 for 2002 Deadline Score
Law on entry and stay of nationals in the territory o f the Republic of Poland (working title) 2002 1
Amendment to law on co-operative banks, associations o f co-operative banks, their association banks, and on amendments to 
certain laws
2002 0
Amendment to law on copyright and neighbouring rights 2002 1
Law on supporting agriculture in less favoured areas 2002 0
Amendment to law of 29 November 2000 on the organization of markets for fruits and vegetables, hops, tobacco and dried feed 2002 0
Amendment to road traffic law of 20 June 1997 2002 1
Amendment to law of 19 November 1987 on technical inspection 2002 0
Amendment to building law of 7 July 1994 2002 0
Amendment to law of 21 December 2000 on inland navigation 2002 1
Law on port facilities for receipt o f waste and load residues from ships 2002 1
Amendment to Labour Code of 26 Jun 1974 (Journal o f Laws of 1998 No. 21, item 94) 2002 1
Law on electronic commerce 2002 1
Amendment to law on Trade Inspection 2002 1
This list was prepared on the basis o f the 2001 NPAA because there was no NPAA in 2002.
8
61 per cent
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Short-Range Plan (January-May 2000) Deadline Monthly Whole Range
Amendment to Customs Code Feb 0 1
Law on common agricultural census Feb 0 1
Law on prices April 0 1
Law on insurance business March 0 1
Law on insurance supervision March 0
Law on insurance intermediation March 0 1
Law on mandatory insurance March 0 1
Law on Gross Domestic Product April 1 1
Amendment to law on special enterprise zones January 0 1
Law on establishment of Polish Business Development Agency January 0 1
Law on protection against excessive imports o f goods into Polish customs area in relation to certain 
textiles and clothes
March 0 1
Law on protection against inports of subsidized goods into Polish customs area March 0 1
Postal law March 1 1
Amendment to law on sectors of administration March 0
Amendment to law on protection of cultivated plants March 0 1
Law concerning the national system of information on the situation in agricultural markets January 0
Amendment to Criminal Code January 0 1
Amendment to Civil Code regulations on agency agreement and leasing agreement January 0 1
Amendment to Code of Criminal Procedure regulations on enforcement of foreign court judgements on 
forfeiture of proceeds o f crime and on taking interim measures in relation to such proceeds
January 0 1
Law on time sharing rights to residential buildings and premises January 0 1
Commercial companies law January 1 1
Amendment to law on foreigners March 0 1
Draft law on the ratification of certain annexes to the Convention on temporary admission done in 
Istanbul on 26 June 1990
January 0 1
Law on product fee and deposit fee March 0 1
Amendment to law on waste January 0 1
Law on packaging and packaging waste Feb 0 1
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Water law January 0 1
Law on environmental protection January 0 1
Law on international register of ships March 0
Aviation law January 0 1
Law on inland navigation January 1 1
Law on Road Transport Inspection January 0 1
Law on the Agency for Medicines March 0
Nuclear law January 0 1
Law on protection o f competition and consumers April 1 1
Amendment to law on public procurement January 0 1
Amendment to law on controlling cross-border trade in double-use products and technologies June
Law on trading quality of food June
Law on animal feeds (the feed law) May 1 1
Law on the organization of certain agricultural markets (fruits and vegetables, hops, tobacco and dried 
feeds)
May 1 1
Amendment to law on combating infectious diseases of cull animals and meat and on State Veterinary 
Inspection
July 0 0
Law on breeding and rearing of framed animals July 0 0
Amendment to law on Border Guard June 0 0
Law on the official financial support for exports with medium- and long-term credit based on fixed 
CIRR rates
June 0 0
7 33
18 per cent 87 per cent
196
Short-Range Plan (May-September 2000) Deadline Quarterly Whole Range
Law on technical inspection June 1 1
Law on standardization June 1 1
Law on trading quality o f food June 1 1
Law on State Trade Inspection June 1 1
Amendment to law on tourist services June 0 1
Amendment to public trade in securities law June 0 1
Amendment to law on investment funds June 1 1
Amendment to law on public finance June 0 1
Law on the organization o f certain agricultural markets (fruits and vegetables, hops, tobacco, and dried 
feeds)
June 1 1
Amendment to Maritime Code June 1 1
Amendment to law on transport by rail June 0 1
Amendment to law on goods and services tax and excise tax June 0 1
Amendment to law on administrative enforcement procedure June 0 1
Amendment to Tax Ordinance June 0 1
Law authorizing the President to ratify the Arbitration Convention on the elimination of double taxation 
in connection with the adjustment of profits or associated enterprises
June 0
Amendment to law local taxes and charges June 0 1
Amendment to Labour Code June 1 1
Amendment to law on the specific principles of terminating employment for reasons attributable to the 
employing establishment
June 0
Amendment to higher education law June 0 1
Amendment to law on the police June 1 1
Amendment to law on Border Guard June 1 1
Law on the official financial support for exports with medium- and long-term credit based on fixed 
CIRR rates
June 1 1
Law on protection against imports of subsidized goods into Polish customs area June 1 1
Amendment to law on controlling cross-border trade in double-use products and technologies June 0 1
Law on cosmetic products September 0 1
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Pharmaceutical law September 0 0
Amendment to law on health conditions of food and catering September 1 1
Law on the Agency for Medicines September 0 0
Amendment to law on the profession of veterinary medical doctor and Veterinary Chambers September 1 1
Amendment to law on professional associations of nurses and midwives September 0 0
Law on a general system for the recognition of higher-education diplomas and second general system of 
recognition of professional education
September 0 0
Amendment to law on Bank Guarantee Fund September 1 1
Law to amend the law on the organization of breeding and rearing of farmed animals and to amend the 
law on combating infectious diseases of cull animals and meat and on Veterinary Inspection
September 1 1
Law on regulation of market for starch September 0 1
Law on regulation of market for milk and dairy products September 0 0
Law on structural benefits September 0 1
Law on the unified system of farm accountancy September 1 1
Law on water supply and waste water disposal September 0 1
17 31
45 per cent 81 per cent
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Short-Range Plan (January-September 2001) Deadline Monthly Score Quarterly Score Whole Range
Law on electronic payment instruments January 0 1 1
Law on final settlement in securities clearing, settlement and payment systems January 0 0 1
Law authorizing the President of the Republic of Poland to ratify the Protocol of 
Amendments to International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization 
of Customs Procedures with Addenda I, II and III (Kyoto Convention)
September 0 0 0
Amendment to the foreign exchange law September 0 0 0
Law on electronic signature January 0 1 1
Amendment to law on protection of personal data September 1 1 1
Law on the conditions and forms of provision by foreigners of legal assistance in 
Poland and on amendment to certain laws
February 1 1
Law to amend Criminal Code, Code of Criminal Procedure, Post-Sentencing Code 
and certain laws
March 1 1 1
Amendment to Code of Civil Procedure June 1 1 1
Amendment to decree of President of the Republic of Poland -  Bankruptcy law June 1 1 1
Amendment to law on certified translators September 0 0
Law on the national record of farms February 0 1 1
Law regulating financing of agricultural policy February 0 0
Law on the organization of market for processed fruits and vegetables March 0 0 1
Amendment to law on the manufacture, bottling and trading of wine products March 0 0 1
Law on the organization of fish market March 0 0 1
Law on structural aid in fisheries March 0 0 0
Law on the principles of defining, labelling, presentation and testing of spirits June 0 0 0
Law on regulation o f food supply during crises and martial law situations June 0 0 0
Law on forestation of farm land June 0 0 0
Law on explosives March 0 0 0
Law to amend industrial property law March 0 0 1
Law on mandatory reserves o f petroleum products June 1 1 1
Law on pre-packaged products June 1 1 1
Amendment to energy law September 0 0 0
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Law on administration of cross-border trade in goods and services September 0 0 0
Amendment to law on financial restructuring of undertakings and banks June 1 1 1
Amendment to law on national investment funds June 1 1 1
Law on European works councils June 0 0 1
Amendment to law on amendment to law on trade unions June 1 1 1
Amendment to Labour Code June 1 1 1
Amendment to law on employment and counteracting unemployment June 1 1 1
Law on combating infectious diseases February 0 0 1
Law on materials and goods designed to have contact with food March 0 0 1
Amendment to law Pharmacists’ Chambers and to law on pharmaceuticals, medical 
materials, pharmacies, wholesalers and Pharmaceutical Inspection
April 0 1 1
Amendment to law on the profession of medical doctor and to law on Medical 
Doctors’ Chambers
April 0 1 1
Law on working time of drivers June 1 1 1
Amendment to law on work onboard sea-going merchant ships June 0 0 0
Amendment to law on Teacher’s Charter September 0 0 0
Law on a general system for the recognition of higher-education diplomas and 
second general system of recognition of professional education
September 1 1 1
Amendment to law on standardization September 0 0 0
Law on database protection September 1 1 1
Building law March 0 0 1
Law on protection of national border February 0 0 0
Law on the principles o f execution of agri-community programs June 0 0 0
Law on supporting agriculture in less favoured areas September 0 0 0
Amendment to the mining and geology law September 0 0 0
Law concerning an implementation procedure for economic sanctions (arms supplies 
embargo) imposed by international organizations
March 0 0 0
15 20 29
31 per cent 42 per cent 60 per cent
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Short-Range Plan (2002) Deadline Monthly Quarterly Whole Range
Law on standardization January 1 0 0
Amendment to law on health conditions of food and catering March 1 0 0
Amendment to pharmaceutical law March 0 1 0
Amendment to law on compliance assessment system, accreditation and on amendment to certain 
laws
March 0 1 0
Amendment to law on substances and preparations March 1 0 0
Amendment to building law June 1 0 0
Amendment to law on arms and ammunition November 1 0 0
Amendment to law on the professional association of nurses and midwives March 1 0 0
Law implementing Directive of 6 December 1993 laying down detailed arrangements for the 
exercise of the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament for 
citizens of the Union residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals
April 0 0 0
Law implementing Directive 94/80 laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the 
right to vote and to stand as a candidate in municipal elections by citizens of the Union residing in 
a Member State of which they are not nationals
April 0 0 1
Amendment to law on the profession of medical doctor March 1 0 0
Law on the principles o f recognizing qualifications obtained in European Union member states for 
taking up or pursuing certain activities
Feb 1 0 0
Law on entry and stay of nationals in the territory o f the Republic of Poland April 0 1 0
Law on the conditions and forms of provision by foreigners of legal assistance in Poland May 1 0 0
Law to amend the law on games of chance, wagers and automatic gaming machines Feb 1 0 0
Law on electronic payment instruments Feb 1 0 0
Law on the protection of certain services provided electronically and accessible conditionally and 
on the services of providing conditional access
March 1 0 0
Law on insurance business May 1 0 0
Law on insurance intermediation May 1 0 0
Law on mandatory insurance, Insurance Guarantee Fund and Polish Traffic Insurance Bureau May 1 0 0
Foreign exchange law Feb 1 0 0
Amendment to industrial property law March 1 0 0
Amendment to law on copyright and neighbouring rights June 0 1 0
Law introducing the convention on grant of European patents March 0 0 1
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Amendment to law on permissibility of and supervision over public aid for undertakings March 0 1 0
Law to amend the law on protection of animals March 1 0 0
Law on the manufacture and examination of spirits March 0 0 1
Law on the organization o f market for processed fruits and vegetables May 0 1 0
Law on supporting agriculture in less favoured areas June 0 0 0
Law on the execution of agri-community programs June 0 0 0
Law on regulation of market for grain and certain field crops June 0 0 0
Amendment to Customs Code and amendment to law on the administration of cross-border trade 
in goods and services
June 0 1 0
Law on forestation o f farm land December 0 0 0
Law on regulation of meat market December 0 0 0
Law on prevention of shortages of foods, feeds and seed lot in emergency situations June 0 0 0
Law on regulation of fish market March 0 1 0
Law on structural aid for the fishing industry March 0 0 1
Aviation law January 0 0 0
Law on port facilities for receipt of waste from ships June 1 0 0
Amendment to law on pollution from ships July 0 0 0
Amendment to road traffic law July 1 0 0
Amendment to law on transport by rail June 0 1 0
Amendment to law on inland navigation June 0 1 0
Law on corporate income tax December 0 0 0
Amendment to law on the National Bank of Poland April 1 0 0
Amendment to law on work onboard sea-going merchant ships July 0 1 0
Law to amend Labour Code December 1 0 0
Law on the conditions of terminating employment for reasons attributable to employer December 1 0 0
Amendment to energy law March 1 0 0
Law on public benefit activities December 1 0 0
Amendment to the telecommunications law May 0 0 1
Postal law May 0 0 1
Law on electronic commerce and provision of telecommunications and networking services May 1 0 0
Law on radio and television Feb 0 0 1
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Law on protection of national treasures May 1 0 0
Amendment to law on the introduction of the environmental protection law and the law on waste 
and on amendment to certain laws
April 0 0 1
Law to amend the environmental protection law, the law on waste and the law on obligations of 
undertakings concerning management of certain waste
April 0 0 1
Law to amend the law on Environmental Protection Inspection June 0 0 0
Amendment to law on protection of competition and consumers April 1 0 0
Law concerning certain aspects of sale of consumer goods and related warranties April 1 0 0
Law on general product safety May 0 0 0
Law on protection against inports of subsidized goods into Polish customs area March 0 1 0
Amendment to Criminal Code July 0 1 0
29 13 9
46 per cent 66 per cent 81 per cent
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Annex 3. List of Interviews
Interview
Number
Interviewee Position Organization Transcript Available
1 Advisor Parliament No
2,3 Minister KPRM No, Yes
4 Director KPRM Yes
5 Middle-ranking Official KPRM No
6 Minister KPRM Yes
7 Middle-ranking Official KPRM Yes
8 Director UKIE Yes
9 Director UKIE No
10,11,12 Director UKIE No, Yes, Yes
13 Director UKIE Yes
14 Minister UKIE Yes
15 Minister UKIE Yes
16 Minister UKIE Yes
17 Minister UKIE Yes
18 Director Parliament Yes
19 Middle-ranking Official Line Ministry Yes
20 Minister UKIE No
21 Middle-ranking Official UKIE No
22 Minister Line Ministry Yes
23 Advisor KPRM Yes
24 Minister Line Ministry Yes
25 Director UKIE Yes
26 Director UKIE Yes
27 Director UKIE Yes
28,29 Minister KPRM Yes, Yes
30,31 Director UKIE Yes, No
32 Middle-ranking Official UKIE Yes
33 Middle-ranking Official UKIE Yes
34 Director UKIE Yes
35 Advisor KPRM Yes
36 Minister UKIE Yes
37 Director Foreign Ministry Yes
38 Minister Foreign Ministry Yes
39 Director UKIE Yes
40 Director UKIE No
41 Director Line Ministry Yes
42 Director Line Ministry Yes
43 Director Line Ministry Yes
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44 Middle-ranking Official Parliament Yes
45 Middle-ranking Official UKIE Yes
46 Director UKIE Yes
47 Director KPRM Yes
48 Director KPRM Yes
49 Minister KPRM Yes
50 Middle-ranking Official UKIE Yes
51 Middle-ranking Official European Commission No
52 Middle-ranking Official UKIE Yes
53 Director European Commission No
54 Advisor European Commission No
55 Middle-ranking Official European Commission No
56 Director KPRM Yes
57 Minister KPRM Yes
58 Director UKIE No
59 Director KPRM Yes
60 Advisor UKIE No
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